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Chapter One
THE CONFERENCE AND HOW IT OPERATED
The worsening food crisis of the underdeveloped nations is
becoming ever more apparent. Much of our world is having difficulty
feeding itself. Although the productivity of agriculture has ad-
vanced in many of the underdeveloped nations, and there are a few
instances of notable success like Mexico, Taiwan, and the Sudan,
in the regions where most of humanity lives the ancient art of
agriculture has been unable to keep pace with the swelling demands
resulting from the twin pressures of the population explosion and
rising industrial incomes. Agriculture has lagged behind industry,
and in country after country it is now acting as a brake on eco-
nomic growth. The gap in living standards between the underdeveloped
and the developed nations is widening dangerously.
A decade ago it seemed to many that the agricultural tech-
nology of the developed nations could be quickly transplanted to
the underdeveloped world, where it would produce rapid increases
in food production. But most such transplants have failed to take
root, and the gap in per acre and per capita yields between de-
veloped and underdeveloped nations is not narrowing but widening.
Ten years ago it was widely believed that one or another single
technique (community development is an example) could solve the
organizational problem of bringing new technology to millions of
individual farmers. Many promising techniques have been tried in
many places, but the record of recent years is one of general fail-
ure and only rare successes. Industrialization, it was commonly
said ten years ago, is the key to development. Industry has ad-
vanced in parts of the underdeveloped world, but agriculture in
3
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many nations is not providing the higher levels of nutrition that
are the first-priority use of higher incomes.
Against this background the plan for the summer study con-
ference for the purpose of studying the agricultural problem in
the underdeveloped world was born in the Center for International
Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and in the
United States Agency for International Development (A.I.D.). The
conference was conducted by the Center with financial support from
A.I.D.
It was not conceived as a purely intellectual exercise but
as a study that might be of help to policymakers in the field of
agriculture. The goal was to frame useful policy recommendations
concerning both research and operations in agriculture. We were
aware that within the general field of development far less is
known about agriculture than about industry. We had no intention
of taking up the controversy as to whether industry or agriculture
should receive first priority in development planning. Our assump-
tion was simply that an increase in agricultural productivity is
needed to feed growing populations and to prevent the rural sector
from limiting over-all economic growth.
As readers of the following chapters will see, agriculture
is a peculiarly difficult subject to grapple with. It presents two
basic difficulties. First, it is a "systems problem": it involves
the interaction of multiple factors as different, and as hard to
compare, as crop responses to fertilizers and the cultural values
of farmers. Second, the almost infinite variety of local conditions,
compounded by the interaction of these varying factors, makes any
generalization hazardous .
We hoped at the conference to avoid two extreme positions.
One is the single-factor solution. Analysis of agricultural fail-
ures has tended, we observed, to follow the discipline of the
diagnostician. Each specialist would find that the factor familiar
to him was crucial in the given situation, though he might also
pay lip service to factors in fields other than his own. His
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prescription would then be likely to read: "Do something about my
factor first--and the others will follow." Plant scientists, econ-
omists, political scientists tend to prescribe remedies within
their specialties. Such single-factor solutions we believed to be
in contradiction to the essential nature of the agricultural prob-
lem. The other extreme position is one that might be called intel-
lectual anarchy. It holds that the complexity of local conditions
makes each situation unique; that therefore no general statement
is possible, no experience gained in one place is transferable to
another. If this were true our study would be of little use. We
wanted to discover whether, between these two extremes, any useful
generalizations could be made.
Our aim was to try to break out of the dilemma familiar to
agricultural policymakers. The dilemma is this: Change in any sin-
gle factor affecting agriculture produces little or no progress
because its effect is limited by other factors; change in several
factors is therefore necessary; but the resources are not availa-
ble to act on several fronts at once; therefore nothing can be
done. Our study would be worth while, we felt, if we could find
ways out of this dilemma, some "handles" by which the problem
could be grasped.
A barrier to discussing agriculture usefully is that, as the
subject involves a wide range of professionals whose backgrounds
and jargons are different, communication among them is difficult.
We decided to bring a group of such men together long enough to
get acquainted, to learn something of each other's specialities,
and to find a common language.
We met for six weeks at.M.I.T.'s Endicott House. We were 44
in all, of whom 33 were present for virtually the full six weeks
and 11 for shorter stays of a week or more. (The list of the par-
ticipants is given on page iii.) In addition about ten appeared for
one or two sessions. Represented among us were the several disci-
plines concerned with agriculture: natural scientists, economists,
behavioral scientists. Among us also were men with years of experi-
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ence in the actual operation of agricultural programs in each ma-
jor area of the underdeveloped world: Asia, Latin America, Africa.
The atmosphere of the conference was informal. At times we met as
a single group; at other times we divided ourselves into small
groups, then redivided into different groups. Much of our learning
came in conversations outside the formal meetings, at meals and in
the evenings. By rubbing our minds against each other's in this
manner we succeeded in breaking through the lines of professional
disciplines and reaching a common understanding, if not unanimous
agreement.
In tackling our subject we found it necessary at the begin-
ning to set some limits on the problems we would discuss. Our
horizon in time was, very roughly, the next ten years, though of-
ten we looked beyond that horizon. We intended to concentrate on
small-scale peasant farming as opposed to plantation agriculture,
though as we looked at the best techniques for settling sparsely
settled land we found we had to consider the efficient scale of the
individual unit. We planned to limit ourselves also to annual food
crops. Tree crops and animal husbandry were to be set aside as
dominant forms of agriculture; we would take them up only when they
were found to be related to food crops. As it turned out, in consid-
ering two types of ecologies--rain forests and high-altitude re-
gions--we could not avoid paying more attention to tree crops and
animal husbandry than we had intended. Our subject remained vast
enough, for, despite these limits, we were still dealing with the
primary occupation of most of mankind.
We followed no rigid agenda. Indeed, finding a scheme to en-
compass our subject proved to be almost as difficult as the subject
itself, and for much the same reasons. Whenever we tried to break
the agricultural problem into parts we found we were doing vio-
lence to its essential nature. It made sense to try to sort out
the factors involved and to take a closer look at each of them,
but in practice we found that any such sorting cut across rela-
tionships that were often more vital to the problem than the pieces
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viewed separately. This intellectual difficulty, which persisted
throughout our discussions, is a useful clue to the practical dif-
ficulties of agricultural development.
It may be helpful to describe briefly how we spent our time.
The first two weeks were taken up with mutual briefings, each par-
ticipant describing what light he felt his particular discipline
or project experience could throw on the problems of agricultural
productivity. During the second two weeks we broke into four work-
ing groups, each concerned with a different type of agricultural
ecology and each including a mix of disciplines. For the last two
weeks we reorganized into four different subgroups, this time di-
viding the subject by functional rather than geographic distinc-
tions.
Our report follows the main lines of our discussions. Most
of it was drafted by the subgroups into which we divided. Some
parts were written by individuals, but the opinions they express
fall within the broad consensus of the group. These drafts were
then revised and edited by the conference chairman, Max F. Millikan,
and the editor, David Hapgood; the text was then submitted to the
participants and revised again in the light of their comments.
Although the editors have tried to produce a text that reflects
the sense of the conference, the report is not the product of una-
nimity on every point, and the attentive reader will find incon-
sistencies and varying emphasis from chapter to chapter; we have,
for example, grouped the factors we discuss differently in differ-
ent places. In fairness to our complex subject, these discrepancies
have not been edited out, for the report in this form is closer to
the realities we discussed than would be a neat pigeonholing of
consistent and unanimous views.
Chapter Two, drafted by the conference chairman, explores
"the nature of the problem." It sets forth the special character-
istics of agriculture, the preconditions for its development (in-
cluding preconditions in areas that appear distant from agricul-
ture), and the general implications for public policy to be derived
from those characteristics and preconditions.
y
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Part II contains four chapters that deal with four major
sets of factors involved in agriculture: physical inputs, economic
factors, the state of knowledge, the human environment. The chap-
ters are the product of the four subgroups formed during the
final period of the conference. The chairmen of these subgroups
were Eilif V. Miller (physical inputs), Raj Krishna (economic fac-
tors), M. B. Russell (research), and Karl D. Olsen (the human
environment).
Part III is also divided into four chapters, by ecological
regions. The areas covered are the regions of wet rice cultivation,
the rainy tropics where rice is not the dominant crop, the monsoon
and subtropical regions, and the high-altitude zones. These chap-
ters are the product of the working groups formed during the middle
two weeks of the exercise. (The four regions are mapped and des-
cribed in the introduction to Part III.) The chairmen of these
subgroups were Kenneth L. Bachman (wet rice), Will M. Myers
(rainy tropics), Arthur T. Mosher (monsoon and subtropical) and
Allan R. Holmberg (high altitudes).
The appendixes consist of papers prepared for the conference
by one or more members. They deal with four successful development
projects, insurance for innovators, the "will to develop," the role
of the bureaucracy, behavioral science research, and land reform.
The division of our report into chapters, like the division
of our discussions, is bound to be arbitrary and to some degree
misleading, for the burden of our message is precisely that the
agricultural problem is not divisible. The reader must keep this
in mind. Nothing can prevent the specialist from flipping the pages
until he finds what we say about his specialty, nor the operational
man from just seeking out those of our findings that concern his
part of the world. We can only repeat that to read the report in
this way is to miss our basic point. The report is a whole, not the
sum of its parts.
We offer no panaceas here. Those looking for a blueprint to
follow will be disappointed. We did not find a magic key to unlock
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the problems of agriculture, nor do we present a program likely, in
ten years or a century, to assure the world's supply of food. We
say this with both regret and pride. Regret, for the urgency of the
world's food needs demands quick solutions; we did not gather sim-
ply to solve an abstract puzzle. (The Indian food crisis appeared
in newspaper headlines while we were meeting.) Pride, on the other
hand, for we are confident that we are on the right track. If,
after our six weeks' deliberations, we laid claim to solving prob-
lems that have baffled so many for so long, we could rightly be
suspected of having failed to come to grips with those problems in
their full complexity. That there are no panaceas is an integral
part of what we have to say. We believe that statements on the
order of, for example, "cooperatives are the best way to provide
farmers with credit" are neither true nor false but are in fact
meaningless. No policy can be evaluated except in the context of
local conditions, and it is the study of those local conditions as
they relate to alternative policies that will prove rewarding.
Yet we believe we have something worth while to say, and that
it is the more useful for avoiding facile solutions. If we have
uncovered no panaceas, we have not bogged down in what we earlier
called intellectual anarchy and decided that we could say nothing
at all. We set out to explore our subject, not to resolve it. If
we have not mapped the trail, we have at least reconnoitered the
ground.
What we present here is essentially a tool of analysis, a
method of approaching agricultural policy. It is a handle by which
one can grasp the "all-or-nothing" dilemma that confronts decision
makers in the field of agriculture. We do not say: "This is what
you should do in this situation. . . ." But we do say: "In this
kind of situation these are the factors you must consider in
planning your program; depending on your local conditions, these
are some alternatives you may wish to experiment with; if you do
thus and so, then you will soon have to resolve these other
problems. . .
9
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We also recommend research projects that can be undertaken
now and that would bring fruitful short-term results. We could
have listed these proposals separately, but we have instead left
them in the text, as they were drafted, for we do not believe they
should be read outside the context in which they were conceived.
One more word of warning. We have said we do not believe
that the technology of agriculture, whether it be a plant variety
or a type of extension service, can be successfully transplanted
without careful experimentation and adaptation to local conditions.
The same principle applies to the ideas set forth in this report.
We believe we have provided a useful guide to thinking about agri-
cultural policy in the underdeveloped world; but nothing said here
is a substitute for painstaking and comprehensive analysis of
local conditions that others know far better than we.
Finally, ours is not a cheerful report. Optimism was not the
prevailing mood at Endicott House, and if anything there was less
optimism in the air at the end than at the beginning of our con-
ference. Compared to the urgency of the need, what we offer here
may seem meagre indeed. Where giant strides are necessary, we have
taken but a few tentative steps. The agricultural problem will not
be solved in a laboratory or at a conference. To get the people of
our world a decent supply of food--that most basic of man's re-
quirements--will require a gigantic effort. It will cost a lot of
money, but money is probably the easiest need to fill. The goal
will not be met unless many millions of people--technicians, of-
ficials, and, above all, farmers--are willing to initiate a radical
and often painful process of social change.
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Chapter Two
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Anyone wishing to devise a program for increasing agricultural
productivity in the underdeveloped countries must bear in mind some
general characteristics of agricultural enterprise wherever it is
conducted, some preconditions to be met by the society at large if
any such program is to succeed, and some policy implications of
these characteristics and preconditions. Most of us came to the
conference with a number of such characteristics, preconditions,
and policy issues in mind. Some of these we did not discuss very
much because they were taken for granted by all of us as under-
lying everything we said. They should be restated so that readers
of this report will find them explicit. Others we discussed at
great length, moving from a principle to its practical application
in particular circumstances and back again toward generalization.
In this process some of our preconceptions were altered and others
were powerfully reinforced or transformed into new convictions.
It is our purpose in this chapter to review briefly these
characteristics, preconditions, and policy issues of agricultural
programs in order to highlight the context in which we carried on
the more specific functional and geographic discussions reported
in Parts II and III. Little here will be new or unfamiliar to
students of agriculture. But truths regarded as too simple or
obvious to need restatement are often among the most neglected
propositions in the development of policy proposals.
The Nature of the Problem
CHARACTERISTICS OF AGRICULTURE
In spite of its diversity, small-scale annual crop agriculture
has several common features throughout the underdeveloped world.
Our first goal was to find a satisfactory classification or check-
list of the principal factors affecting agricultural productivity
that we could use to ensure that in both diagnosis and prescription
for any particular situation attention would be paid to all its
relevant aspects. Since there is an extraordinary degree of inter-
dependence and interaction among all the factors affecting agri-
culture, any classification is bound to cut across some important
relationships. Moreover, any classification of continuous and
interdependent phenomena must to some degree be arbitrary. However,
the conference finally agreed upon one to use for its own discussions
to facilitate communication and ensure some comparability of the
analyses we undertook. This classification is outlined in Table 1.
It divides the factors affecting agricultural development into
five major categories--physical input factors, economic factors,
organizational factors, socio-psycho-cultural factors, and knowl-
edge factors--each of which is divided into a series of subcate-
gories. We hold no special brief for the virtues of this as opposed
to any alternative classification, but we are reasonably satisfied
that it is comprehensive in the sense that everything that has a
significant impact on agricultural productivity finds a place some-
where in the system.
Within each major category of factors affecting agriculture
some limited generalization is possible. It is the function of the
succeeding chapters to elaborate these middle-level generalizations
more fully, but a few examples will illustrate the point. For in-
stance, the major physical inputs are similar for all types of
agriculture, unlike industry. Agriculture everywhere needs water,
and in many parts of the world an improvement in water control over
what nature offers--including added amounts, better timing, better
distribution, and the removal of excess through proper drainage--
offers major opportunities for productivity increases. Similarly
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TABLE 1. CLASSIFICATION OF FACTORS AFFECTING AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
Physical Input Factors Socio-Psycho-Cultural Factors
1. Nonhuman physical inputs
e. Fertilizer
f. Pesticides
g. Structures
h. Work animals
i. Other animals
j. Tools and machinery
k. Fuel and power other
than animal power
2. Labor
Economic Factors
1. Transport, storage, processing, and marketing facilities
for products
2. Facilities for the supply and distribution of inputs,
including credit
3. Input prices, including interest rates
4. Product prices, including prices of consumer goods
5. Taxes, subsidies, quotas
Organizational Factors
1. Tenure, land
2. Farm size and legal form
3. General government services and policies
4. Voluntary and statutory farmers' organizations for:
a. Coordinating physical input use, e.g., irrigation
associations, tractor stations
b. Economic services, e.g., purchase, sale, credit asso-
ciations and cooperatives
c. Social services, e.g., health centers, schools, family
planning centers
d. Local government
e. Diffusion of knowledge, e.g., adult education classes,
youth clubs
1. Integration of agricultural institutions, practices, and
values within the technosocial matrix of the nation
2. Public administration factors, structure, values, mode of
operation of the innovating bureaucracy
3. Social structure, cultural values, and dynamics of peas-
ant communities
4. Processes of sociocultural change, barriers, and motiva-
tions in the innovative sequence, functional harmony or
disharmony in society as its constituent parts change
Knowledge Factors
1. Organization of basic and applied research
2. Diffusion of knowledge relating to:
a. Technical knowledge, e.g., agronomy, plant genetics,
soil science, water management, agricultural engineer-
ing, pest control, home technology
b. Economic knowledge, e.g., land economics, general
economics, farm management
c. Policy, e.g., politics, public administration, planning
d. General education, e.g., literacy, adult education,
mass communication
a. Land
b. Climate
c. Seeds
d. Water
a
O
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the big problems in increasing the supply of plant nutrients come
down primarily to three major factors--nitrogen, potash, and phos-
phorous--whatever the crop and its location. With respect to the
economic environment, all commercial farming, whatever is grown and
wherever it takes place, must be profitable; there must be markets
for both inputs and outputs reachable by the farmer; all farming is
time-consuming and requires some credit; and, in most types of farm-
ing, innovation is inhibited by the high risks associated with the
adoption of new practices, some of which can be reduced by appro-
priate governmental policies. All modern farming requires higher
levels of knowledge, education, and training than those required by
traditional agriculture. Elements among the organizational and
psychocultural factors cut across the endless variety of particular
agricultural situations.
Nonetheless, right down the list of factors, agriculture is
characterized by an extraordinary degree of variation in its specific
requirements for efficient production from crop to crop, from country
to country, and from locality to locality within larger regions.
Variations in agriculture are much greater than the place-to-place
variations in the processes for steel making, textile manufacture,
machine tools, and the like. Before the conference began, some of
us with less background in agriculture than others were hoping that
we might arrive at some fairly powerful general rules about prior-
ities, sequences, policy emphases, and organizational structures
that could be applied without much modification to any agricultural
region. We were thoroughly convinced by the end of the conference
that this was a vain hope. Agriculture is practiced in the under-
developed world under an enormous range of climatic conditions from
the rainy tropics of Africa to the arid lands of the Middle East.
Associated with these variations in climate are variations in
soils that enormously influence optimal water management, nutrient
requirements, needed crop varieties, and a host of other factors.
In some places a modification of land tenure arrangements seems a
first prerequisite to any advance along other fronts, while in other
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areas land is reasonably widely and securely held by owner-culti-
vators in plots of a size that can be efficient. Although the
organizational management of agriculture is a critical limitation
in a great many places, there are areas, like Malaysia, where the
organizational problem is less urgent than many other factors. In
large parts of the underdeveloped world the problem can be de-
scribed as one of improved management of existing farms, while in
considerable sections of Africa, for instance, units that can be
described as farms rarely exist. More basic knowledge of plant
science is needed everywhere, but in some areas existing knowledge
is so far ahead of average practice that further research is a
long-term goal, and in other areas we scarcely have the biological
knowledge to know what to do to get any agricultural program started.
Taking all five of our major categories of factors into account,
the range of diversity is so great that even though some general
principles apply very widely, their application in particular situa-
tions cannot be by blanket rule but must be based upon the tailoring
of a program to meet the detailed diagnosis of each particular lo-
cality. A program even for a single crop like rice requires funda-
mental adaptation to the circumstances of the place where it is to
be applied.
We cannot appraise the consequences of a number of factors in
our classification by looking at each one separately and then summing
the results. The interdependencies among the factors are so strong
that the effects of a package of factors are likely to be very
different from the sum of the effects of each one applied by itself.
This is true within a broad category like physical inputs. Additional
fertilizer without water control may have little result, and the con-
sequences of more water may be very modest if additional nutrients
are not supplied. If both are supplied together, existing crop
varieties that do as well as any others in the absence of water and
fertilizer may not benefit as much from these new inputs as new
varieties specifically tailored ,o water and nutrient availability;
yield on existing varieties may even be reduced by added water or
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fertilizer. Insects and diseases that are unimportant under existing
practices may multiply dangerously under irrigated and fertilized
conditions and require new measures of disease and insect control.
Even a single physical input involves many nonphysical factors.
The effective use of fertilizer, for example, requires economic in-
centives, better distribution, and extension services to instruct the
farmers in its use. Similarly, optimum organization of marketing may
depend on what kinds of farmers' organizations are set up for water
control; or effective credit institutions may be most usefully linked
to arrangements for the supply of fertilizer and seed. Not only the
kind but the depth of education and training of farmers, extension
workers, experiment station personnel, and the like will depend upon
the complexity of the farming operations implied by cropping patterns,
input utilization, and varietal improvement. As we shall see later
in this report, the interdependence of the factors affecting the
farm enterprise has profound and general implications for the organi-
zation of programs for the promotion of agricultural productivity.
Another characteristic of agriculture that conditions what we
can do to improve it is the extraordinary number and dispersion of
decision-making units whose behavior must be changed if this sector
is to be modernized. Unless agriculture is industrialized on a massive
scale--and with isolated exceptions this seems to us neither feasible
nor desirable--any program of change must affect the knowledge, moti-
vations, and voluntary behavior of many millions of independent entre-
preneurs. Farm decision makers are widely scattered geographically,
they vary enormously in economic status and potential, they cover a
wide political spectrum, they are subject even within one country to
a considerable variety of institutional connections, and they exhibit
a widely varying pattern of attitudes and motivations. By contrast,
managerial control in industry and social overhead facilities is
highly concentrated, and the development of a reasonably effective
industrial labor force is infinitely simpler and more manageable than
the building of a modern community of farmers. The characteristic
agricultural need for unusually complex and extensive organizational
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and administrative arrangements poses an acute dilemma for societies
whose scarcest resource is often organizational and administrative
talent.
This last characteristic of widely dispersed decision making,
taken together with the enormous variability of local conditions,
implies another requirement for the organization of governmental
services to agriculture that is very seldom adequately met in prac-
tice. This requirement is effective two-way communication in the
administrative process, with information passing efficiently from
the farmer up through the bureaucratic hierarchy as well as down to
him from ministries, research stations, and the like. It is now
standard doctrine that such two-way communication is necessary for
the effective operation of any administrative system, but it is
both much more important and much more difficult to achieve in
agriculture than in industry because of the decentralization and
variability of local circumstances of farming.
Another complication arises from the fact that the moderniza-
tion of agriculture in many countries requires shifting each small
farm unit from a relatively simple pattern of producing a few tradi-
tional crops with few if any purchased inputs to a multiprocess en-
terprise with many interrelated products and inputs. At a later
stage, commercialization may lead the individual farmer to specialize
on one product, but initially multicropping, rotation, and the intro-
duction of fertilizer, water, new seed, and pest control enormously
increase the complexity of farm management and multiply many times
the problems of education, training, extension, and organization.
The traditional method on which many societies have relied to
achieve some consistency and complementarity in the decisions of
large numbers of independent units such as characterize agriculture
has been through the operation of a price and market mechanism. In
most of the underdeveloped world the traditional farmer, even when
he has some commercial operations, engages in a minimum of socially
organized collaborative activities. But some aspects of modernized
agriculture, such as water management and control, effective insect
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and disease control, the use of equipment too large for ownership
by a small farmer, and some aspects of marketing require the coordi-
nation of farm decisions through more explicitly social mechanisms
supplementing the atomistic processes of the market.
Several of these characteristics have a further implication:
Sustained growth in agricultural output requires technical, economic,
attitudinal, and political transformations of the whole structure of
rural society that cannot be brought about quickly. A single decision
can, with appropriate outside help, lead quite rapidly to the build-
ing of a dam, railway, factory, or sewer plant. But the transfor-
mation of traditional agriculture requires a series of interlocking
changes in so many different aspects of rural life that a perspective
of decades is required. This does not mean that some things cannot
be done quickly. We cite in the balance of this report numerous
instances of measures with potentially rapid immediate payoff. But
the introduction into the rural economy of innovations that will
ensure sustained growth requires patience and very steady purpose.
Finally, in most underdeveloped countries an intangible charac-
teristic of agriculture that poses barriers to its modernization is
the fact that it is conceived of as a low-status occupation. If
agriculture is to be effectively modernized, it must attract the
attention of a significant number of the brightest, most imagina-
tive, most innovative, and most ambitious members of the rural com-
munity. This is true both in farming and in such farm-related activ-
ities as research, extension, cooperatives, and marketing. But these
are precisely the individuals in underdeveloped societies who are
most likely to identify farming with traditional drudgery and see
their only potential for mobility, self-improvement, and exciting
challenge in an escape from farming to industry and urban life. Even
though in many underdeveloped countries the widely held view that
there is a surplus population in the countryside is valid in the
aggregate, there is no surplus of the energetic and innovative types
who alone can take the lead in the modernization of agriculture.
Development programs must deal with this problem of raising the
status and challenge of agriculture.
Preconditions for Agricultural Development
PRECONDITIONS FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
A large number of conditions outside the realm of agricultural
policy itself, even when that policy is very broadly defined to in-
clude research, education, marketing and price policy, rural organi-
zations and administration, and the like, must be at least minimally
met if any program to expand agricultural productivity is to have even
a marginal chance of success. Perhaps the first and least tangible
of these conditions is that a will to develop agriculture must be
present in the minds of at least some of the national and local
leadership. There must be more than merely a verbal recognition of
the importance of this sector. Because of the characteristics out-
lined in the preceding section, the amount of administrative time
and attention that must be given to agriculture is out of all pro-
portion to its relative financial requirements. Yet its low status
inhibits the leadership in many countries from devoting to it the
energies required. Effective programs of development once begun
will reinforce this will, but there is a substantial lower threshold
of this motivation of leadership without which no program, however
skillfully designed in detail, has much chance of taking hold. Two
of our participants have devoted some time to exploring objective
measures of the will to develop, and they review their conclusions
in Appendix C to this report.
A second requirement is at least some modicum of political
stability and continuity in a country undertaking agricultural
development programs. This is of course required for the effective-
ness of development programs of any sort, but is perhaps peculiarly
necessary for agriculture because of two of the characteristics of
agriculture outlined in the previous section, namely that it involves
the participation of very large numbers of people at decision-making
levels and that the modernization of traditional agriculture requires
time horizons not of months or years but of decades. One should not
exaggerate the minimal degree of political stability and continuity
required for at least some progress in the rural sector. A good
many underdeveloped countries probably exhibit this minimum, but
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there are certainly a number where the absence of this precondition
makes the prospects bleak however fully the other requirements are
satisfied.
A third requirement is at least a minimal corps of administra-
tive and organizational talent and competence. We say a good deal
in Chapter Six about how to expand this resource to meet the very
large needs of agricultural programs for these inputs, but in agri-
culture, unlike some branches of industry and social overhead, an
indigenous administrative and organizational base of at least a
limited sort is absolutely essential. A steel plant, a railway
system, a mining enterprise can be launched in an underdeveloped
country largely or entirely with expatriate administration and
management, with the breeding of an indigenous corps of managers
postponed to a later date. The same can be done in isolated in-
stances with industrialized plantation-type agriculture, but for
the bulk of peasant-type agriculture it is impossible.
This implies a fourth requirement: the existence of at least
a few nationals trained in agriculture before an effective program
can be launched. One of their first tasks will be a training program
to expand this corps at an adequate rate, but without the seed corn
of at least a small group of indigenous professionals, an action
program cannot even be started. Again, most underdeveloped countries
probably meet these minimal initial requirements in getting started,
but in some countries the numbers are so small as hardly to provide
a viable nucleus.
Fifth, there must be expanding markets for the products of
agriculture if an agricultural development program is to have any
chance of success. In specialized crops these may be export markets,
but the basic demand for the foodstuffs emerging from the heightened
production of food in the underdeveloped world must come from the
economies of the underdeveloped countries themselves. While the bulk
of the total consumption of agricultural products will continue to
be in rural areas, since this is where the majority of the population
of the underdeveloped countries will continue to live for some decades,
rising urban incomes play a necessary catalytic role in the commer-
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cialization of agriculture. This implies that incomes outside the
agricultural sector must be expanding if modernized agriculture is
to prosper. Again, in much of the underdeveloped world, progress
has recently been more promising in industry and social overhead
than in agriculture. Although this condition does not appear impos-
sible for many countries to meet, we state it to raise a warning
flag that a diversion of resources into agriculture sufficiently
massive to interrupt growth in other sectors of the economy could
well be self-defeating. Agriculture, industry, and infrastructure
must grow together.
A sixth condition related to the preceding and implying a
similar conclusion is that both domestic and foreign resources must
be available to supply the necessary capital inputs for agricultural
modernization. Some underdeveloped countries like Ghana, Thailand,
and Colombia have already developed a specialized foreign-exchange-
earning export agriculture and may be able to finance the moderni-
zation of their food crop agriculture from the unstable earnings of
the present export sector. And of course after modernization is
well under way, a prosperous and rapidly growing diversified agri-
culture can readily supply its own capital requirements and even
some excess for investment in other branches of activity. Agri-
cultural development programs should be so designed as to promote
self-sustaining growth in agriculture in this sense at the earliest
possible date. Nonetheless in many countries, including some big ones
like India, it is unlikely that traditional agriculture can transform
and modernize itself in the early stages (including the supply of new
inputs of fertilizer, water, and the like, the expansion of social
overhead facilities for transportation and communication serving agri-
culture, and the establishment of educational facilities essential
for agricultural advance) without an additional injection of resources
from outside the agricultural sector.
The same conclusion holds in many cases when we turn our atten-
tion from aggregate capital resources to the specific needs that can
be met only from abroad. While agriculture seems at first blush to
be less dependent for its success on adequate supplies of foreign
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exchange, creating an adequate supply of the expanded inputs of wa-
ter, nutrients, pesticides, knowledge, and training, and the expan-
sion of facilities for transporting, storing, and distributing agri-
cultural products that the modernization of agriculture requires,
place very heavy burdens on a country's foreign exchange resources.
Again, those countries where traditional agriculture has been export
oriented may be able to meet these requirements from the foreign
exchange that their own agriculture produces, but many will require
either foreign aid or an industrial or extractive base with a high
foreign-exchange-earning potential.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A number of policy implications that follow from the above
characteristics of agriculture and preconditions for its development
became increasingly evident as the conference proceeded. Although
few of these are novel to those who have thought deeply about agri-
cultural problems, they received emphasis, body, and content in our
joint deliberations, and it may not be amiss to restate them briefly
as a prelude to the more detailed exposition in subsequent chapters.
The first generalization concerns the application of generaliza-
tions to specific situations. As we pointed out in Chapter One, the
diversity of situations in which agriculture operates in the under-
developed countries--physical, economic, institutional, and motiva-
tional--taken together with the pervasiveness of interdependence in
any particular situation means that generalizations cannot be applied
without adaptive research and experiment. The biologists have taught
us this with respect to crop varieties. The basic principles of
breeding improved crop varieties are developed in the biological
laboratory and are independent of their place of application. But
few plant breeders would feel safe in recommending to a minister of
agriculture that he should adopt for use throughout his country, or
even in any particular region of it, a variety that has been highly
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successful elsewhere without an extensive series of field tests to
determine its adaptation to local conditions of climate, soil, wa-
ter and fertilizer availability, pest and weed prevalence, and so on.
This same principle of the need for adaptive research and ex-
perimentation under local conditions is fully as valid for manipu-
lations of the economic environment, for organizational and institu-
tional patterns, for the types and complexities of knowledge that
can be absorbed by the local population, for education and training,
and indeed for the whole package of interrelated activities that
must constitute an agricultural program. This need for adaptive
research and experimentation outside the biological field is not
yet well understood by those responsible for agricultural programs
in the underdeveloped countries. They seek outside advice on what
kinds of programs they should adopt, whereas the best advice that
can be given is that they should conduct pilot schemes and test the
adaptability of ideas developed elsewhere for their own complex of
local conditions. In what follows we cite a number of dilemmas with-
out any clear indication of how to solve them. Viable solutions for a
particular region can be found only by adaptive experiments in that
region with careful evaluation to test the results. A checklist of
such dilemmas will produce no solutions but may direct attention to a
series of hypotheses to be tested against local conditions.
An important dilemma is that while on the one hand a great
many things need to be done to make modern agriculture work, running
through the whole list of factors affecting productivity, and while
many of these things require for their successful performance admin-
istrative and organizational attention 'from all levels of government,
the human resources available to perf/orm all these functions are ex-
ceedingly limited, and if too much is attempted at once, nothing will
be done well. It is clear that the effective manipulation of all
the variables that affect agricultural productivity in such a way
as to eliminate simultaneously over the whole country all the
potential bottlenecks is beyond the capacity of most underdeveloped
governments. Faced with this dilemma, what do they do?
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One possible answer is to be found in a sequence of trial-and-
error attempts. In a small region in which almost everything is
missing, a quick diagnosis will suggest one or two critical bottle-
necks or urgently felt needs, like the control of pest losses or
the timing of water supplies. Administrative energies can initially
be concentrated on breaking this bottleneck. As progress is made,
complementary bottlenecks will appear, such for example as institu-
tions to supply credit for the purchase of insecticides, or more
extension agents to explain its proper use to the farmer. If the
initial program is concentrated in a small district, and if at the
start there exist administrative skills and resources to broaden
the program as the need becomes apparent, diagnosis and remedy can
proceed sequentially, adjusting the program in stages to the re-
vealed priority issues. The alternative procedure, more logical but
perhaps less feasible, is to conduct a local survey attempting to
diagnose in advance all the elements required, their interconnections,
and their relative priorities and then to design a complete package
program to deal with them. Choice between these techniques will have
to be made locally, and experiments with both are to be encouraged.
The one thing of which we are fairly confident is that organizational
experiment of this sort should initially be on a small scale and not
national in scope. It is clear from the interdependence of all the
factors affecting agriculture that the nationwide manipulation of
one variable, like price policy or ample fertilizer supplies or
adequate water or a good credit system, is likely by itself in most
cases to produce only limited results. Where the prospects for a
high immediate payoff are very promising from such single-factor
programs, they may be tried on a national scale, but in such cases,
administrative resources should be kept available to follow up
quickly with programs of complementary factors as they turn out to
be needed. For the longer run the conference broadly accepted the
principle of attempting to install fairly complete packages in
limited areas, either sequentially or all at once, rather than deal-
ing nationwide with a few problems one at a time.
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This leaves open a great many questions. How large should
these packages be? Which elements in them deserve the most emphasis?
How should they be designed and administered? How many should there
be, and how rapidly can the number be expanded? Answers to all these
questions will differ not only from country to country but also from
region to region within countries. They can be found only by pilot
study and experimentation. The early experiments will almost cer-
tainly involve much heavier inputs of manpower than could be quickly
extended to whole regions, but if serious attention is paid to ways
of reducing the manpower inputs in the future, such pilot programs
can yield insights for national policy. Meanwhile more modest effects
may be achievable by more widely diffused policies outside the
package areas.
A further important question is how much diversification of
crops and practices is desirable and feasible both nationally and in
the individual farm unit. In many circumstances a higher degree of
diversification, certainly nationally and frequently on the individual
farm, will reduce risks and significantly increase the efficiency of
farm operations. But done properly such diversification makes much
heavier demands on the knowledge and education of the farmer and on
the training and competence of the extension service that backs him
up than simpler types of agriculture. Again there is no general
answer, and the solution for a particular region with particular
physical and human characteristics can be found only through adaptive
research and experimentation.
Another problem that characterizes many areas of development
policy is rendered particularly acute in agriculture by some of the
conclusions we have already reached. It is the problem of balancing
considerations of productivity and of equity. How far are the limited
resources--economic, physical, and human--available to the government
of an underdeveloped country to be used to promote the maximum pos-
sible increases in the output of its economy, and how far are they
to be used to ensure an equitable distribution of the yields of that
economy among its members and particularly among its underprivileged
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members? From what we have already said about the principle of con-
centration, it is clear that productivity will as a rule increase
more rapidly if resources are concentrated on limited regions and
within those regions possibly on limited numbers of people. Although
this will not always be true, frequently those most likely success-
fully to adopt a package of inputs and practices yielding much higher
returns will be those who have had some experience of success in the
past and more than average resources to risk on innovations in the
future. Concentrating resources on the more promising regions and
individuals may therefore result in increasing rather than reducing
the disparities between the more and the less fortunate.,
There was a general feeling among us that practical politicians
faced with this dilemma might well be pushed too far in the direc-
tion of sacrificing productivity for equity even though in the
absence of significant increases in productivity more resources may
never become available to improve the lot of the less fortunate. On
the other hand, concentration on productivity at the expense of
equity may violate deeply held social values and may also generate
such tensions within the society as to make the continuation of
productivity programs difficult or impossible. Again, few general
principles can be suggested to guide the administrator in making
the compromises necessary in each particular situation.
Fortunately the alternatives are not usually limited to an
inequitable concentration on success by too few or an unproductive
spreading of resources over too many. Concentration can be accom-
panied by other measures to relieve inequities that may contribute
to productivity rather than limit it. A notable example is the
development of a rural public works program using primarily the
abundant resource of unskilled rural labor for such projects as
feeder roads or water distributaries that would contribute to
productivity and provide employment for the least favored of the
rural population--the landless laborers and those displaced from
farming. This important problem is discussed further in the last
part of Chapter Four.
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These alternatives are merely illustrative of a broader range
of problems having to do with conflicts between economic goals and
sociopolitical goals that may be in competition with them. Since the
conference was devoting its primary attention to agricultural pro-
ductivity we did not go at length into cataloging these conflicts or
suggesting principles for their resolution, but we were continuously
aware that such conflicts exist and must be taken into account. Again
how far they exist in fact and how far they are only fears in the
minds of politicians can frequently be tested effectively only by
pilot experiments on a small scale, where the potential threat to
deeply held sociopolitical goals is much more limited than when the
experiment is tried on a national scale.
Another dilemma that confronts any government attempting to
organize an agricultural program to affect large numbers of culti-
vators is: how far to attempt by a variety of devices to generate
voluntary and active participation by cultivators in the program
and how far to rely on paternalistic and coercive devices to ensure
performance. The former choice is much more desirable in human and
political terms but may be much slower, much more costly in both
economic and human resources, and at least in the short term some-
what less effective. Indeed in certain situations like complex
water management or pest and disease control, coercion may be nec-
essary, for a minority of noncooperators may threaten the success
of a whole program. Again how far it is practicable to pursue the
desirable aim of securing maximum participation and voluntary
cooperation will have to be determined in particular cases and can
frequently be settled only by a highly experimental approach with
a variety of pilot schemes.
A dilemma that ran through almost everything we did at the
conference and underlies many of the points made earlier is the
one posed by the desperate urgency in many countries for raising
production as quickly as possible and the need in most areas for
much further study and experiment (physical, economic, organiza-
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tional, psychocultural, and intellectual) before launching major
and time-consuming reorganizations of agriculture. In most situa-
tions, whatever we do in the short run, it is likely that the
thorough transformation of agriculture required to produce radi-
cally improved performance will take decades to effect. On the other
hand, with population pressing and with industrialization being
limited in its growth by the agricultural bottleneck in many places,
politicians who want to survive cannot wait decades. A statesmanlike
posture is of course to pay attention to both short-term and long-
term measures. We were convinced that in many places significant
if limited improvements in agricultural performance can be brought
about with measures that can be taken fairly promptly. However, un-
less longer-term measures are initiated at once to expand our basic
knowledge of the factors contributing to agricultural improvement
and to experiment with more radical alterations in the whole structure
and pattern of traditional agriculture, the short-term measures will
very soon, in a matter of a few years, bump against ceilings of per-
formance that cannot then be broken through without a protracted
delay in the pace and momentum of advance. We have tried in the
balance of our report to divide our recommendations into the short-
term and longer-term ones, but the balance between these must be
determined in each particular case by weighing the immediate ur-
gencies against longer-term needs.
A final generalization to which we would all subscribe is that
the fundamental problem confronting agriculture is not so much the
adoption and spread of any particular set of physical inputs or of
economic arrangements or of organizational patterns or of research
institutions. Rather it is to build into the whole agricultural
process--from the farmer to the university research institute, from
the field extension agent to the minister of agriculture--an attitude
of experiment, trial and error, continued innovation, and adaptation
of new ideas. Once this innovative and experimental spirit permeates
the rural community, the farm supply and marketing industries, the
bureaucracy, and the intellectual institutions concerned with agri-
Policy Implications 29
culture, the gulf that presently exists in most underdeveloped
countries between city and country, between universities and
farmers, between ministers and village officials will be bridged,
and continued development can be built into the system. Without it
improvements in performance, though they may occur, will be halting
and transitory and thus provide no lasting contribution to agri-
cultural productivity.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Part II
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES: THE MAJOR FACTORS
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
INTRODUCTION
Part II will deal with agriculture in the broadest sense,
seeking policy suggestions in the range of factors described in
the previous chapter and classified in Table 1 in Chapter Two.
Chapter Three deals with the physical inputs: the factors
that can be added to make the land yield larger crops. Here we
propose a major effort on fertilizer.
Chapter Four deals with the economic environment: how it
can be manipulated to increase the farmer's incentive to produce.
Here we propose, among other policies, price supports for food
crops and subsidies for fertilizer and other inputs, the use of
surplus labor for rural public works, and the testing of a scheme
to provide innovation insurance for farmers.
Chapter Five deals with knowledge: the research and educa-
tional policies needed to provide a flow of new technology and the
men who will put that technology into practice. We were pretty
well agreed by the end of the conference that unless a greatly
stepped-up program of long-range research is initiated now we
could exhaust the potential of presently known technology with-
out providing long-term solutions to the world's food problems.
Chapter Six deals with the organizational environment of
agriculture: the principles governing the relations between the
farmer and the institutions of his society, and how that relation-
ship is affected by the attitudes and values of both farmer and
bureaucrat. Here our key recommendation is for many pilot experi-
ments in each country, with organizational alternatives tailored
to local needs and local situations.
Thus the questions we are attacking here are basically two:
What techniques exist for increasing agricultural yields? What must
be done in other fields to put those techniques into practice or
to add to their number?
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Chapter Three
THE PHYSICAL INPUTS
We concentrate our attention in this chapter on five major
physical inputs that may be purchased by farmers either individ-
ually or collectively: chemical fertilizers--primarily nitrogen
(N), phosphate (P), and potash (K); water; improved plant varie-
ties; tools and machines; and pesticides. Since the proper applica-
tion of these inputs to what is now regarded as the world's supply
of arable land could multiply agricultural yields by several fold,
the conference did not take up ways of farming land not now con-
sidered arable.
Since the effectiveness of one physical input depends on the
presence of others, a combination or package of new inputs usually
produces greater yields than the sum of those inputs applied singly.
For example, in experiments performed in Indiana a doubling of
water availability with no fertilizer raised corn yields by only
about 16 per cent. With the addition of 100 pounds of nitrogen per
acre the same increase in water increased yields by 38 per cent.
The addition of 100 pounds of nitrogen with the existing water level
increased yields by 186 per cent, while with the doubled water
supply the increase was 239 per cent.
When economic yields are calculated, it may be that no single
input will repay its cost, whereas a package of new inputs would be
highly profitable. Or, even if profitable, the margin of gain on a
single input may be too small, given the risks that characterize
farming, to lead the farmer to adopt it. A theoretical (but not un-
typical) illustration would be: $1 invested in irrigation without
other inputs might return $2 in added yield; the same return might
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be gained on each of the other inputs alone. But $1 invested in a
package of those same inputs might return $10.
Some physical inputs introduced singly, for instance pest con-
trol or the addition of fertilizer, may yield important gains. Yet
though these are cases of single inputs, they are not single-factor
solutions, for each involves a wide range of nonphysical factors.
Pest control may require a high degree of social organization; and
getting fertilizer on farmers' fields involves complex problems
of administration, distribution, knowledge, and economic policy.
Thus even with a single physical input we are dealing with a
package of factors. Since adding other physical inputs simply makes
the package more complicated, the policymaker designing the package
is confronted with a difficult series of choices between optimum
feasibility and optimum return. The simplest program is the easiest
to design and administer and stands the best chance of being adopted
by farmers. But, as we have seen, it also offers the least return.
The addition of new inputs places an increasing strain on both the
farmer and the agent of change. Thus, as the package becomes po-
tentially more profitable, its chances of being successfully intro-
duced are likely to diminish. The optimum package of physical inputs
(varying of course from place to place) will be the one providing
the best compromise between potential yield and likelihood of
effective adoption.
FERTILIZERI
Among the physical inputs, fertilizer, in the opinion of many,
offers the best hope of a quick and major increase in agricultural
production. How great and how certain that gain may be are still
under dispute among professionals. Some of us felt that fertilizer
alone could produce great gains over the next decade, before other
physical inputs become limiting. Despite the problems involved, this
group favored a major effort on fertilizer. A minority felt that the
Fertilizer
evidence is still insufficient to justify concentration on fer-
tilizer under present conditions. This minority dissented, at
least in part, from the policy proposed in this section.
Fertilizer adds to the natural supply of plant nutrients in
the soil. Crops have fairly definite nutrient needs. A 1,000 pound
per acre crop of paddy rice, for example, needs 30 pounds of nitro-
gen, 10 of phosphate, and 25 of potash. To double the yield, the
supply of nutrients available to the plant must be doubled. Most
of the soils of the tropics and subtropics supply only about 30
pounds of nitrogen a year. This limits the yield of most cereals
to 800-1,200 pounds per acre, compared to about 2,500 pounds in
many temperate zones. Lack of nutrients, rather than the nature
of existing crop varieties, appears to be the limiting factor in
areas that have enough water. The experience of a minority of
farmers in underdeveloped areas indicates that the existing
varieties may yield much more than the present average yields.
Some of us were persuaded, on the basis of the experience
of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), that substantial
yield increases--of at least 50 per cent--are often possible with
the single input of fertilizer. Since 1961 the FAO has run ex-
tensive fertilizer trials and demonstrations in fifteen nations
in the Middle East, West Africa, and northern Latin America. The
trials were conducted mainly on food crops on farmers' fields and
without other inputs. The most economic fertilizer treatments
sometimes produced increases of 50-80 per cent; rarely was the in-
crease less than 30 per cent or more than 100 per cent. A tentative
generalization from this evidence would suggest that the use of
fertilizer may be able to increase the production of the major
food crops in important areas of the three continents by about 50
per cent where water is not a limiting factor.
But fertilizer is little used in the underdeveloped world.
As Table 2 shows, Asia, Africa, and Latin America consume far less
fertilizer than do the developed nations. Fertilizer consumption is
closely correlated to per acre yields and to the general level of
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development. The range among nations is extremely wide. Denmark,
for example, consumes 64 pounds of nitrogen per capita per year,
India only 1.7 pounds, and China 1.2 pounds. The underdeveloped
nations produce even less fertilizer than the little they consume.
As Table 3 shows, their production in 1962/63 supplied only about
half of their own consumption.
TABLE 2. FERTILIZER CONSUMPTION, 1962/63
Total Consumption Pounds Per
(Metric Tons) Capita
Asia (except China and Japan) 1,780,000 4.1
Africa 810,000 6.6
Latin America 898,000 8.9
Soviet Union 2,749,000 27.0
Japan 1,640,000 38.0
Europe 14,630,000 74.o
United States and Canada 8,782,000 94.0
The use of fertilizer in the underdeveloped world is inhibited
by many factors. The cost/yield ratio is in general less favorable
to the farmer than in the developed nations. The farmer in under-
developed nations typically pays more for fertilizer and gets a
lower price for his crop. The result is that the same physical re-
turn--four pounds of crop for one pound of fertilizer, let us say--
may be economic for one farmer but not for the other. This is
especially true of food crops; as a consequence, fertilizer is
used more on higher-priced cash crops than on food crops.
The cost of producing fertilizer in the underdeveloped world
is comparatively high. Capital costs, involving imported machinery,
are high, the lowest cost methods of production are not always used,
and inefficient management frequently increases operating costs.
In India, for example, production costs are 50 per cent higher than
in the United States.
Fertilizer
TABLE 3. FERTILIZER DATA: ASIA, AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA
Production, Consumption, and Imports of Fertilizer, 1962/63
(in million metric tons of plant nutrients)
Net
Production Imports
Asia (except China and Japan)
Africa
Latin America
0.67
0.46
0.60
1.73
1.11
0.35
0.30
1.76
Consumption
1.78
0.81
0.90
3.49
Fertilizer Needs at 30 Pounds Per Person Per Year
(in million metric tons of plant nutrients)
Asia (except China and Japan)
Africa
Latin America
1970
15.7
4.4
3.9
24.0
1980
19.9
5.6
5.2
30.7
Additional Grain Production Equivalent to
30 Pounds of Plant Nutrient Per Person*
(in million metric tons)
1970
Asia (except China and Japan)
Africa
Latin America
109
29
24
167
1980
143
38
34
220
*Calculated as 10 tons of grain per ton of plant nutrient.
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Distribution is probably the most critical bottleneck. Getting
the fertilizer from factory or dock to the farmer requires extensive
planning and a complex infrastructure. The fertilizer must be trans-
ported to the region where it will be used and stockpiled well in
advance, which requires adequate transportation facilities and local
storage places. Timing is crucial; the fertilizer is of no use if
it arrives after the time when it must be applied. The critical
factors here are physical infrastructure and effective management,
both of which are frequently lacking.
The farmer suffers from other inhibitions. If he is a tenant
rather than an owner, he has, under most tenancy conditions, less
to gain from fertilizer. A typical tenancy arrangement forces the
farmer to pay for all inputs and deliver half the crop to the
landlord; so the tenant who uses fertilizer gets only half as
much return on his investment as he would if he owned the land.
Even when it is proven to be profitable, the farmer may be as
slow to adopt fertilizer as he is to try any innovation requiring
a cash outlay; for risks are reluctantly taken by people living
close to the level of starvation. (We suggest later some ways of
overcoming these obstacles to innovation in the economic environ-
ment.)
Knowledge also is lacking. In one sense this means that the
farmer does not receive existing information--from salesmen or
extension services--about the use of fertilizer. In another sense
the information itself is lacking. Indiscriminately applied,
fertilizer may reduce yields. The optimum dose and blend of fer-
tilizer vary widely with soils and crops. The blend usually con-
tains at least two of the three major ingredients--N, P, and K--
but the proportions will differ according to local needs. Nor is
crop response proportionate to the amount of fertilizer applied:
that is, doubling the dose does not necessarily double the extra
yield. Only a particular dose may be economic; less, or more,
may not pay off. Only extensive local trials can determine how
much to use of what mixture.
Fertilizer
The majority of us felt that, despite the problems involved,
the potential was sufficient to justify a major effort toward
promoting the use of fertilizer. With present technology, the
majority felt that it should be possible with fertilizer alone to
raise food production enough to guarantee the food supply of the
underdeveloped world for several years. At some point--and we
differed as to how soon it would be--another ceiling would be
reached; fertilizer would not be able to raise yields any further
in the absence of other physical inputs. But precious time would
have been bought. We all agreed that this time must be used to
set in motion the complementary activities that eventually would
make possible, through other inputs, other advances in production.
Some considerations involved in generalizing fertilizer use are
set forth below.
Future Fertilizer Requirements of Developing Countries
At present rates of growth the projected increases (over
the 1960 level) in the populations of Asia (excluding China and
Japan), Africa, and Latin America will total 400 million in 1970
and 900 million in 1980.
Agricultural production has been approximately static in
these areas during the past four years. Clearly a considerable rise
in production will be needed to feed the added population even at
present low levels of nutrition. To continue to provide one pound
of grain per person per day in 1980 will require a grain production
of about 150,000,000 tons in 1980, in addition to the 1960/61 pro-
duction of 231,000,000 tons. This represents an increase of 65 per
cent in only twenty years.
A target of 30 pounds of consumption of plant nutrients per
capita per year in Asia, Africa, and Latin America is postulated as
a necessity for attaining even minimal food production in 1980. It
would be highly desirable to attain such a consumption target by
1970, but this seems impossible. Table 3 shows the tonnage of fer-
tilizer in each area in 1970 and 1980 corresponding to 30 pounds
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per person per year. This goal would require consumption of 30.5
million tons of plant nutrients, compared with three million tons
in 1960/61. In 1962/63 the consumption of fertilizer in terms of
plant nutrients was as shown in Table 2.
The following distribution of plant nutrients is suggested
within the 30 pounds per capita target: nitrogen (N)--16 pounds,
phosphate (P2 05 )--8 pounds, potash (K20)--6 pounds. The world
average ratio of N-P 2 0 5~K 2 0 was near 1:1:1 for many years, but
nitrogen has been steadily pushing ahead relative to phosphate
and potash during the past few years. Therefore some analysts
have suggested a ratio of 2:1:0.75 as a provisional "norm" for
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. However, many regions may deviate
substantially from the norm.
Table 3 shows that the projected 30.7 million tons of plant
nutrients used in 1980 would correspond at best to 220 million
tons of additional grain over and above 1962/63 production. This
calculation assumes a return of ten pounds of grain for one pound
of plant nutrient, a higher rate of return than is now being
achieved in many nations. Thus the grain target would not be met
unless other physical inputs, such as seeds and water, were
supplied in appropriate quantities, along with the nonphysical
inputs of knowledge and organization. Additional grain production
of 220 million tons would be somewhat more than enough to maintain
grain consumption at one pound per capita per day in 1980, but
part of the fertilizer would be needed for other foods and non-
food crops. Therefore the goal of 30 pounds per capita per year
represents a minimal target to feed Asia, Africa, and Latin
America in 1980.
The Short Term--1970
For 1970 let us postulate a short-term target of 20 pounds per
capita per year. This would break down by continents as shown in
Table 4. The total consumption of 16 million tons needed in 1970
compares with a total production of 1.7 million tons in 1962/63.
Fertilizer
New projects are under way in many countries, and production on the
three continents may reach 4 to 6 million tons by 1970. This is far
from the goal. Therefore the consumption target of 16 million tons
will presumably have to be met largely by increased imports. The 5
years remaining before 1970 is too short a time to achieve self-
sufficiency in Asia, Africa, and Latin America even under a forced-
draft crash program.
TABLE 4. FERTILIZER CONSUMPTION TARGET:
ASIA, AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA, 1970
(Million Tons)
N P2 0 5  K2 0 Total
Asia (except China and Japan) 5.6 2.8 2.0 10.4
Africa 1.6 0.8 0.5 2.9
Latin America 1.4 0.7 0.6 2.7
8.6 4.3 3.1 16.0
There was a world-wide shortage of fertilizer in 1964 due to
rapidly increasing demand in the United States and Western Europe
and the import demand of the Soviet Union, China, India, and other
large consumers. However, production capacity is expanding rapidly
in the developed nations, and it appears likely there will be enough
capacity in operation to meet all needs in 1970.
Long-Range Development of Fertilizer Supplies
While the 1970 fertilizer requirements of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America will have to be met largely by imports, the larger
countries should plan to become self-sufficient in fertilizers by
1980. On the basis of 30 pounds of plant nutrients per person per
year, a country of 5,000,000 population, the minimum for a basic
factory, would need 75,000 tons of plant nutrients per year. The
annual production value of such a unit would be about $10 million.
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Fertilizer plants become progressively cheaper in both
capital and operating costs as they become larger, but the addi-
tional gain beyond 150,000 to 200,000 tons (nutrient basis) in
annual capacity is slight.
Smaller countries could establish a large fertilizer plant
cooperatively on a regional basis. West Africa, Central America,
and the Middle East seem to be areas where such an approach is
clearly desirable.
The economic feasibility of a fertilizer plant is determined
largely by (in addition to its size) its location with respect to
raw materials, markets, and transportation. Secondary factors in-
clude electric power, water, and labor supply. These factors may be
illustrated by the following diagram:
ELECTRIC WATER LABOR
POWER
RAW LSFERTILIZER TRANSPORT MARKETTRAESPORT PLANT4
A plant may be located at the raw materials, at the market, or any-
where between the raw materials and the market. The delivered cost
of the raw materials is the important criterion, and since water
transport is relatively cheap, coastal locations are preferable
when raw materials are shipped by water. Raw materials need not be
available in the nation itself. For example, Japan has the third
largest fertilizer industry in the world, next to the United States
and the Soviet Union, and yet Japan imports all her raw materials.
The raw materials needed for fertilizer production are four:
Hydrocarbons, preferably gaseous or liquid, to combine
with air and water to produce ammonia, the basic source of
nitrogen.
Phosphate rock.
Fertilizer
Potash salts.
Sulphur.
Table 5 shows the occurrence of these raw materials in the major
areas of the world.
Ammonia either can be used directly as a fertilizer or can be
converted into solid derivatives such as urea, ammonium nitrate,
ammonium sulfate, ammonium phosphate, and others; it can be used in
aqueous solutions, called nitrogen solutions, in combination with
ammonium nitrate and/or urea.
Phosphate rock is converted into any of several fertilizer
materials by treatment with sulfuric acid. This is why sulfur is
an essential raw material for fertilizer production. Potash salts
usually come to the fertilizer plant as potassium chloride or
potassium sulfate ready to be mixed with nitrogen and phosphate
materials.
The principal hydrocarbon raw materials used for producing
ammonia are natural gas, naphtha (raw gasoline), and crude oil.
Natural gas is used in the lowest cost plants. Naphtha is also
used, but it is usually more expensive than natural gas. Naphtha
is used extensively in India and Western Europe. Japan uses princi-
pally crude oil.
Capital costs for fertilizer plants may be summarized as
follows in terms of annual capacity:
Per 100,000 tons N $15,000,000-$20,000,000
Per 100,000 tons P205 $ 5,000,000-$10,000,000
Per 100,000 tons K 20 No processing required
Per 100,000 tons mixed $ 1,000,000-$ 1,500,000
*
fertilizer
Therefore construction of factories with a capacity to produce
30,000,000 tons of plant nutrients (16:8:6 ratio) in Asia, Africa,
*
Cost of blending plant in addition to cost of producing fer-
tilizers.
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TABLE 5. KNOWN RAW MATERIAL RESOURCES FOR FERTILIZER PRODUCTION
Hydrocarbon1
(for Nitrogen
Production) Phosphate Potash Sulfur 2
United States and Canada
Mexico and Central America
South America, West Coast
South America, East Coast
Western Europe
Eastern Europe
Soviet Union
North Africa
Sub-Sahara Africa
Middle East 3
India
Pakistan
China, Mainland
Japan
Indonesia
Rest of Southeast Asia
Oceania
+ + +
+ +
+
+ + +
+
+ +
+ + +
+ + +
+
+ ++ + ++ ++ +
+
+
+
0
0
0
0
0
+
+
+
+
+
0
0
+
+
+
+
+ +
+++ + ++ + +
++ + 0
+ +
+ + +
+
+
+
0
+
+
+ + +
0
0
+
0
0
+
+
+ +
+ +
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
+
0
0
0
+
0
0
0
+
1Gaseous and liquid hydrocarbons only; excludes coal.
2Includes elemental sulfur and sulfur content of pyrites.
3Includes Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan,
Arabian states, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan.
Ample resources.
Good resources.
Scarcity of resources.
ONot known.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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and Latin America would cost about $4 billion--one tenth the cost
of putting a man on the moon.
Cheaper fertilizer may be obtained from recently built
nitrogen factories in areas with a plentiful supply of cheap nat-
ural gas, such as the Persian Gulf, North Africa, Venezuela, and
Trinidad. Plants established there could ship liquid ammonia to the
consuming countries for conversion to solid fertilizer, or they
could make and ship solid fertilizers directly. Typical of such a
large low-cost nitrogen plant is a new factory in Trinidad with a
capacity of 150,000 tons that uses the cheap natural gas available
there. A similar plant is now under construction in Kuwait in the
Persian Gulf. Another approach to cheaper fertilizer is to ship
liquefied natural gas from gas surplus areas such as the Persian
Gulf to places with a large fertilizer demand, like India.
The new approach of local blending can lessen the difficulty
of distribution. Bulk blending at the local warehousing sites can
be a cheap means of combining the three varieties of fertilizer in
any proportion that local soils or crops require. Such blending
plants are small, efficient, and low in capital costs. They fVunc-
tion equally well with imported or locally made materials, as long
as the particle sizes are roughly equal. The blended product can be
sold in bulk or in bags. Bulk blending favors the decentralization
of storage and the accumulation of stock in the agricultural re-
gions well ahead of the rush season.
The cost of setting up a bulk-blending plant in a provincial
town on a railroad siding, and providing stockpile storage for
3,000 tons of fertilizer mixing ingredients, may run approximately
$100,000.
Such plants ease fertilizer distribution because only three
main ingredients need to be handled to provide any possible combi-
nation of the three major plant nutrients. They provide a local
supply base upon which the farmer can rely and thereby increase the
chances that he will get the mix he needs when he needs it.
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IRRIGATION WATER
Irrigation agriculture is the most productive kind of farming
devised by man. It is also the most expensive. The capital costs of
providing the water for irrigation agriculture are commonly so large
that they cannot be fully met by the farmers themselves but must be
spread throughout the economy.
Because of its high capital and operating costs, irrigation
agriculture must be intensive. The yields per unit of water must be
high, which usually requires an intensive use of land. If the water
is spread on too much land, a large per cent of the water will be
lost through seepage and useless evapotranspiration. To maintain
the high yields required by the high cost of irrigation agriculture,
all other factors of production--fertilizers, pest control, high-
yield seeds, and effective farm practices--must be used to full ad-
vantage. Many aspects of water supply through irrigation are illus-
trated in Chart 1 in this section. In many irrigation projects,
attention has been too much concentrated on construction of central
facilities (shown between the dotted lines on the chart) with
inadequate attention to other aspects of water management.
Water Needs of Crops
Four factors--the potential evapotranspiration during the
growing season, the permeability of the soil, the quality of the
water, and the salt tolerance of the crops--determine the amount of
irrigation water that must be applied for maximum crop yields in a
particular situation. Whether the supply of these amounts is economic
in a given situation is of course a different question, depending
on the cost of water supply, the value of the crops to be produced,
and the consequences for yields of less than optimal water inputs.
Evapotranspiration depends largely on the length of the grow-
ing season and the amount of sunlight. The amount of water required
by different crops varies over a wide range. Winter wheat in West
Irrigation Water
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Pakistan, for example, needs about 14 inches of water to meet the
evapotranspiration requirement, while sugar cane and cotton, be-
cause of their long growing season, which extends from early spring
through the high water-demanding months of summer to late fall,
may demand 50 or 60 inches.
In sandy soils much of the water will be lost by downward
percolation, and hence for any particular crop the amount of water
required will be far greater than the evapotranspiration require-
ment. In a tight silty or clayey soil little water will be lost by
downward percolation.
Sufficient additional water must be supplied to prevent salt
accumulation in the soil. The dissolved salts can be carried off in
the return flows or leached into the underground. With salty irri-
gation water and crops of low salt tolerance, a great deal more
water must be applied to the fields than is required to meet the
evapotranspiration potential. For crops of medium salt tolerance,
such as maize and sugar cane, irrigation with water containing 2,000
parts per million of salt, the excess of applied water must be about
70 per cent over the evapotranspiration requirement.
Sources of Irrigation Water
Water for irrigation can be gathered from a large or infertile
area to be used on a relatively small fertile area, or water in ex-
cess of evapotranspiration during the wet season can be stored for
use during dry parts of the year. It may be stored either on the
surface behind dams or bunds or underground, usually in porous
alluvium or limestone.
Without storage the farmers are dependent for their irriga-
tion water on variable and unpredictable river flows, which cannot
be timed to coincide with crop growing seasons. If water can be
stored, the farmers are able to use it when their crops require it;
consequently they can plant crops whose growing season does not
match the rhythm of the rivers. When the river flows are peaked
during part of the growing season, a combined use of river flows
and stored waters makes it possible to use more river water, and a
Irrigation Water
larger area can be planted and harvested. Stored water can also
be used during low river stages and thus double or triple cropping
becomes possible on the same fields.
Short-Term Water Development
Small-scale water improvements can be accomplished by the
farmers themselves. They include the construction of earthen tanks
and small hillside dams, the construction of water spreading struc-
tures to increase recharge of the underground aquifer, digging and
rigging shallow wells, the construction of water courses to carry
the water from government canal systems and from wells to farm
fields, terracing, building bunds, and water guidance structures
to conserve rain water, and digging drainage ditches to carry off
irrigation return flows.
Larger structures require engineering design and special
equipment and often help from the government. These include tube
wells, which must be drilled and fitted with casing, pumps, and
motors by specialists; collector drains for return flows; under-
ground drains, such as tile drains, ditches, and sumps for salt
and water table control; and small deep wells for village drinking
water. Reclamation of saline or sodium damaged soils by leaching
with surplus irrigation waters may require government guidance.
The farmers also need instruction in land leveling, the construc-
tion of water distribution systems in their fields, and proper
irrigation practices.
Tube wells can be privately constructed, owned, and operated,
but the spacing, the depth, and the quantity of water pumped must
be controlled by the government through licensing arrangements,
and the quality of the pumped water must be continuously monitored
to prevent salt damage. Tube wells on a large-scale pattern in-
volving hundreds of thousands or even millions of acres must be
government projects.
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Long-Term Water Development
Large-scale water development, involving the construction of
dams on major rivers, diversion structures, and canal systems, takes
many years and often involves bringing new lands under cultivation.
Planning farm villages and building roads, schools, marketing,
storage, and other facilities must be part of the project, as well
as the preparation of the new lands for cultivation. The costs are
usually so high that only the national government can bear them.
Attention is often focused on the construction of major
public works while other aspects are neglected. These include I
conservation of the watershed above the dam and provision for
drainage to carry off canal leakage and irrigation return flows.
Neglect of the watershed may mean that silt from rapid
erosion will quickly fill up the reservoir back of the dam so
that its life will be limited to a few decades. Erosion control
can double or triple the life of the reservoir.
Many irrigation projects fail because of lack of drainage.
Excess water, instead of draining off the irrigated fields, simply
seeps into the underground and raises the water table. The water
table may also be raised by canal leakage. When the underground
water has risen sufficiently, water is sucked up by capillary
action and evaporates at the surface, a residue of salt accumulates
in the fields, and the productivity of the land gradually diminishes.
Drainage of excess irrigation water to maintain salinity control is
as important in the long run as providing the water in the first
place.
Supply and Pricing of Irrigation Water to the Farmers
In many countries government pricing and distribution policies
for irrigation water are not designed to lead to optimum agricul-
tural development. Instead of water being supplied on the demand
of the farmer it is provided on a regular schedule to each farmer
in seguence. The price he pays is based not on the amount of water
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used but on the area of land irrigated. The ideal water delivery
policy would be to make the water available to the individual farmer
in the quantities and at the time he needs it for his crops and to
charge him for the amount of water actually used. At a minimum the
farmer needs better advance information than he often gets on the
probable availability of water for the coming growing season.
Already Cultivated Land Rather Than New Land
In many areas greater benefit in relation to costs will be
obtained from an increase in the productivity of already cultivated
land than by attempting to bring new lands under cultivation. This
is particularly true in monsoon tropical areas where one very wet
season is succeeded by seven to nine months of dry season. In the
Ganges-Brahmaputra Plain of India and East Pakistan, productivity
could be increased several fold by developing irrigation water
supplies so that two or three crops could be grown instead of the
single monsoon crop.
It is commonly assumed that agriculture is such a simple
human occupation that the farmer will immediately be able to move
in and start a wholly new productive economy. This is usually very
far from reality. Pilot agricultural trials need to be undertaken
in the area where extensive development of new land is planned in
order to gain the knowledge and the experience necessary for prof-
itable and economically sound operation. Such pilot trials can
often be made with ground water available locally in the area or
by diverting a portion of river flows through small inundation
canals. These pilot trials of irrigation practices are an illus-
tration of the principle of local experimentation stressed in
Chapter Six.
Value of Short-Term, Small-Scale Projects
Water storage for irrigation is one of the principal justi-
fications for such spectacular public works as great dams and aque-
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ducts. These structures, though enormously popular with local
politicians and with project-minded administrators of aid-giving
agencies, and necessary to take full advantage of river flows, re-
quire a high degree of centralized operation and a uniform timing
of water supplies over large areas. This seriously inhibits the
flexibility and freedom of individual farmers to vary their crop-
ping patterns. Major irrigation works place a strain on both the
villagers' social structure and the government apparatus that has
at time proved unbearable. Villagers may refuse the new forms of
social organization (in land tenure, for example) required by
irrigation; the government may prove unable to devise and impose
the necessary new patterns of behavior.
Underground storage of water and withdrawal by means of
wells give far more freedom. The drama and impressiveness of
large-scale projects should not blind us to the immense value
and the great potential of less conspicuous projects.
IMPROVED SEED
Superior varieties of crops are fundamental to the program
of supplying improved seeds. So long as only the common unimproved
varieties are used, little profit is usually gained from giving
special consideration to problems of seed supplies. Common seed
for planting is available to the farmer within his own community.
Limited exceptions occur among some of the vegetable and fodder
crops whose seeds are not routinely harvested.
When a variety has been developed through selection or
breeding and has proved superior, producing and distributing its
seed become important to agricultural productivity. Improved vari-
eties, however, are superior with reference to only a particular
set of environmental circumstances. The best varieties for one
region may be completely useless in another. A proven variety is
superior because of genetic characteristics bred into it that give
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adaptation to specific conditions of soil and climate, high yield-
ing capacity, resistance to drought or cold, resistance to diseases
and insects, nutritive value, acceptability of taste and texture,
desirable growth habit, and other characteristics that enable it to
perform better than other varieties. Highly improved varieties tend
to have limited geographical adaptation and therefore limited dis-
tribution patterns. The factors involved in the marketing of seeds
are illustrated in Chart 2.
Chart 2
THE CHAIN OF IMPROVED SEED MARKETING
FUNCTION ACTION AGENCIES INSPECTION AND
CONTROL AGENCIES
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Unique Characteristics of Seeds
Because of the special characteristics of seeds, the require-
ments for their successful production and distribution are somewhat
different from those of other purchasable inputs. Among these char-
acteristics are the following:
1. The fundamental qualities of the variety can be maintained
only by the use of authentic planting stocks and careful production
practices. Its characteristics cannot be assessed by research sta-
tion tests, but only by the field performance of plants produced
from the seed.
2. Seeds are living entities that require special procedures
and handling in all steps of production, processing, storing, and
distribution to ensure that the seed reaching the farmer will be
viable.
3. Since the origin of farmer seed supplies is a small se-
lected lot of pre-existing seeds, several generations are required
to multiply the stocks from the original nucleus of breeder seed
to the thousands or millions of pounds required by the farmers.
4. Seed-borne diseases and contaminants such as weed seeds
will reduce the productivity of the crop and must be avoided.
Methods of Reproduction
Crops vary widely in their methods of reproduction or seed
multiplication.
Such crops as potatoes, sugar cane, and rubber are propagated
by asexual or vegetative means, that is, by cuttings, budding,
grafting, or tubers. Aside from mislabeling and mechanical mixing,
the main precaution is to avoid contamination with systemic dis-
eases such as viruses.
The naturally self-pollinated crops such as wheat, rice, and
beans are relatively free from danger of contamination of the vari-
ety by natural cross-pollination. With sufficient care to prevent
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mechanical mixing, seed of varieties of this kind of crop can be
easily reproduced through successive generations of the multipli-
cation process.
The naturally cross-pollinated crops present special problems
for seed production. To prevent genetic contamination from other
varieties due to cross-pollination, seed fields of either open
pollinated varieties or hybrids must be isolated by as much as
one-fourth mile from other fields of the same crop. Furthermore, as
the open-pollinated varieties are subject to genetic shift during
reproduction, special precautions must be taken in selection and
breeding to maintain the genetic integrity of the variety.
Classes of Seed
Several classes of seed are generally recognized in the stages
from the plant breeders' program to the farmers' fields. Breeder
seed is maintained under rigidly exacting conditions and serves as
a source for producing the stock seed. Stock seed in turn is used
to produce the commercial seed that is distributed to farmers.
Maintenance of an adequate supply of breeder seed is normally the
task of the experiment station at which the variety was developed.
In the case of proprietary varieties the company that owns the
variety normally maintains the breeder seed. From the nucleus of
breeder seed there must be an orderly program for multiplying the
stock seed. This step may be carried out by governmental seed farms,
by individual farmer-producers under appropriate supervision, or by
seed companies under contract with producers or in their own fields,
also under supervision. Since any changes in genetic characteristics
that occur during multiplication of the stock seed will be passed
on to the commercial seed produced from it, it is essential that
great care be exercised during this stage. Commerical seed is pref-
erably produced by farmer-producers independently or under contract
with seed companies.
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Seed Marketing
The major requirements for successful seed marketing proce-
dures include:
Facilities for processing (including drying immediately after
harvest), cleaning, grading, treating, and bagging.
Facilities for storage and distribution at the wholesale
level.
Facilities within easy reach of individual farmers for the
retail distribution of properly labeled seed of good quality. Be-
cause of the localized nature of varietal adaptation and of seed
production, wholesale facilities may in some cases be less urgent.
Individual farmers, cooperatives, or small seed firms may produce
and sell to farmers in their areas.
A merchandizing and information program that takes the seed
to the farmer.
Supervisory and control work should be carried out by es-
tablishing seed laws and seed quality standards with an enforce-
ment agency, seed laboratories, and seed certification agencies.
TOOLS AND MACHINERY
Tools and machinery multiply the power of human muscle. They
give the farmer greater control over his production environment and
make possible new forms of cultivation and the farming of greater
areas per farmer. Animal-drawn and motor-powered equipment are also
used for transport. Improved hand tools are likely to be a useful
input at the earliest stage of development; motor-powered machinery,
with its much higher capital and operating costs, usually comes late
in the process, though just when it should come is subject to debate.
Tools and Machinery
Tools
Tools in most underdeveloped lands are few in number, crude,
and apparently inefficient. Since in some areas the only tools in
use today are those used two thousand or more years ago, there would
seem to be room for considerable improvement. Here again, however,
technology is not easily transplanted. Many efforts to transplant
tools have failed, often because the tool was designed for different
conditions--metal plows that are effective on temperate-zone soils
but not in the tropics are one example.
Yet opportunities exist for providing farmers with better
tools. Adaptive research is needed, and it must take into account
all the factors involved. The new tool must of course be tested.
The innovating agency must determine also whether the tool can be
conveniently repaired in the village, whether its use clashes with
the farmer's custom or habit, and whether he has the skill to use
it. Animal-drawn equipment must be adapted to the strength and
bodily structure of the local animals. The most attractive innova-
tions in tools would be cheap, simple to operate, and such that
they could be maintained (or if possible made) in the village it-
self. These may be single inputs that can raise yields without
forming part of a package.
The design and distribution of such simple tools has not
attracted much manufacturer interest. The long research time needed
and the low profits to be gained (particularly in the case of a
tool to be made in the village) make such tools commercially unat-
tractive. Thus it is likely that at least the early stages of tool
development will have to be carried out by the government. Once
the tool has proved to be successful it may be desirable to interest
private companies in its manufacture and distribution (including
maintenance).
Some examples of promising areas of innovation are:
Plows. Bullock-drawn plows often fail to use the animal's
potential power and do not prepare the soil as well as required for
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maximum yields. Different methods of hitching could increase the
animal's effective power and therefore the depth of plowing, and
in some cases it would then be possible to plow with one instead
of two bullocks.
Harvesting implements. Sickles and scythes, little known in
the tropics, are efficient for harvesting grains on small farms.
They could replace straight-blade knives and the hand-picking of
rice heads.
Threshing equipment. Machines operated by foot pedal (or
motor), now used in Japan and Taiwan, are efficient for threshing
on small farms. They could be useful in other countries where rice
or wheat is grown.
Multipurpose equipment with rubber tires. A French-designed
form of animal-drawn equipment called "tropiculture" has been suc-
cessfully introduced in Senegal and Madagascar. It has a draw bar
to which various implements--plows, disk, a lift--can be attached.
Despite its many uses, the equipment has no nuts or bolts to lose
and is simple to maintain. It also rides on rubber wheels. Rubber
wheels to replace traditional narrow wooden wheels are an attrac-
tive possibility in many areas. They greatly increase the range of
the cart (and the farmer's access to markets) because they are
easier for the animal to pull, and they avoid the damage done to
roads by wooden wheels. Such wheels can often be made from discarded
automobile tires.
Machinery
When to introduce motor-powered machinery is a complex ques-
tion. After a period of overhasty and often disastrous attempts to
mechanize, the trend of thinking in many quarters has turned in the
opposite direction, and it is often assumed that machines such as
tractors have no place in most underdeveloped nations at the present
stage. The argument is that these nations are short of capital but
have abundant surplus labor (unemployed or underemployed); there-
fore an expensive labor-saving machine is not what they need.
Tools and Machinery
We found that this assumption needs to be re-examined, for
the issues involved are complex. We found that machinery may some-
times be the only way to raise yields and that, far from saving
labor, such machines as tractors are often labor-complementary--
that is, their use increases rather than decreases the demand for
labor.
Two key factors here are planting dates and soil preparation.
Multicropping may in some cases be possible only with powered ma-
chinery. This is true if planting dates are critically short or if
the soil for the second crop cannot be prepared except by machine.
Machinery often makes it possible for the farmer to prepare the
soil better and to seed more precisely. Thus significant yield in-
creases may require machinery even when surplus labor is available.
Often the time during which a crop must be planted for maxi-
mum yield is limited to a few days of the year. That time is the
farmer's limiting factor. That he is underemployed much of the rest
of the year is irrelevant, for he can plant only in those few days.
This is a fairly common situation in the underdeveloped world. The
use of a tractor at the planting season can break through that lim-
iting factor. For soil preparation the ground may often be too hard
to plow with animal-drawn equipment at the optimum time of year.
When machinery permits double cropping, or larger plantings
of a crop such as rice that is labor intensive in other stages as
well as planting, the effect is to increase the demand for labor.
What happens is that the farmer's effective labor is increased at
those key times when he is fully employed in any case. His larger
crops then require more labor at other times of the year. Another
example of labor-complementary machinery is pumps for irrigation,
which make possible more intensive cultivation and therefore raise
the demand for labor.
Another consideration is that many machines replace draft
animals. While many draft animals in underdeveloped countries now
subsist largely on wastes or on the products of uncultivated land,
there is a requirement in some areas for land for growing feed for
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draft animals. If their tasks were mechanized, that land could be
devoted to food crops or to grazing for meat animals. This consid-
eration may be important in densely populated areas, where arable
land is scarce and where people do not get enough protein in their
diet.
There is also the question of prestige. As noted earlier, one
of the most subtle barriers to agricultural progress is the low sta-
tus of agriculture. Farming is drudgery and it is "primitive"; the
bright innovative people needed for its progress flee instead to
the modern world of the city. Machines are a symbol of that modern
world. The presence of tractors and other machines in rural areas
may serve to demonstrate that being a farmer and being "modern" are
not mutually exclusive. The status of the farmer may be raised.
Even if he does not have a tractor himself, he may see it as an
eventual goal--his "horizon of the possible" is widened. A young
farmer may stay and work for a tractor instead of emigrating to the
city, and to get that tractor, with the status it symbolizes, he
may be willing to innovate.
For all these reasons we believe that mechanization must be
examined in the light of the full range of issues involved, not
summarily dismissed on the single and oversimplified issue of labor
saving. We do not, however, underestimate the formidable problems
it raises, and we certainly do not advocate quick and catastrophic
policies of hasty mechanization.
We would emphasize that the question of status must be han-
dled carefully, for if the proposed mechanization is uneconomic
the return in status (and the effect on productive attitudes) may
well prove illusory. Maintenance is an acute problem that must be
solved before any degree of mechanization is possible. Repair fa-
cilities do not exist; the supply of parts is erratic; mechanics
are scarce; and, perhaps most important, farmers in underdeveloped
nations have not grown up around machines and therefore do not
understand such requirements as oiling that are familiar to people
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from mechanized cultures even if they are not themselves mechanics.
Under these circumstances the life of the machine will be short.
Nor are many individual small farmers going to be able to
afford to own a tractor. Tractors may be provided by a government-
operated station that gives custom service to the farmers, or they
may be bought by farmer cooperatives (the latter being more likely
to succeed if the cooperative is already a going concern). If the
government station also provides drivers who perform the actual
operations, the maintenance is simplified since the station, not
the farmer, is responsible for the care of the machines. It should
be expected that such tractor pools will run at a loss for one or
more years until farmers become familiar with the potential uses
of machinery. Comilla in East Pakistan (see Appendix A) has found
that under its conditions the minimum size of the tractor pool for
economic operation is likely to be 12-15 machines, but the question
deserves study in other locations.
The machines must also be adapted to local conditions. The
innovating agency should be imaginative in choosing machines that
are versatile in their potential use (tractors have proved useful
for transport in East Pakistan, for example). Such secondary uses
may make the difference between profit and loss. Machines developed
only in temperate-zone climates and with ready maintenance available
are likely to break down quickly in tropical conditions. It may
well be advisable to sacrifice some other assets, such as power,
in order to have a machine that is durable in the tropics.
PEST CONTROL
Pest control is the art of protecting crops and harvested
farm products from being destroyed by disease or eaten by insects
and rodents or choked by weeds.
Pest control in many situations could be a valuable single
input. Probably the best example is rats. In India, one observer
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has estimated, there are about ten rats per person, and they eat an
estimated 27,000,000 tons of food annually--one third of the coun-
try's production. Even if the estimate is far too high, the poten-
tial saving from rat control is enormous. Much of the food is eaten
by rats in the fields, and the rest in storage. In West Africa an
estimated 25 per cent of the food produced is lost to pests in
storage. Cattle cannot be raised in large parts of Africa because
of the tsetse fly, which carries sleeping sickness. In such situa-
tions pest control can be successful as a single physical input,
provided the means exist to control pests.
Pesticides interact strongly with other inputs in the later
stages of agricultural development. The need for pesticides rises
steeply as development proceeds, because the other inputs often
create conditions that favor the growth of disease and pests.
Take, for example, an irrigation project to which fertilizer
and improved crop varieties are added. Multicropping is now possible
where before only one annual crop was grown. This provides a year-
round supply of plant life for disease and pests. Thicker foliage
and solid stands of single varieties support more pests and make
the entire wiping out of a crop more likely. In Egypt, in areas
where multicropping has been achieved, army worms move from corn to
sorghum and back again with the change in crops.
In these cases, pest control is a "late" input. The return on
investment in pesticides is likely to rise rapidly after the other
inputs are in use; and so does the potential danger of massive crop
destruction. Pest control is likely to be an indispensable input in
a package providing for intensive cultivation.
Being poisons, the use of some chemical pesticides involves
dangers, which are likely to be much greater in underdeveloped na-
tions where the rate of illiteracy is high, for the farmer cannot
read the warnings attached to the package. Poisons designed, say,
for rats may kill human beings or domestic animals; or pesticides
applied to crops may upset a natural equilibrium by killing, along
with the insects that feed on the crops, other insects that normally
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eat these insects. By removing the second insect the pesticide
application ensures that an increasing amount of pesticide will be
needed. For some cotton crops the increasing need for pesticides
has driven the cost of production beyond an economic return on the
crop. The dangers involved in using poisons can be avoided where
biological controls are possible. An example is the breeding and
release of wasps that feed on the rhinoceros beetle that attacks
coconuts in Africa and in the Pacific.
Pest control in many cases shares an important characteristic
with major irrigation projects: the need for a high degree of social
control. Many forms of pest control cannot be usefully adopted by a
single farmer or even a majority within a community. This is true
for controlling migratory insects and diseases that spread from one
field to the next. In order for the pest to be successfully con-
trolled, each farmer in the area must be convinced or coerced to
join the program.
Widespread pest-control programs can be carried out by the
government, and it can recover its costs fairly easily in the case
of export cash crops. When the cacao trees of Ghana were attacked
by swollen shoot, the government carried out a compulsory control
program, first by cutting down the stricken trees, later by spray-
ing. The program was financed by an export tax on cacao. But with
subsistence crops the government would be unable to recover its
costs in this way.
A notable success in social mobilization was scored in the
Taiwanese campaign against rats. Before the campaign Taiwan lost
between 150,000 and 200,000 metric tons of food annually to rats.
The saving from the campaign is estimated at about 140,000 tons of
food a year. The main problem was to secure popular cooperation in
setting out rat poison and then to find out what had in fact been
accomplished. The program was a voluntary one directed at communi-
ties rather than individuals. The government and the Joint Commis-
sion on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) provided materials, and the
community put up its labor. (See Appendix A.) In 1956 the program
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was successfully tested in 14 communities. The following year 309
communities asked to participate. To find out if the rats were
being killed, as well as to provide motivation for putting out the
poison, the government offered a bounty for each rat tail turned
in. In 1957 the farmers of Taiwan turned in 6.9 million rat tails.
Since only about one in every four dead rats is found, this repre-
sented the extermination of about 27 million rats--more than half
the island's rat population.
Chapter Four
THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
In framing any policy for agricultural development, agricul-
tural as well as industrial fundamentalism should be avoided.
Some of the most chronic difficulties of agriculture can be effec-
tively resolved only by developments in the nonagricultural
sectors of the economy. On the other hand, the agricultural
sector is too important to be left to develop by itself while na-
tional planning concentrates on industrialization. It is therefore
necessary that a plan for agricultural development be designed and
carried out as an integral part of planning for general economic
development.
We recognize that measures to increase productivity may come
into conflict with measures to realize other important objectives
of policy, for example, equity in income distribution, self-
sufficiency (independence from foreign aid at the very least,
autarky at the very most), political stability, and fulfillment of
certain wants such as education that are above and beyond the
levels dictated by market tests. Economists need not restrict them-
selves to making productivity-oriented recommendations while merely
mentioning other objectives. They have to recognize the multiplic-
ity of, and conflicts among objectives of public policy. In the
field of agricultural policy the concentration of limited develop-
mental resources on a few regions that promise the greatest returns,
or on large farms, may be desirable from the point of view of
productivity but run counter to the objective of equity in the
distribution of gains from growth. Economists should face such con-
flicts squarely and try to clarify and quantify the implications of
feasible alternatives for various objectives. The allocation of
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funds should depend on both technology and tastes--on the techno-
logical possibilities that determine the rate at which gains in
terms of one objective can be traded for gains in terms of the
other, and the policymakers' tastes or value judgments that deter-
mine the rate at which they are willing to trade gains toward the
achievement of one goal for gains in terms of the other. Given a
reasonable amount of data, which can be collected, economists can
order alternatives according to their efficacy in realizing a num-
ber of objectives. Meanwhile in developing our proposals we have
kept both efficiency and nonefficiency objectives in view.
We would like to emphasize that, in order to obtain satisfac-
tory rates of improvement in the living standard over the longer
run, measures to increase food production must be coupled with
measures to control population growth. The governments of poor
countries should not only expand and improve the administrative
efficiency of current population control programs but also seri-
ously consider the introduction of such additional measures as
legalization of abortion under specified conditions, sterilization,
and the possible use of recently discovered cheap and effective
intrauterine devices.
We have focused our attention on the following aspects of
agricultural policy: product and input price policy, credit policy,
farm insurance, market reform, and policy concerning the size,
tenure, and organization of farms. We have also set out some consid-
erations relevant to using surplus agricultural commodities imported
under special arrangements, and to schemes for rural public works.
Current policies relating to all these subjects require urgent
review and revision. The relative importance, or priority, to be
given to individual policy changes would depend on the particular
situation of every country and on its political will and adminis-
trative capacity* to make those changes.
The requirements of administrative capacity are elaborated
further in Chapter Six.
Price Policy
PRICE POLICY
It cannot be asserted that all farmers everywhere respond
strongly to economic incentives. However, a growing volume of evi-
dence shows that with a minimum degree of monetization and the de-
velopment of transport a fairly large proportion of farmers do re-
spond to them in some aspects of their behavior. It follows that
while all necessary techno-organizational measures should be taken
to increase the physical outputs obtainable from given inputs, these
measures should be combined with economic policies designed to take
advantage of the price responsiveness of supply and factor demand
wherever it is positive. In many situations the rate of absorption
of new knowledge and inputs may depend critically on the price and
risk milieu.
Any policy to improve the price milieu of developing agricul-
ture should take into account and, if necessary, influence the
variability of agricultural prices, which affects the riskiness
of farming; the relative prices of various crops, which affect the
allocation of land and other inputs among crops; the ratio of the
general level of agricultural product prices to the level of agri-
cultural input prices; and the ratio of the general level of agri-
cultural product prices to the general level of nonagricultural
prices.
Although these price relationships are distinct in theory,
any set of price regulation measures will simultaneously affect all
of them to some extent. For example, if the government successfully
establishes price floors for two or three major crops of the coun-
try, the downvward price fluctuation will be restricted and relative
prices, the output-input price ratio, and the terms of trade of
agriculture will all be altered in some degree. Therefore it is nec-
essary that the price policies followed be based on a consideration
of their effects on all the key price relationships.
About the desirability of price stability there can be little
argument. Price fluctuations add immeasurably to the risks facing
the cultivator and do not afford sufficient offsetting advantages
to the community as a whole. A fall in the price of wheat between
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planting and harvesting or over a series of harvest years can
render an apparently profitable investment in fertilizer or pesti-
cides or new capital equipment uneconomic. And the adverse effects
of declines may not be balanced by gains from price increases of
equal number and magnitude in later years because of the limited
capital that most peasant farmers possess. Hence the need for the
administration of floor prices for a few selected crops.
Price stability cannot be willed by legislative fiat. An
adequate warehouse and transportation network is required for
stock operations designed to reduce price instability. Of course
price stability need not, and should not, be absolute. Besides
normal seasonal fluctuations reflecting carrying charges, flexi-
bility should be allowed between fixed minima and maxima in order
to remove some of the burdens of changes in demand and supply from
the storage system.
An alternative to direct price stabilization from the view-
point of reducing risk is a system of forward markets that would
enable the cultivator to ensure the price of at least a part of
his crop prior to planting. But it should be remembered that fu-
tures markets in the more advanced countries have been of much
more help to processors than to growers in reducing price risks.
In any case the problems of making futures markets accessible to
peasant farmers in the developing countries are formidable enough
to rule out futures markets as an alternative to direct price
stabilization operations in the immediate future.
Studies of the effects of changes in the relative prices of
different agricultural products on the allocation of the existing
stock of inputs among products show that farmers respond to changes
in prices by redirecting their efforts in accordance with shifts
in profitability. Therefore, insofar as it is desired to increase
the output of a few important food and fiber crops by a transfer
of inputs among competing crops, the objective can be realized
through the manipulation of the relative prices of competing crops.
The shortages of such essential commodities as wheat, rice,
and cotton are so acute in some countries that in addition to other
Price Policy
measures it is absolutely necessary to administer floor prices for
these major crops both to stabilize their prices and to obtain some
increases in output by improving their relative prices.
The fixing of floor prices requires technical studies and
some experimental action. The floors at the very least should pre-
vent price crashes in case significant output increases do materi-
alize. Preferably they should cover the cultivating costs of at
least the more efficient farmers using improved practices. If
necessary they may include an incentive element over and above the
cost of cultivation. The levels fixed will have to lie somewhere
between the anticrash level and the cost of cultivation (with or
without an incentive element), depending on the responsiveness of
output. More investigation is needed to determine the magnitude of
that response, either by examining reactions to price changes that
in fact have taken place or by experimental manipulation in selected
regions. Price floors should be held stable for several years--say,
three--and should be adjustable or removable after each such period;
and the government must make arrangements for direct purchase at the
floor prices from farmers in a sufficient number of primary agricul-
tural markets.
When we consider the growth of the over-all level of agricul-
tural output rather than the output of individual crops, it is
clear that the price ratio of outputs to inputs is as important as
the relative prices of outputs, if not more so. Price ratios more
favorable to cultivators can be brought about both by raising out-
put prices and by lowering the prices of inputs to the farmer.
Each course of action has its positive as well as its negative
features.
The outstanding advantage of subsidizing purchasable inputs
like fertilizers, pesticides, equipment, and livestock rather than
raising product prices is that the cost of the subsidy program is
directly related to the utilization of practices that increase
productivity. The cost to the economy as a whole of increasing agri-
cultural output is likely to be lower in the case of subsidies and
can be borne through the tax system. More resources are available
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for development of the nonagricultural sectors of the economy as
well as other purposes; the government can avoid the political
consequences of higher food and fiber prices to the nonagricul-
tural population; and, equally important, the cultivator must
employ purchasable inputs to reap any advantage whatsoever from
input subsidies. By contrast higher product prices add to the
income of both noninnovators and innovators. This windfall income
may to some extent vitiate the incentive provided for increasing
production by the improved ratio of product to input prices by
increasing the marginal preference for leisure relative to labor
of at least some farmers.
The case for higher product prices can turn some of these
very arguments to advantage. The very fact that a program of input
subsidies costs less than a program of product price supports
means that the agricultural sector derives a smaller income from
the first program than from the second. This is an important
consideration, for it can be argued that at current price rela-
tionships agriculture receives less than its "fair" share of the
national income, and that a major obstacle to innovation in
peasant agriculture is the lack of a capital cushion to absorb
the added fluctuations in income produced by many innovations, such
as fertilizer in areas dependent on variable weather. A second
argument for higher product prices is that input subsidies are of
no avail in situations in which increases in agricultural produc-
tivity come from additions of nonpurchasable inputs that are not
complementary with purchasable inputs--for example, the farmer's
labor in better cultivation, weeding, clearing, and local irriga-
tion and drainage channels. Third, if the use of purchasable inputs
is already widespread, the costs of input subsidies mount. More-
over, since noninnovators as well as innovators benefit, the
argument for input subsidies on the ground that they do not in-
crease the preference for leisure is weakened. If, however, the
use of improved inputs is not widespread, it is doubtful whether
the mere cheapening of inputs will by itself induce more farmers
to begin to use them.
Price Policy
Thus it should be clear that a blanket preference cannot be
given either to general price supports or to input subsidies. The
relative efficacy of the two means of improving the price ratio of
outputs to inputs depends on the existing level of input use, the
technological character of the measures necessary to increase pro-
ductivity, the relative importance of low cost and provision of a
cushion for risk-taking to the cultivator, and a value judgment
with respect to the distribution of incomes between the agricul-
tural and nonagricultural sectors. All but the last-named aspect of
the problem can be resolved by specific empirical research in each
country facing the choice between price supports and input subsi-
dies, and even the question of rural-urban income distribution can
be illuminated by such research.
The rural-urban question is of course most important when
we consider the relationship between the levels of agricultural
and nonagricultural prices. In this connection it is important to
remember that policymakers may be less free to depress the terms
of trade against agriculture during industrialization in democratic
countries with a peasant franchise than in the already industrial-
ized countries.
In summary, a feasible price policy mix for the near future
would include floors for a few selected crops determined on the
lines suggested; perhaps a program of subsidies for fixed as well
as working capital inputs; and an over-all policy to prevent a
serious deterioration of the rural sector's domestic terms of
trade. As a part of such a policy it would be desirable to grant
tariff protection to infant industries only when their output
actually attains a certain proportion, say, 10 to 20 per cent, of
the domestic demand. (Until that time subsidies might be granted.)
This action would prevent undue and premature increases in the
prices of many industrial products.
Countries depending mainly on a single export crop would con-
tinue to need international commodity agreements to have some
short-run price stability, but the provisions of these agreements
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must not jeopardize long-run price flexibility lest resources
remain overcommitted to the crops even when demand conditions
change.
Finally, the case for export subsidies on selected agricul-
tural commodities exported by developing countries is as economi-
cally valid as that for industry protection. Properly designed
subsidies should therefore not be frowned upon by international
agencies.
CREDIT
Three types of production credit may be distinguished: short-
term credit, for periods of a year or less; medium-term credit,
for periods exceeding one year but less than five years; and long-
term credit, for five years or more.
In order to be most productive, short-term credit from
official and cooperative sources should almost always be "super-
vised," that is, tied in with the farmer's performance. Loans
should be granted on condition that the borrower agree to adopt a
"package" of recommended inputs and practices. Second, loans should
be made primarily on the basis of the increased production poten-
tial of the package rather than upon the security of land or other
assets, so that credit is accessible to tenants and small farmers
as well as to larger farmers. Third, as far as possible they should
be made in kind in the form of the inputs themselves. Since offi-
cial credit cannot possibly meet the full credit requirements of
the agricultural sector, it should be channeled primarily to meet
the financial needs of innovation.
In order to facilitate loan recoveries, it may be useful to
link the provision of credit with marketing. However, where market-
ing is undertaken by a governmental or semiofficial cooperative
agency, care should be taken to provide the services and conven-
iences provided by alternative private agencies such as boarding
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and lodging for farmers coming to sell grain in the town, prompt
payment, and emergency relief. Otherwise new agencies fail to
attract farmers. Alternatively the government may provide only a
storage service to farmers at a nominal charge. Official ware-
houses may give them negotiable warehouse receipts so that farmers
may market their produce whenever they can get a good price for it.
It is necessary to examine the possibility of revising the
current practice of charging a uniform interest rate for all short-
term official credit. The introduction of differential interest
rates on loans for different purposes might improve the use of
loan funds and recovery rates.
The actual role of traditional moneylenders deserves careful
empirical study as part of a broader study of the relative effi-
ciency of alternative systems for providing credit. Moneylenders
have many operational advantages such as intimate familiarity with
borrowers, readiness to grant risky loans, quick and low-cost loan
management, and a high rate of loan recovery. Since they provide
such a large proportion of the total rural credit needs on such a
wide scale the aim of eliminating them is utopian. Measures should
therefore be devised to build upon the advantages of their system
while eliminating any monopoly power or gains enjoyed by them.
One possibility that needs to be tried is the establishment of a
system of rediscounting credit instruments between the farmer and
the moneylender under specified conditions. Such paper could be
rediscounted by government agencies or commercial banks under cer-
tain governmental guarantees against a part of the losses. The
rediscount system would increase the flow of funds through the
traditional system, facilitate the entry of new moneylenders,
break the islands of monopoly, and lower the level of interest
rates. It might also induce commercial banks to enter the agricul-
tural money market as wholesalers if not as retailers of credit.
Any research studying alternative systems for providing agri-
cultural credit should distinguish and if possible separate the
three components of the gross interest charge--real interest, risk
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premium, and the cost of administration and collection. Quantita-
tive comparisons of these magnitudes will help improve the credit
system.
As a rule, provision is made for a far greater proportion of
the short-term credit needs of the rural sector than of the medium-
and long-term needs--for land improvement, minor irrigation, equip-
ment, and livestock--even though the longer-term needs are no less
urgent and important. More research is needed to estimate the real
degree of risk involved in medium- and long-term loans. It may be
that on the whole they are no more risky than short-term loans.
Since the traditional and commercial banking sectors fail to meet
medium- and long-term credit needs adequately, special new credit
agencies must be created to meet them.
The principle of linking loans with a "package" should be
fully extended to cover medium- and long-term loans. Medium- and
long-term packages as well as short-term packages should be super-
vised. The new agencies will need trained personnel to draft,
evaluate, and supervise medium- and long-term projects. Again,
commercial banks can also be induced to participate in the retail
or wholesale side of longer-term lending to farmers if they are
guaranteed against a part of the loss, and if they are provided
with technical help from the public sector. They may also need
some guarantee against losses due to inflation.
Special study is needed to improve long-term land mortgage
banking. Where land statutes, judicial decisions, or traditions
have clouded land titles and thus adversely affected the volume of
mortgage lending, it is necessary to clarify tenure for the purposes
of lending.
INSURANCE*
The risks of farming in poor countries may be classified into
In this section, risk and uncertainty are not distinguished,
Insurance
the overlapping categories of weather risks, pest risks, price
risks, risks of innovation, and administrative risks.
Although in principle almost all risks are insurable for a
certain premium, it is evident that the cost of weather and pest
insurance is likely to be prohibitive in developing countries until
normal loss-preventing technological developments--irrigation,
flood control, and widespread use of pesticides--have reduced
risks to a manageable magnitude. For a considerable time to come,
therefore, development schemes themselves should be regarded as
the main form of insurance. Some insurance against widespread crop
losses due to drought, floods, and the like is and may continue to
be provided through ad hoc land-tax relief, water-rate relief, and
famine and flood relief measures. At a subsequent stage of develop-
ment direct and regular weather and pest insurance might be
undertaken at a reasonably low cost, which will be less if the
insurance is compulsory than if it is voluntary.
The remedy for price risk is guaranteed purchase at minimum
prices. It has already been suggested in a previous section that
if major food and fiber crops are in short supply efficient sys-
tems of purchase at minimum prices should be established.
But the kind of insurance most urgently needed in developing
countries is "innovation insurance,"* that is, insurance against
loss following the use of new inputs and the adoption of improved
and the word insurance is used to mean any scheme of reduction or
sharing by public agencies of losses due to the uncertain behavior
of natural, economic, or other factors. It is not restricted to
mean only actuarially self-financing insurance.
*
"Innovation insurance" is a convenient term to describe the
scheme proposed here. But strictly speaking it is the innovator
who is insured, not the innovation. The scheme is described in
greater detail in Appendix B.
TT
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practices requiring substantial additional outlay. Farmers who
have little capital to fall back on are reluctant to incur this
cost, fearing that the additional return may not cover it. Even
if at the input and output prices prevailing in the market, or
determined by the government by means of input subsidies and out-
put price guarantees, the expected additional return is many times
the additional cost, as in the case of some innovations such as
hybrid corn seed, the rate of adoption may remain very low due to
initial uncertainties. Often the government experts recommending
the innovations are themselves uncertain about the results that
farmers may expect from them because the innovations have not been
adapted to and tested under the specific conditions in which the
farmers operate. In such circumstances it is necessary that the
package of recommended inputs and practices carry some insurance
with it in the initial years of trial.
We considered two alternative ways of providing the needed
cover. One proposal was that imported surplus commodities be
delivered as compensation to farmers in the event of the net return
from the package being less than an assured minimum, but it did not
find favor in view of the many serious operational difficulties it
would entail. The proposal eventually preferred by us was that,
since any program aiming at the widespread diffusion of a package
is and ought to be linked with a supervised credit system that
makes loans to farmers covering the bulk of the cost of the pack-.
age, risk coverage be provided in the form of the promise of
relief from a part of the total loan in case the additional yield
per acre turns out to be less than the yield equivalent of the
cost of the package. Only packages with a high ratio of returns to
costs--say, not less than three to one--should carry this insur-
ance, and the insurance fund should be distinct from the loan fund.
An insurance scheme of this kind has some obvious advantages.
It will make the package-promoting administration a risk partner
of the innovating farmer instead of a mere adviser and thereby in-
crease its interest in the rapid and successful diffusion of the
package. Where loans are already being granted, the administration
Insurance
of the scheme would require only additional inspection and book
adjustments. But the inspection system to check the actual appli-
cation of package inputs in the fields and to settle relief claims
will have to be designed with care. Base yields of insured farmers
will have to be fixed on the basis of average prepackage yields
estimated from revenue records and other evidence. The insured
farmers should be responsible for notifying the administration
that their harvest may generate claims. The fields of notifying
farmers will have to be inspected at appropriate times to deter-
mine their actual yields and settle their claims. The administra-
tion will have to have adequate technical staff and equipment for
all these purposes.
Although these administrative tasks are difficult, an exist-
ing supervised credit administration can be expanded to handle
them. The provision of innovation insurance is such a crucial
requirement for the success of an agricultural program that the
difficulties of administering it must be faced and resolved.
The experience of agricultural programs in some countries
makes it necessary to identify another class of risks in addition
to the ones already discussed. These are the risks that arise from
the failure of the government machinery to render its services to
the farmers in an efficient manner. If the seed, fertilizer, and
pesticide deliveries, the deliveries of irrigation water, and the
grant of loans and material permits and other permissions by the
government agencies are slow, untimely, and uncertain, farmers
depending on them incur losses. These risks due to the poor per-
formance of the administration are comparable in their incidence
to the risks due to the poor performance of the monsoon. And, like
the monsoon, they are so widespread that the main remedy must be
preventive. Direct insurance against them will be prohibitive for
a long time. However, an awareness of these risks should under-
score the dire need to expedite administrative reform. Also as far
as possible farmers should have access to alternative sources of
the supply of their inputs. Reliance on monopolistic suppliers,
official or nonofficial, can be extremely risky.
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MARKETING
Market reform ought to be an integral part of any policy for
agricultural development. Normal economic incentives to induce
farmers to increase productivity can operate only to the extent
that the marketing system enlarges the market for their produce
and brings them a reasonable price for it. Their desire to earn
larger cash incomes can be stimulated by a marketing system that
brings them cheap consumer goods, and their effort to increase
productivity can succeed only to the extent that the marketing
system delivers the needed inputs. Marketing is as critical to
better performance in agriculture as farming itself and should be
regarded and developed as such.
The government has the primary responsibility for providing
the essential elements of the infrastructure required for an
efficient marketing system: a good transport system, particularly
a network of arterial and feeder roads; public storage to supple-
ment private storage; a market information system; and a commodity
grading system. The direct and indirect effects of transport
development on agricultural productivity, through the expansion
and activation of the markets serving farmers, cannot be overem-
phasized. Efficient storage can cut the current heavy losses due
to bad storage. The government can build warehouses of its own and
provide technical assistance to private stockers to improve their
storage facilities. If produce brought by farmers is stored for a
nominal charge in public warehouses as their (the farmers') prop-
erty, for which they are given negotiable warehouse receipts,
they can liquidate their stocks into cash as and when they like
and thus obtain a better price for them. Better market information
also enables farmers to realize a better price for their produce by
removing market imperfections due to their ignorance of alterna-
tives.
A public grading service enables the farmers producing
higher-grade commodities to obtain correspondingly higher prices
Marketing
and induces others to improve the quality of their output. At the
same time it enables consumers to know what they are getting and
to get what they want. Often the expansion of commodity exports
depends critically on grading. It should be remembered, however,
that grading should be refined only pari passu with the refinement
of demand. It is necessary to beware of the danger that certain
types of quality control intended to raise the technical quality
of the product may have the effect of contracting the market if,
as a consequence, the price rises beyond the reach of a sizable
part of the market in an early stage of economic development.
It is easy to find fault with existing distribution agencies
but difficult to make new agencies perform all the necessary func-
tions that the old agencies are performing at a lower cost per
unit of sales. Therefore new marketing agencies promoted or run
by the government should aim at supplementing rather than sup-
planting the existing agencies wherever the latter operate on an
extensive scale. The concept of extension must be broadened to
cover the further education of traders, particularly small traders,
who abound in developing countries, and an information service
should be set up to help them improve their operations. In par-
ticular, traditional dealers should be educated to operate on a
low-price and high-turnover basis rather than a high-price and
low-turnover basis.
The relative efficiency of different kinds of marketing
agencies (private, public, and cooperative) should not be ideo-
logically prejudged. Empirical studies need to be undertaken to
estimate and compare the efficiency of marketing under different
arrangements. The efficiency of marketing can be measured by two
magnitudes: the cost of marketing per unit of a given turnover,
and the rate of growth of the turnover.
The existence of monopoly in agricultural marketing should
not be assumed but empirically established. Prima facie, in many
developing countries it seems that underemployment causes small-
scale trade to be very overcrowded and hence competitive. But
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where monopoly is definitely found to exist the government should
either open its own agencies to increase competition or, prefera-
bly, take measures to facilitate entry by more marketing units.
In any marketing policy, special attention should be given
to the improvement of the processing of agricultural commodities,
particularly the processing of perishable foods for city markets.
Modern processing plants in a short time can create substantial
additional income for farmers and stabilize, expand, and improve
the food supply of cities. Governments should establish processing
plants if they do not exist and/or help private agencies to estab-
lish them.
If marketing is deemed to be fully as "productive" as farm-
ing, the view of marketing margins current in some countries needs
revision. It is often believed that "high" marketing margins always
represent exploitation of the farmer. Although everything should
be done to minimize the cost of marketing, often the new marketing
agencies cannot really lower the cost of marketing if they perform
all the operations performed by the traditional agencies. Moreover,
the marketing margin and the return to the farmer for his resources
or his total revenue need not be negatively related. If the im-
provement of marketing (including processing) raises the marketing
margin but expands the market, the return to the farmer or his
total revenue may simultaneously increase.
If in some countries adequate technical and managerial skill
and financial resources are not available for large-scale process-
ing and marketing operations, it may be desirable to allow foreign
firms to collaborate with domestic firms under specified conditions.
In addition to the conditions that are usually stipulated in con-
temporary collaboration agreements--providing for joint capital
contributions, training of senior technical and managerial person-
nel, repatriation of funds, and so on--it may be useful to specify
that foreign collaboration will be definitely withdrawn after an
agreed number of years. This provision would emphasize the strictly
temporary, educative purpose of collaboration and allay suspicions
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of continuing domination by foreigners. If conditions are propi-
tious, on the termination of a collaboration agreement a foreign
concern may shift to another neglected field on the basis of a
similar collaboration agreement. Thus foreign skill and finances
can improve a number of marketing sectors in succession.
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SIZE, TENURE, AND ORGANIZATION OF FARMS*
Four general types of size-tenure situations may be distin-
guished: First is the small-farm situation that characterizes
densely settled regions. The ownership distribution is highly
skewed, but the overwhelming majority of operating units are small.
The large owners have leased out most of their lands. There are
relatively few large, owner-operated farms. In some areasholdings
have been so fragmented by inheritance that an individual may farm
several tiny plots, often widely scattered.
Second is the plantation situation. There are many large-
scale plantation units--some very efficient, some inefficient--
each employing large numbers of hired workers. There are some
owner-operated small-scale plantations. There are also "mixed"
haciendas where a part of the land is cultivated for the absentee
owners by laborers working under agents and a part is let out to
workers in small patches for cash, kind, and/or personal service
rent.
Third is the settlement situation, in which an area is newly
reclaimed and settled by a public agency.
Fourth is the forest and shifting cultivation situation, in
which a farm is hardly definable.
With respect to the small-farm situation, where individual
holdings are fragmented, a strong case can be made for consoli-
dating the plots tilled by an individual into a single unit. A
quite different question is whether the size of the individual
* See also Appendix F on land reform.
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holding is too small to be efficient. In many small-farm and
plantation situations one often comes across a confused argument
that asks for the liquidation of large estates on the ground that
they are too large to be efficient and at the same time for the
consolidation of small farms into cooperative or collective farms
on the ground that the farms are too small to be efficient.
Evidence across nations as well as within individual countries,
however, shows that in densely settled areas the enlargement of
farm size is not an absolute precondition of increased agricultural
productivity per acre. Farm management data for individual
countries show that yield per acre does not increase and often
diminishes with size over a considerable range. In countries like
Japan and Taiwan, productivity per acre has been raised many fold
without any significant enlargement of farm size. * And it can be
similarly raised in most small-farm situations. For the technologi-
cal changes that are relevant in the immediate future as well as
economically most efficient at current factor prices, such as
varietal improvement., better water management, and fertilizer
use, do not necessarily require the enlargement of the farm. The
mechanization of some operations (for example, land improvement,
pumping, plowing, and haulage) may also be necessary and efficient
in spite of labor density if the improvement of these operations--
particularly timely plowing and irrigation- -increases income many
fold by making multiple cropping possible without diminishing
employment. (Engineering-economic studies to identify these proc-
esses and select the techniques most suitable for small-farm
situations are urgently needed.)
*
The conventional measurement of farm size in terms of a
single input, the area of the farm, and the measurement of pro-
ductivity as productivity per acre are questionable in theory and
may be misleading in some situations. But they continue to be used
in this discussion on the assumption that in labor-surplus, small-
farm situations they are adequate for operational purposes.
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The central principle is that the economies of scale do not
obtain to the same extent in all operations that are defined to
constitute farming. The economies may be significantly large in
the case of some operations and unimportant in others. It follows
that the farm may be enlarged in some dimensions while the domi-
nant managerial unit remains small. Thus the scale of some of the
land improvement, irrigation, input purchase, output sale, and
fund-raising operations may be enlarged while the plowing, tilling,
and harvesting operations continue to be performed on a small,
family-farm scale.
The recognition of this principle of selective enlargement
of scale will open up numerous possibilities of farm organization
that are now blocked by bipolar ideological controversy. This
principle is implicitly embodied in the farm reorganization pat-
terns that have proved to be most successful in raising productiv-
ity in many western as well as eastern countries. It is the core
of every agricultural structure of small family farms served by
large-scale cooperative and public agencies, but it needs to be
enunciated and applied as an explicit principle. One of its great
merits is that it makes it possible to leave untouched those
dimensions of the family farm with which interference has the most
damaging effects in terms of farmers' incentives in schemes of
cooperativization and collectivization.
Conversely the principle implies that large estates can be
broken up in respect of the land unit of some operations without
much damage to productivity, provided that some large-scale common
services are maintained intact.
Where the ownership distribution of holdings is very skewed,
it may be a necessary condition in order to induce the majority
of farmers to raise productivity and also a requirement of politi-
cal stability and social justice that landownership be redistrib-
uted. Numerous precedents of fairly successful redistributions of
land in small-farm situations leave no room for doubt that, given
political will and administrative zeal, redistribution can be
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carried out without much short-run damage and with remarkable
long-run gains in the productivity of land.
When redistribution is undertaken, two aspects should be
sharply distinguished: the promotion of existing tenants to
ownership, and the settlement of the landless on land appropri-
ated from ex-owners. As regards the promotion of tenants to
ownership it is desirable, in the first place, that the "ceilings"
to be applied for the appropriation of land for redistribution be
differentiated according to the intensity of cultivation.* In
addition the ceilings should be defined per adult in the owner's
immediate family so that their evasion through intrafamily transfers
is minimized. Second, compensation should be set at a relatively
low level; a small proportion of it may be paid in cash and the
rest in long-term, low-interest bonds that should not be negoti-
able except for the purpose of industrial investment. However, the
receivable real value of the bonds should be protected against
inflation by being linked to a price index. Tenants who are pro-
moted to ownership may be required to pay compensation to the
government in convenient, small annual installments.
Redistribution along these lines is desirable and practica-
ble. However, it may be useful to set out an alternative scheme of
fiscally induced voluntary redistribution. It is possible to devise
a scheme of progressive taxation of landholdings that rises
steeply with the estimated "potential yield." The tax on large
farms with low productivity can be made so heavy that large farm-
ers are forced either to attain the potential yield or to sell
parts of their holdings to others at prices which, if many large
*
An example of such differentiation is to be found in the
Italian agrarian reform law of 1951, which provides that the
greater the intensity of cultivation of an estate the smaller is
the proportion of its area to be expropriated.
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owners are forced to do so, are likely to fall very low. This
scheme is no better than a scheme of direct redistribution of
land. The political will required to implement it is no less.
The administrative difficulties are equally serious. The dangers
of evasion are equally acute. But policymakers can choose the
scheme that in their judgment has a better chance of success in
a given situation.
Although the abolition or near-abolition of tenancy has been
the ideal of many land reform movements, it is debatable whether
tenancy can ever be entirely abolished even if the man-land ratio
in agriculture is favorable for its abolition, for a variety of
circumstances may necessitate its continuance to some extent in all
situations. When the man-land ratio is extremely unfavorable, and
is likely to remain so for a long time to come, the early aboli-
tion of tenancy is a utopian hope. Even if a redistribution of
land is carried out, every rural family cannot possibly be given
a piece of land sufficient to provide subsistence; therefore the
landless are bound to take, and the landowners bound to offer,
land under tenancy arrangements of one kind or another. In the
short run, then, the only realistic course of policy is to recog-
nize the inevitability of some tenancy and to legalize and promote
the most productivity-oriented form of tenancy, not to attempt to
outlaw it (and thus promote the worst and most insecure forms of
illegal tenancy).
Almost all tenancy arrangements have some adverse effect
on the incentives of the operator and cause him to employ fewer
resources than he would if he did not have to give a substantial
part of his output for the mere right to cultivate. But empirical
research is urgently required to determine the precise manner in
which alternative tenancy arrangements affect input use and pro-
ductivity in developing countries. Some conditions of efficient
tenancy, however, can be safely set out a priori. A money rent
fixed for a long period is most likely to induce the tenant to
intensify cultivation, but the reason for the widespread prevalence
88 The Economic Environment
of crop-sharing tenancies in many areas is that this system
reduces the tenant's burden in the event of crop failure. Thus,
although a shift to fixed money rent contracts would be highly
desirable, it is not likely to come about on a large scale unless
the risks of cultivation are reduced.
As a second-best alternative, crop-sharing tenancy can be
improved in many ways. The law should require that all tenancy con-
tracts be written and registered. The landlord should be required
to share a part of the cost of cultivation, varying with the pro-
portion of crop received as rent. Managerial decisions should lie
with the tenant operator, but the landlord might give informal
advice. Tenancy should be secured neither for very long periods nor
for very short periods, such as one or two harvest years. An inter-
mediate tenure of five to ten years, subject to renewal, might be
desirable so that the inefficiency of tenants is not perpetuated.
In the event of a shift of tenancy, outgoing tenants should be
entitled to compensation for enduring improvements made on the
land. There is a case for legislating rent maxima, but in general
it is nearly impossible to enforce them if the pressure of excess
demand for land makes them unrealistic. The maintenance of unreal-
istic legal rent maxima on paper only causes widespread evasion
and brings law into ridicule. It would therefore be desirable to
impose rent maxima only after considerable empirical evidence is
collected about actual rents and enforceable rents. Ultimately the
only way to make rent maxima as well as other provisions of tenancy
legislation effective is to organize strong tenants' associations
in all areas where tenancy is widespread. The case for such associ-
ations is analogous to that for trade unions.
For dealing with the plantation situation many of the basic
principles set out in the foregoing discussion are relevant. An
additional principle that may be stated is that it is inefficient
to break up integrated, well-managed, large plantations. They
should be treated like indivisible industrial enterprises; and the
promotion of distributive equity should take the form of income
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redistribution through wage bargaining, taxation, and social secu-
rity arrangements rather than property redistribution. If necessary
some of them may be nationalized, but as far as possible they
should continue to be managed as integrated units. The case of
large, inefficient plantations is different. The demesne parts of
haciendas will usually fall in this category. They may need to be
broken up except for some common services. The workers on haciendas
may be given ownership of their small patches as well as of parts
of the broken-up demesnes.
When newly reclaimed areas are settled, experiments with
alternative forms of organization are possible and should be
conducted. In general the balance of advantage would seem to lie
in arrangements that give the settlers ownership or long-term
leases of family-size units but provide them with a network of
common services for technical knowledge, irrigation, input purchase,
output sale, machine services, and the like. The Gezira scheme in
the Sudan has many lessons to offer for the evolution of mixed
arrangements that utilize both the drive of the farmers' individ-
*
ualism and the advantages of large-scale services.
The selection of settlers should receive careful attention.
At all stages of the development of the settlement, organizational
arrangements should be based on realistic assumptions about the
settlers' skills.
Consolidation of holdings is the known remedy for fragmenta-
tion. Recent experience with consolidation, however, has revealed
that in some areas an important reason for fragmentation is the
need to give every family a patch of land in each of many loca-
tions if the land in different locations in the same village re-
ceives varying amounts of water over the season (owing to the loca-
tion of wells, canals, or seasonal flood water). Consolidation
* See Appendix A for a description of the Gezira scheme.
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schemes should take such situations into account and may have to
consolidate the holding of every farmer in more than one but less
than the original number of fragments.
Provisions restricting the subdivision of very small inher-
ited holdings among inheritors can be enacted, but it is nearly
impossible to enforce them in areas of intense demographic pres-
sure. It may be desirable instead to promote partnership arrange-
ments for preventing the subdivision of very small holdings.
Satisfactory tenure arrangements governing forest and
shifting cultivation situations can be developed only on the basis
of further research.
USE OF IMPORTED SURPLUS FOOD
Stocks of surplus food imported by some developing countries
under special arrangements, such as the U.S. PL 480 agreements,
can be used by them for a variety of purposes.
Basically, surplus food should be regarded as a subsistence
fund (which is the original meaning of capital)--an addition to
the other investible funds of the recipient country. It enables
the government to reduce to some extent the pressure on food prices
exerted by the additional effective demand generated by large-scale
investments in development projects. Although food prices may rise,
sales of the surplus stocks can prevent them from rising to intol-
erable levels. Thus the effect of these sales may not necessarily
be a lowering of the relative price of food and hence a discour-
agement to the growth of food production but simply a partial
relief of the hardship caused by developmental inflation to some
of the landless workers and city dwellers. This role of surpluses
as a counterinflationary lever has crucial importance, for without
this lever it might be necessary for the government to reduce non-
agricultural investment and/or divert more foreign exchange for the
import of food, thereby slowing the rate of growth. By and large,
Use of Imported Surplus Food
surplus food has performed the function of supporting expanded
investment in many recipient countries.
Surpluses can also help reduce rural umemployment and accel-
erate rural capital formation if they are used to pay a part of the
wages of workers employed in rural public works, as we propose in
the next section. Although the possibility of undertaking such proj-
ects with surplus food is widely recognized, and has been tried in
North Africa, it could be done on a much larger scale. It has, how-
ever, been difficult to organize the distribution of food as a part
of wages in rural project areas. An alternative procedure with simi-
lar effects is. to sell the imported surplus in regular food markets
and use the local currency proceeds to pay the wages of workers on
large-scale capital projects that would not have been financed
otherwise. This procedure avoids the technical and administrative
difficulties of organizing a large number of small works projects
with wages paid in kind.
Surplus food can also be used to build buffer food stocks to
be employed to narrow the range of food price fluctuations and re-
lieve abnormal shortages that may develop in particular regions of
a country.
It is.important that the availability of surplus food not be
allowed to cause any complacency among planners about the need to
attain a satisfactory rate of growth of domestic food production.
It should not underwrite the deficiencies of agricultural policy
and administration. Neither should it permit a downgrading of plan
allocations for the agricultural sector.
Although surplus food may be used to reduce price instability
and providd emergency relief, it should be treated primarily as a
resource supplementing other resources committed to a comprehensive
plan of investment.
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RURAL PFUBLIC WORKS
In overpopulated countries with an annual income of less than
$100 per capita, there does not seem to be a prospect of reducing
the substantial volume of open and disguised unemployment within
the next decade. Even if, for instance, all the objectives of the
third five-year plan in India were to be fulfilled, unemployment
would not be reduced and might even increase slightly. Since reali-
zation may fall short of targets, unemployment may increase consid-
erably. Nor can it be said that a thorough reshuffle and change in
design of the five-year plans in India can markedly change the
situation. The notion of labor-intensive methods producing more
goods by handicraft and small industry remains a dream on the basis
of today's technology. The productivity per man-hour in handicrafts
is so low that it cannot provide a rise in per capita income. It is
true that there is a tremendous reservoir of manpower; but labor
without capital can produce nothing--and capital is scarce. Under
these circumstances there is--at least for the short period of the
next two or three five-year plans--a conflict between the objectives
of maximum output (income) and maximum employment.
Only one course might permit the creation of substantial addi-
tional employment without diverting considerable amounts of capital
from more "productive" uses: a massive program of rural public works
using labor with only minimal amounts of capital. These are activi-
ties like bunding, terracing, fencing, and building secondary roads
(if they are not washed away by monsoons) with spades only, like
the Burma Road.
Five million workers in India could, for instance, be organ-
ized in such rural public works for two hundred days a year. The
works could "pay" if they increase agricultural productivity. Al-
though they would not produce an immediate increase in the output
of consumer goods, they would pave the way for higher production in
Rural Public Works
the future. The wage bill* for such works--presumably one half would
be spent on food that could be supplied under PL 480 agreements--is
not a problem even for India.
The really scarce factor is organization. The academic ap-
proach of first studying how many people are in disguised unemploy-
ment (although one cannot hope to absorb more than a quarter or a
third of them), then committee paper work on the design of pilot
projects, and so on serves as an escape from the need to take real
and energetic action. Reliable sources report that there is no
doubt that an ample supply of rural labor would be forthcoming for
public works under the stated conditions. But digging is not enough;
there must be people who will plan and supervise the digging. If
only a half of India's villages (that is, 300 thousand) were to be
covered, cadres of at least 100 thousand people would have to be
formed to supervise and direct such public works. Although there is
a host of problems relating to the payments (delayed or contingent
liability payments) to be exacted from the owners of holdings on
which public works are executed, these problems can be solved with
a proper will and drive. The potential benefit is great: rural
works seem to be the only way in India to reduce unemployment in
the next five years from 20 to, perhaps, 15 million.
Organization of such rural public works in overpopulated
countries is urgent and must be given the highest priority.
*
The right wage will have to be determined through experimen-
tation. It should be high enough to attract a sufficient number of
the unemployed to the works program in every region and, at the
same time, low enough not to divert labor from essential agricul-
tural harvest operations. The works will have to be located within
short walking distance of villages where the unemployed live; or
transport will have to be organized for them.
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Chapter Five
RESEARCH AND KNOWLEDGE
RESEARCH
To meet the needs of an expanding population and at the same
time provide for some improvement in per capita food consumption,
agricultural productivity must increase at the rate of 4 to 5 per
cent annually. This is a larger rate of increase than any country
has sustained over a period of years. Only vastly improved tech-
nology developed by research and applied by a large part of the
world's farmers will enable agriculture to meet this challenge.
What kind of research will be most fruitful? Should the major
effort be on short- or long-term projects? Here we were faced with
a difficult problem in priorities. The underlying questions are:
How much can agriculture advance by the diffusion and adaptation of
existing knowledge, and how much is advance dependent on new knowl-
edge--knowledge that we do not have now and that must be acquired
by fundamental long-range research?
The conference was impressed by the great areas in which our
knowledge is so limited that little if anything can be done. The
soils of the tropical rain forests are an example; present knowledge
does not seem to provide any alternative to the existing methods of
cultivation. * Only much fuller understanding of rain-forest ecology,
demanding a long-term research effort, would make possible a sub-
stantial advance in production.
*
The rain-forest area is described in Chapter Eight.
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In other areas our basic knowledge is good and needs only
adaptive research to apply it to local conditions to produce sub-
stantial increases in yields. The opportunity for wider use of
fertilizer in some areas is an example. Yet even such short-run
gains will provide only short-term solutions. Almost everywhere,
it seems, yields based on adaptations of existing technology would
reach a ceiling in the relatively near future.
The gestation period of basic research is long. Development
of new plant varieties, for example, takes years, yet only through
such research can new advances in technology be available when the
yields from short-term measures are exhausted. We believe therefore
that a major effort in long-range research must be gotten under way
at once, and that developing nations must make a higher commitment
of money and of scientific and trained manpower to agricultural
research and education.
In a society currently doing little research the additional
expenditures required for agricultural research may appear large
even though they are not in comparison with the costs of a steel
mill or a major highway. For the total costs of research must in-
clude expenditures for efforts that produce no results and for the
Our feeling about the importance of research increased during
the weeks of the conference. Two questionnaires, one filled out by
us on the opening day of the conference, the second at its close,
documented this shift in our opinions. One question asked whether
we would give first priority to research or to the implementation
of existing knowledge. Thirty-six per cent chose research both times,
and 33 per cent chose implementation. In the second questionnaire,
however, 23 per cent who had given priority to implementation now
gave it to research, and only 8 per cent switched their preference
from research to implementation. This net swing of 15 per cent meant
that what had been a majority for implementation was by the end of
the conference a majority for research.
Research
extraordinarily demanding requirements of human resources. Moreover,
the time lag between the initial step and the establishment of a
steady flow of useful results may be considerable. Such commitments
should be viewed as investments in the country's future.
The research program should have as its main focus the solu-
tion of problems and the development of new scientific and techno-
logical information that woul have an immediate bearing on agri-
cultural production. With such a focus of objectives no distinction
need be made between fundamental and applied research. The scientists
should have the freedom and encouragement to probe into the funda-
mentals of a question when necessary, but the program generally would
be heavily field and problem oriented.
Research will be required on each of the many factors that
have been identified as influencing productivity. (Table 1 in Chapter
Two lists these factors.) Since their relative importance will vary
over time and in different countries, it is not possible to generalize
regarding the priorities for research. Such decisions will instead
have to be made for each country and perhaps for different regions
within countries in accordance with needs and opportunities. The
chapters on ecological regions (Part III) list specific problems in
the respective areas on which research is especially needed.
In addition to research of the more conventional kind dealing
with the various aspects of the production and marketing of agri-
cultural commodities, we emphasize the need for research on the prob-
lems of organization and administration of training, of research, and
of services to agriculture. Such research should involve both the
study and analysis of the effectiveness of existing institutions and
the creation of experimental models or pilot units in which new ideas
and techniques can be tried. Results of such studies would do for
public administration what conventional agricultural research does
for crops and farming practices: provide an opportunity for con-
tinuing evolutionary improvement.
Agriculture, as we have emphasized, is dominated by interactions.
Hence all its operations and all the institutions that serve it must
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be studied and designed with that fact in mind. Agriculture is con-
ditioned by localized combinations of natural resources. Hence great
importance is placed on the decision-making ability and managerial
skills of individual farmers. Agriculture is capable of dynamic
growth. Hence the kind of training needed by all engaged in it must
be geared to change. It is in this context that we make the follow-
ing generalizations.
A broadly interdisciplinary analytical diagnosis of existing
physical, biological, economic, and social conditions and of the
institutions serving agriculture is an imperative prerequisite to
the planning of an agricultural research and educational system.
Only with the aid of such a diagnosis can government officials
plan the allocation of the nation's own resources to the sector of
agricultural research and education. With this information, external
resources from foreign assistance programs can be made to fit to-
gether into an effective mosaic instead of forming, as too often
happens, scattered, unrelated, and sometimes competitive pieces.
The precise blueprint of an effective agricultural research
organization for any given country will be determined by many fac-
tors, including the size of the country, the variety of its soils
and ecological situations, the variations in its present and poten-
tial agricultural enterprises and types of farming areas, political
considerations, the present and potential financial resources that
can be invested in agricultural development, and the present and
prospective scientific talent.
Sustained growth in agriculture depends on the creation of a
broad-based research and educational system that is responsive to
the needs of rural society.
This responsiveness can be facilitated by maintaining a close.
linkage between the research system and farmers both directly and
through the extension service and other public and private groups
that serve the agricultural sector. A two-way flow of problems,
ideas, and information through such an interconnected system will
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do much to keep the research program focused on the needs of rural
people. It is unwise, however, to have the scope and emphasis of
the research program wholly determined by information from the field.
New ideas from outside the experience of traditional agriculture
must be sought and examined if the "horizon of the possible" is to
be raised. Often, particularly in the early stages of agricultural
development, it will be necessary for the research worker not only
to develop the new variety or system of weed control but also to
make sure that the improved seed or new tools are produced and made
available to farmers at the time, place, and price necessary for
their effective use. The researcher must take as part of his job the
responsibility of putting his research to work in farmers' fields.
To provide a two-way flow of information, provision should be
made for close liaison between research and the extension organiza-
tion. New practices and new technology flow into farm practice, and
there is a return flow of information on the applicability or weak-
nesses of research findings; information on new problems encountered
in farm practice is thus brought to the attention of the research
scientists.
Major intermediate-stage production increases can be obtained
by adaptation of technologies from more developed countries to local
conditions through experimentation.
Any program aimed at increasing agricultural production can be
successful only if profitable and acceptable alternatives to tradi-
tional practices are available. Without critical examination it has
too often been assumed that sufficient alternatives are readily
available in the technologies of the advanced countries and that all
that is needed is to apply them in the new situation. This is a
dangerous fallacy. Experience has shown that crop varieties, cultural
practices, fertilizer applications, water management systems, credit
schemes, or organizational patterns from one region often fail to
give the expected increases in productivity when introduced into a
new ecology. It is then necessary through research to adapt them to
the new environment.
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The response of grains to fertilizer in India is an example,
among many, of the difficulty of transferring methods from one
ecology to another. The grains do not respond as well as they do in
the United States. Although the reasons are not fully understood,
experience has provided some clues. In northern India, maize is
grown principally during the monsoon rain season. Methods of culti-
vation designed to conserve and store rainwater in the soil appear
to have the effect of restricting growth of the root system. This in
turn affects where the fertilizer must be placed in order to be
utilized by the plants. Thus fertilizer placement principles developed
in the United States must be re-examined in the Indian context. It is
also possible that effective use of fertilizer in India will require
new techniques of cultivation, of handling the soil surface, and of
weed control.
Significant early increases in production may be possible in
some areas through the more uniform and effective use of existing
resources and technologies.
The more able and progressive farmers often produce far more
than neighbors who have similar soil and climate and access to the
same production inputs and markets. Similar differences may also
exist in the effectiveness of the individuals and firms that are
serving the farm sector. An analysis of the rural scene should un-
cover many ways in which existing superior methods could be more
fully exploited. The successful use of leading farmers in Japan
during the early stages of development should not be overlooked.
Research dealing with problems of major significance can be
undertaken that will yield results of great immediate value without
sacrificing progress toward long-range goals.
Research tends to involve successive advances. The early
evaluation of existing or introduced varieties will show some that
are superior to those in common usage. Such knowledge can be used
at once to upgrade crop yields. Initial studies of cropping systems
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may reveal rather simply controlled diseases or pests. Initial studies
of fertilization systems may yield consistent patterns of response
with certain crops and not with others or when used in a particular
way. A research scientist working on field problems will find a
variety of ways to use his data and observations even in their early
stages.
The transformation of a traditional agriculture involves
important and fundamental changes in the attitudes, values, and
orientation of farmers and of those who work with them. Research
is needed on these topics.
There is a wide range of phenomena relating to the structure and
dynamics of society that bear on the ways individuals and groups re-
act when placed in situations of change. Behavioral science research
(dealing with social, cultural, and psychological phenomena) can aid
in promoting the adoption of more productive practices by analyzing
the structure, the values, and the operations of agricultural ad-
ministrative units and of peasant society and by investigating the
precise ways in which social institutions, individual attitudes, and
personal values hold back or stimulate the innovative process. The
Cornell project at Vicos in Peru illustrates the successful use of be-
havioral science in agricultural development.t The problem was to
shift a serf-bound population on a large hacienda in Vicos from their
dependent and unproductive state to membership in a self-reliant and
productive community. The program that successfully accomplished this
transition was based on a careful anthropological study of the hacienda
people.
To be effective a research unit needs to reach a certain minimal
size and to operate in an environment that encourages individual
*
Appendix E discusses the potential uses of behavioral science
research.
tThe Vicos project is described in Appendix A.
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initiative, intellectual discipline, and responsiveness to the needs
of society.
It cannot be assumed that a research organization transplanted
from a developed to an underdeveloped society will thrive and be pro-
ductive. The stimulation that comes from contact with other educated
people, the intellectual discipline imposed by dialogue with fellow
scientists, the opportunity to see the results of one's research
put into action, and the opportunity to work closely with and help
train keen young minds are some of the features of the environment
that will stimulate and make productive an agricultural research
unit.
The basic organization should provide for one or more strong
centers at which a substantial group of well-trained scientists from
the various scientific disciplines can be assembled. The main center
or centers should be linked with a system of substations whose
principal functions would be to test the applicability of materials
or practices in various ecological situations and to discover prob-
lems peculiar to these various subareas. The number of such sub-
stations will vary with the size of the nation and with the number
of major ecological and farming areas to be served. These substations
should also form an important link with the extension officers in
their respective areas.
The division of research activities among the various levels
may be along the following lines:
Research at the central location. Emphasis should be placed
on the kinds of research that (1) require concentrations of scien-
tists of refined laboratory and field techniques, (2) are concerned
with development of new knowledge, practices, and materials, and
(3) have broad nationwide or interregional applications. Scientists
of the central station should also provide leadership and coordina-
tion (but not direction) for research at the regional stations.
Research at the regional locations. Emphasis should be placed
on trials and modifications of practices and materials developed at
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the central location and on the integration of these practices and
materials into enterprises and combinations of enterprises adapted
to the region served. Less emphasis should be placed on the
development of new knowledge, practices, and materials. Concen-
tration should be on the solution of problems particularly pertinent
to the region that the station serves.
Research at the local fields. Simple trials of single prac-
tices or simple enterprises should be conducted to determine or
refine adaptation to specific sets of local conditions of a few
selected variables judged from regional trials of local farm prac-
tice to be adapted to local conditions. These trials should be under
the supervision of the scientists at the regional or central loca-
tion, and they should be designed to serve as both demonstrations
and the final stage in adaptive research. Ideally there would be an
extensive network of such local field trials so that one is within
reach of each farm community. In practice, such an extensive network
would exceed in cost the resources that are likely to be available
in the early stages of agricultural development. It is suggested
that the first local fields be established on the basis of (1) areas
in which the biological and physical potentials for improved agri-
cultural productivity seem best, and (2) communities in which local
interest and hence likelihood of adoption are highest. Local fields
may take a variety of forms, such as trials in the cultivators' own
fields, village or other publicly owned and operated lands, and
stations specifically established for that purpose.
Research at the pilot farms. Research should emphasize the
biological and economic aspects of integrating systems of enter-
prises evaluated on a farm scale. These farms should be under the
direct control of staff members of the farm management unit of the
central station or of a comparable unit of the regional station.
Immediate operations should be in the hands of the most competent
farmer available or of a college graduate who has had actual "on-
farm" experience. The primary purpose is research. Ideally these
pilot farms would serve as demonstrations, but experience to date
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does not give much cause to believe that they will be particularly
effective in this respect. The pilot farms could serve as focal
or training centers for farm leaders, in-service training of ex-
tension personnel, and farm experience for college and university
students.
The temptation to fragment and disperse scarce human resources
should be avoided. Unless a sizable group of scientists from the
various disciplines can be assembled in one center it is doubtful
whether a sustained flow of new technology can be expected, and
certainly such a group would be essential to provide the training
suggested below. It is our judgment that this will require at least
15 to 20 well-trained front-line scientists and preferably some-
what more. In institutions offering graduate programs in several
disciplines the "critical mass" for the academic staff will be con-
siderably higher. Experience indicates that a minimum of 4-6 senior
staff of coordinate rank and academic stature is required for each
subject-matter area. Where talent and resources are limited the
principle of concentration must be kept in mind and, if necessary,
only one such main center should be developed, at least initially.
It should be possible to move progressively from a simple but pro-
ductive research organization to a much larger and more complex
organization as the requisite resources in funds and trained
scientific manpower make it feasible.
Some very small nations probably cannot support even one such
central station. They should, however, support a substation drawing
information and materials from major stations in other countries.
A somewhat larger nation might meet its requirements with one main
research station plus a variable number of substations for testing
in its major ecological subdivisions. This pattern might represent
that to be followed for individual states or regions in a large
nation, with a complementary research organization at the center
serving a coordinating function among the various states on problems
and commodities of concern to more than one state and providing re-
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sources and staff that would add strength and flexibility beyond
what is attainable in the individual states. In a very large country
such as India, which at the same time has developed a quite sub-
stantial body of trained agricultural scientists, it may sometimes
be necessary and desirable to develop more than one main center per
state, at least in the larger states. The principle of concentrating
the core staff in a limited number of locations should still be kept
clearly in mind.
The research program should have a strong training component.
This might include in-service training of younger staff members,
postgraduate research for Masters and Ph.D. candidates, and perhaps
part-time employment of undergraduate students in some of the simpler
and more routine tasks of the research program. A research program
focused on significant problems forms one of the most effective
vehicles for training the new generation of scientists who are to
carry on this tradition. This suggests a close linkage between an
agricultural college and the main research center. At the substations,
if the staff is sufficient, the scientists should also teach, perhaps
at the subcollegiate level, and give short courses for extension
workers or farmers.
The research and educational needs of agriculture will change
as development occurs; hence the number, size, composition, and
program emphasis of the institutions should also change.
An example from plant-breeding research may serve as an illus-
tration. The first step is to assemble and evaluate lots of seeds
being used by farmers from other areas having similar environmental
conditions. Selections from those are compared with new combinations
of introduced germ plasm. A third step is to initiate the more re-
fined procedures such as hybridization and inbreeding. As these steps
proceed, problems of disease and insect control, fertilization,
cultivation practices, and harvesting will arise that require the
expansion of the research team and its program. Throughout the entire
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process the proposed package must be evaluated as to its economic
viability. Similarly the institutional structure to support the
expanding program must evolve to meet the requirements of the ex-
panded research and to enable it to study problems with increasing
scientific intensity.
RESEARCH AND THE DEMAND FOR HUMAN CAPITAL
The role of new knowledge, or research findings, as a princi-
pal source of economic growth is coming to be better recognized.
Research findings become a productive factor in the economy only
when they are incorporated in capital goods or when people in-
corporate them into their work habits and procedures. Increases in
productivity take place because the improved production processes
reduce the unit costs of labor, of capital resources, and of natu-
ral resources.
In the agricultural sector new knowledge increases the demand
for skilled manpower. New knowledge requires applied research to
adapt it to particular sets of conditions, and development and
design activities to incorporate it with more productive new inputs.
A credit system is needed to provide credit on terms that will
facilitate the farmers' use of the new inputs or the new information.
A marketing organization is also needed to assemble, store, and
distribute the additional output from the new inputs or new infor-
mation. Also needed are educators to train the additional research
workers, the managers and staff for seed multiplication and for
marketing organizations, the extension workers, the credit super.
visors, and the additional teachers.
In many underdeveloped countries the initiation of a flow of
useful research findings will increase these manpower needs greatly
because many of the organizations into which this new knowledge must
flow in order to become effective do not exist at all or exist only
on paper. They must be built from the ground up, and this process is
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not only slow and often painful but also requires a concentration
of human resources that are very scarce.
Take the example of a new plant variety produced by a research
station. If capacity for seed multiplication does not exist, then
plant breeders and other agricultural scientists will have to be
allocated to this task. A great deal of research will be needed on
the interaction of the new variety with water, fertilizer, pest-
control measures, cultural practices, and other inputs. When the
seed is available in volume, an organization will be needed to
distribute it to points of need, along with other inputs that are
complementary. Extension education is then needed to disseminate
all the relevant information to cultivators.
It is likely that the demand for skilled personnel will grow
much more rapidly than the flow of useful research findings. Failure
to foresee these manpower needs will frustrate for a time the con-
tribution that the new knowledge could make to agricultural pro-
ductivity.
EDUCATION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
Education is like a general-purpose investment that can be
directed toward a large number of essential needs when it matures.
A society with a substantial number of high-school graduates can
meet its needs for research, extension, credit, and other supporting
workers much more rapidly than can a society with only elementary-
school graduates. Many types of specialized training can be designed
and grafted with little loss of time onto a good program of general
education.
The advantages of general education extend far beyond the
capacity to fill positions already known to be essential to develop-
ment. Central to development is the idea of change; and education
in its broadest sense is the cumulative impact of experience that
leads to change in future patterns of behavior. Thus education, by
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increasing an individual's "perception of the possible," can
condition and predispose him to change. It can create in him a new
level of dynamic behavior that is essential for innovation.
Because much of the educational process involves the transfer
of knowledge from one person to another, the availability of diverse
channels through which the interchange can occur is important.
Illiteracy, by ruling out the channel of the printed page, greatly
impedes the diffusion of knowledge. Hence the removal of this obstacle
should be a high-priority objective in the strategy of development.
Modern technology in mass communication by aural and visual means
offers many opportunities for transmitting information to those
unable to read. Radio and television may be imaginatively used as
complements to personal communication, demonstrations, and formal
schooling.
Institutions concerned with agricultural education must be
responsive to the needs of the rural sector. Classical education
concerned with purely academic matters must give way to the concept
of education for service to the nation. This is important all the
way from the primary schools to the universities.
Teaching programs must be designed to stimulate at all levels
a spirit of inquiry, inventiveness, and constructive thinking. This
will require modern concepts of teaching with emphasis on under-
standing rather than memorization. It will require dedicated,
enthusiastic teachers freed from stifling restrictions that force
a rigid mediocrity on the whole system.
In-service training, short courses, on-the-job training, and
other devices are important and effective supplements to formal class-
room teaching. They are particularly pertinent where large numbers
of trained people are needed quickly and where many of the students
in agriculture are from urban areas.
General education through primary and preferably through
secondary school is obviously a desirable objective. However, it may
have to take second place to the needs for trained agricultural
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technicians and other workers if personnel shortages are seriously
impeding agricultural development. In such cases vocational and
technical agricultural schools will be more important than general
secondary-school education of the classical kind.
The importance of the education of farmers as a means of a
increasing agricultural productivity in both the short- and long-
term time scale cannot be overemphasized. The phenomenon of inter-
actions is brought into sharp focus by the decision-making ability
and managerial skill required at the place where production occurs--
the individual farm. To talk about production inputs and package
programs in aggregative terms is useful in planning national programs
and goals, but their effects on production are determined by the way
in which the individual farmer is able to put all the technologies
together on his farm. On each farm the particular "mix" may repre-
sent a unique combination of all the components of a complex mosaic.
The ultimate effectiveness of any program depends on the ability of
farmers to make sound decisions based on an understanding of the
alternatives open to them and an appraisal of their consequences. It
is for this reason that at all stages in the development process,
whether with the villagers of highland Luzon, Dahomey, or Bolivia or
the farmers of Taiwan, Israel, or Illinois, information and technology
should be extended in such a manner that the farmer--the man who puts
the information into the production machine--is himself improved by
learning the "why," not merely the "what" or "how," of the innovation.
Only in this way will he grow in his ability to evaluate al-
ternatives, to adapt the input mix to the unique environment of his
farm, and to improve steadily in his ability to adapt to changing
circumstances.
109
-
m
 
m
 
~
 
~
 
-
-
-
-
-rn
--rn
----
Chapter Six
ORGANIZING AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
Let us assume that we now have a package of viable new inputs
to offer the farmer, economic policies to make their adoption
feasible, and a research system that steadily improves and adds
to our supply of technology. The need remains for means to bring
the package to the producer, from ministry and research station
to the farm itself. Without this factor our package is incomplete
and the other factors will remain barren. The factor of organiza-
tion is perhaps the least tangible and least clearly understood
of all the factors that go into the "systems problem" of agricul-
tural development.
The key actors here are the farmer and the bureaucrat, for
the state must play a role in catalyzing agricultural development.
Private firms and traders may play a greater or lesser role in
different nations, but in this chapter we are concerned with those
crucial responsibilities that fall on government. The profit in
many agricultural enterprises cannot be recaptured by the private
entrepreneur because it diffuses through society. We cannot expect
private concerns to build farm-to-market roads, create and staff
an extension system, or manipulate prices in the general social in-
terest. The state may often aid the private sector so that it can
better serve agriculture, notably in marketing. One example is the
training of rural merchants, who can be a crucial force for change.
Even when the state enters the marketing process it will usually
be useful to preserve and stimulate the private sector in order
that the farmer will benefit from the flexibility of competition
rather than suffer from the rigidities of monopoly.
Organizing Agricultural Development
The bureaucrat must therefore be an agent of change. In the
form of extension agent, cooperative organizer, or local official
he must bring innovation to the farmer. The encounter between
farmer and bureaucrat is a crucial point in the process of develop-
ment. If that encounter does not appear fruitful to the farmer,
then the most attractive of packages will remain on the shelf,
unsold.
The nature of the encounter between farmer and bureaucrat
requires close study in the evaluation of any developmental program.
All too little is known about what actually happens when the pro-
ducer meets the agent of change. Is the farmer approached in
language he understands, in terms that are relevant to his ex-
perience and desires--and by people he trusts and respects? Are
his customs and beliefs insulted? Is he subject to humiliation,
red tape, and delay? How many people must the farmer see in order
to get his new inputs and learn how to use them, and does he have
reason to believe that his fertilizer, for example, will be de-
livered when he needs it? These are essential questions that
cannot be answered by examining a table of organization in the
ministry of agriculture.
THE INNOVATION PACKAGE
We have seen that the strain of innovation on the farmer is
great. In the case of a package, he is required to master new physi-
cal skills (in cultivating a new variety, for example), to learn
the use of credit, and at times to accept unsettling changes in his
social order, all in a limited space of time. Since such change is
difficult at best, it follows that any further barriers in the re-
lationship between farmer and bureaucrat-innovator will drastically
reduce the chances that the package will be accepted.
The bureaucracy must design and implement its package of in-
novations in such a way as to reduce as much as possible the barriers
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to its acceptance by the producers. Experience from various sources
suggests the following as desirable characteristics to have in a
first package of innovations:
1. Profitability.
2. Novelty. Contain at least one key innovation.
3. Complementarity. Include all of the practices complemen-
tary to the key innovation(s).
4. Appeal. A strong motivation toward adoption should be in-
duced both on the part of the farmer, whose felt needs it should
tend to satisfy, and on the part of the agent of change, who should
feel a personal challenge in promoting the package.
5. Compatibility. Collision with the culture must be avoided.
Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that propensity to accept the
package might be seriously hampered by previous failures.
6. Simplicity. Elements included in the package should be
easy to manage, demanding as little as possible in skill pre-
requisites.
7. Availability. Knowledge, materials, and credit must be
readily available.
8. Immediate applicability. Packages with long gestation
periods should be saved for later phases.
9. Inexpensiveness. If possible, relatively little or no
additional costs to the farming operation should be involved; this
consideration will be less important later.
10. Low risks should be involved for the farmer.
11. Short payoff period.
12. Expandable. Adjustable to operation on different scales.
13. Spectacular impact. Preferably on cash crops.
14. Communicability. Results should be easily visible to
everybody.
15. Residual effect of self-reliance on farmers.
Such a package, including both tangible and intangible factors, can
be designed in the ministry, but it can be implemented, particularly
in its intangibles, only by agents of change who are fully aware of
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and committed to its requirements. Only their tactics in dealing
with farmers can guarantee its success.
Thus bureaucracy faces a task as difficult and complex as that
of the farmers themselves. The government's need for human resources
to accomplish this task is acute. That need takes two forms. First,
and most obvious, is the sheer need for large numbers of skilled
people. As we saw in Chapter Five, agricultural development causes
a steeply rising demand for people to man the structures serving the
rural sector. The personnel requirements exist before the increased
agricultural yields occur that are eventually to finance their costs;
research and extension, for example, are needed before the farmers
begin to innovate.
The organizational problems and therefore the personnel needs
of agriculture are far greater than those of industrial development.
The introduction and operation of modern industrial plants depend
on the decisions of relatively few people. The large scale of opera-
tion can support the cost of personnel in the specialized functions
of integrating production, supplying inputs, and marketing. By be-
coming employed in a factory, labor is taken into a new environment.
The tasks to be learned are standardized, relatively simple, and
not substantially different from production tasks in the same indus-
try anywhere else in the world. Supervision of labor to achieve
productivity is more a matter of achieving a well-integrated flow
of materials and semifinished goods through the production process
than a matter of incentives and sophisticated decision making on
the part of the workers.
On the other hand, improving the efficiency of agricultural
production depends on the decisions of millions of small producers.
The tasks are not standardized, conditions vary from area to area and
even between fields on the same farm, and account has to be taken of
weather and the occurrence of diseases. Even the smallest farms usu-
ally diversify their production. The supply of inputs and marketing
of products have to be organized to serve the many producers spread
over the land, and requirements are usually seasonal. Provision of
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credit is also complicated by the need to serve many producers
and by the seasonal character of income and production expenses.
The poverty of most rural people increases the risk of experimenting
with new practices. Lack of transport and communications makes it
difficult to reach the dispersed millions of the farming population.
Roads are few. The multiplicity of languages impedes communication;
cultural differences between educated elites and farmers hinder
effective communication even when a common language exists.
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Yet the skilled human resources of developing nations are
typically scant. Almost by definition they do not have a pool of
trained manpower available to staff new or vastly expanded organi-
zations. The demand is many times greater than the supply. The issue
then is: How can these scarce human resources be allocated--knowing
they are far from adequate--in such a way as to make the best possi-
ble use of them?
The second problem in the supply of human resources is less
tangible than the sheer lack of numbers. It is implicit in our
earlier statement that the "bureaucrat must be the agent of change."
What makes a successful extension agent? Obviously he must know the
technical side of his job if his advice is to be worth hearing;
that much can be accomplished in his training. But he must also be
deeply committed to innovation, which means that he must accept
the painful personal adjustments (by himself as well as the farmer)
that come with rapid social evolution. If he is not committed to
change or is afraid of it, if he is content with the status quo, or
if his primary commitment is to, say, his personal status, then the
agent is hardly likely to be an effective promoter of innovation.
Although easy to state, this principle in practice gets less atten-
tion than it deserves, perhaps simply because it is an intangible.
We cannot measure the "innovation response" of an official as we can
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measure the fertilizer response of a plant. But the fact that we
cannot assign numbers to this quality does not excuse us if we dis-
regard it in our planning.
However, to draw up lists of the qualities desirable in an
agent of change is of little help. We can say that an extension
agent should seek farmers' opinions in order to understand the
community in which he is working; or, to put it on the simplest
level, we can say that the manager of a cooperative should not
steal the funds. Such statements do not advance us far, for we are
then dealing with agents of change as individuals rather than as a
class. For example, an outstanding individual will often be cited
with the wistful comment: "If only we had a hundred more like him
our problems would soon be solved. . .
Whether there can be "a hundred more like him" depends on the
values prevalent in the bureaucracy. Most officials, like most
farmers, are conditioned in their behavior by their environment.
Thus the human environment of the bureaucrat, like that of the
farmer, must be conducive to innovation if development is to take
place. Otherwise the exceptional individual remains just that--an
exception. What is needed is a system of values in which the un-
exceptional individual can be an effective agent of change; only
then can a society mobilize such agents in the numbers that agri-
cultural development demands. Technical training in itself is not
enough.
Put in other terms, the environment of the bureaucracy must
encourage the growth of the "will to develop" that was listed in
Chapter Two as a precondition to agricultural development. The
"will" must be distinguished from the mere "wish" to develop The
wish is evident in the public statements and development plans of
the developing nations, yet it alone does not guarantee the will to
overcome the barriers that often exist in the bureaucracy itself.
*
Appendix C tentatively explores ways of measuring the will to
develop in the field of agriculture, in the hope that yardsticks
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Values that are not conducive to innovation are generally
prevalent in the bureaucracies of the developing nations. The bu-
reaucracies are typically characterized by elitist and authoritarian
attitudes; rigid adherence to rules is valued over accomplishment,
and there is great concern with symbols of prestige and status; and
agriculture is seen as a despised occupation. These attitudes may
be seen in terms of the bureaucrat's response to what he views as
threats to himself or to the civil service as an institution. Even
where some will to develop exists, these bureaucratic characteris-
tics hinder effective implementation of any innovating program.
We do not offer any organizational panaceas, any administra-
tive technology to be transplanted whole from one society to another.
It is useless to draw up the table of organization of an "ideal" ex-
tension or credit system, for no such bureaucratic shell would guar-
antee that the agent of change would perform in such a way as to
achieve the goal we have stated: to make fruitful the farmer's
encounter with bureaucracy.
In the past, claims have been advanced for particular forms
of organization: cooperative credit and community development are
examples. Our view is that--entirely aside from the issue of the
will to develop--the variation in the factors involved is far too
great to put forth any single technique as having general applica-
bility or, for that matter, to reject a technique because it has
failed in one situation. The priorities in the needs of agriculture
vary from roads here to fertilizer there and to research in the third
place; the variety of local cultures in which the innovations are to
be introduced is almost infinite; different nations have different
can be devised to make it possible to decide (in allocating aid,
for example) whether enough will exists to give any agricultural
program its needed bureaucratic support. A specific case of the
will to develop is discussed in the appendix on land reform
(Appendix F), which points out that the precondition to effective
reform of land tenure lies not in any particular legislative meas-
ures but in the will to carry out the reform.
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bureaucratic resources. If both problems and resources vary, it is
normal that the best techniques for solving the problems should also
vary.
We found ourselves divided on one issue in our approach to the
bureaucratic barrier: whether to try to work primarily within or
primarily outside existing bureaucratic organizations. Some partici-
pants argued that human resources for development do exist within
the bureaucracy and that in any event the bureaucracy is indis-
pensable since it is the locus of decisions determining the fate
of any agricultural program. Accordingly the existing bureaucratic
machinery must be made use of. Others felt that the nature of the
bureaucracy makes it impossible for development-minded individuals
to accomplish anything within its structures. They therefore pro-
posed the establishment of new administrative entities alongside
of but outside the existing framework, designed to concentrate on
particular programs of innovation.
All agreed that the organizations that deal with agriculture
need to have the capacity for effective interaction and coordination.
The conventional bureaucracy usually emphasizes line authority and
responsibility through various hierarchical levels within a more or
less rigidly defined set of functions. The services needed often
do not fit neatly into the existing organizational "boxes." Further-
more the actions taken in one "box" may strongly affect what happens
in other "boxes." Hence some provision must be made for the opera-
tional combination of elements from two or more "boxes" into task
forces, especially at the local level, which in the main should be
ad hoc in nature. We came to refer to these ad hoc combinations,
either of elements of existing organizations or of specially con-
structed new ones, as administrative "disposable plastic bags." We
recognized the danger that these "disposable bags" would tend to be-
come "boxes." Indeed in some cases perhaps they should, but in gen-
eral such rigidity should be avoided because the birth of each new
"box" creates a new set of "interbox" barriers and thus further com-
plicates the very situation the "plastic bags" are designed to correct.
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We were impressed with what had been done at Comilla (see
Appendix A) to organize the local representatives of the various
ministries concerned with agriculture into an effective working
team, housing them in the sane building, drawing them together in
working parties and seminars, and ensuring frequent consultation on
common problems in the local community while leaving unchanged their
formal responsibilities to their respective ministries. Different
ways of forming these "disposable bag" task forces will have to be
experimented with in each country and often in each local community.
But the complex of factors affecting agriculture in any area is so
interconnected that we felt that organizational experiment and in-
novation in reshuffling elements selected from the formal organiza-
tion chart were necessary features of any successful program.
The ad hoc group or task force is of course in no sense a
substitute for the regular civil service. Rather, it particularly
commends itself for dealing with special priority problems such as
an emergency fertilizer campaign or a resettlement scheme. In every
possible instance the establishment first of an investigation and
study unit to appraise the situation may save much effort, funds,
and possibly reputations. One task of such a unit is to define and
delimit the terms of reference of the task force. For example, in an
emergency program for food production through immediate fertilizer
use, a country-wide approach is scarcely viable. Specific areas must
be selected on the basis of precise criteria. The same unit may pro-
vide the objective evaluation of the performance of the task force
that is essential if this method is to be fully effective.
The task force may take the form of either an interdepartmental
body or an autonomous corporation, including private citizens, that
can establish a routine and cadre specifically suited to the job.
Which it is depends on the type of undertaking. If it is the second
alternative, there is the ever-present danger that the governmental
departments will be reluctant to assist the new body, and good staff
will hesitate to transfer to it. Both alternatives have two essen-
tials. First a senior, time-honored public servant of considerable
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ability who commands the respect of contiguous departments must
be appointed as its head. Second, if a large area of the problem
is to be tackled at once, the combination of inputs must be re-
duced to the minimum.
The question of the "boxes" is still the one stated earlier:
how best to group scarce human resources. An analogous question is
that of diffusion or concentration: Should the available personnel
be spread thinly in both geography and function in an attempt to
bring benefits to as many farmers as possible? Or should they be
concentrated in the hope that they can bring greater total benefits
in a relatively small area? Whatever choice is made can only repre-
sent a compromise between great needs and scanty resources.
On the whole, however, we tended to favor concentration over
diffusion. Our reasoning was pragmatic. We were convinced, as stated
in Chapter Two, that only in rare cases can a single new physical
input provide more than small or transient benefits. Most agri-
cultural situations require a package that is typically complex.
The package in turn requires considerable numbers of scarce human
resources if it is to have any chance for success. Most developing
nations can man such a package over only a relatively small area
and often with benefit only to the better farmers. On the other side,
that of diffusion, the available manpower could at best staff a pro-
gram bringing a single simple input to great numbers of farmers. All
the force of social justice of course sustains the case for diffusion
of effort and benefits in desperately poor societies. The only possi-
ble counterargument, and it is the one we adopted, is that in most
situations diffusion of effort will provide virtually no benefits
for anyone. We do not argue that concentration is socially attractive
or equitable--but that it is usually the only method that can hope
to succeed.
Our examination of successful agricultural development programs,
and they are all too few, confirmed our skepticism about administra-
tive panaceas. Appendix A describes the salient features of four
successful schemes: the Comilla Academy for Rural Development in
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East Pakistan, the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR)
in Taiwan, the Gezira scheme in the Sudan, and the Vicos project in
Peru. Even these do not have much in common. Comilla is primarily
a farmer-training project that started with a single factor--coopera-
tive credit--in a single district and has expanded very cautiously.
The JCRR, on the other hand, operates nationwide and covers a broad
spectrum of activities. Gezira is a capital-intensive irrigation
scheme involving a high degree of paternalism and enforced change
in land tenure and farming patterns. Vicos is a community project
that grew out of a study by foreign anthropologists.
The lessons of such success stories do not lie in the form of
the project or in any particular techniques. Many similar projects
have failed. (Gezira has been imitated unsuccessfully.) They are
dependent on local conditions. The success of the JCRR may simply
tell us that Taiwan is a small island with a high proportion of
skilled people that received much foreign aid. The wise management
of Comilla and Gezira is not a quality that can be exported. Thus
the effort to transplant any specific techniques is extremely
dangerous.
Although they provide no readily exportable panaceas, the
success stories point to some underlying principles of general
validity. We examined the successful projects in the light of our
previous exploration of the complex series of factors influencing
agriculture. We then arrived at the general principles that follow.
They are closer to hypotheses than to dogma, yet we believe that
they provide criteria by which the organization of agricultural
development can be evaluated.
ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLES
Bureaucratic Feasibility
This precondition is as essential as technical and economic
feasibility. Before any program is approved, this question must be
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answered: Are the needed organizational resources likely to be
available, and is this their optimum use? This principle has all
too often been disregarded with the result that otherwise attrac-
tive projects failed. Basic decisions may turn on answers to these
questions. The choice between large- and small-scale irrigation is
an example. One may have the choice between one big dam serving
large numbers and, on the other hand, many wells and small village
dams, each serving at most a few fields. The big dam, as noted in
Chapter Three, requires vast social change and a high degree of im-
posed discipline; for example, the Gezira scheme was paternalist
not by choice but by necessity. Landholdings have to be reshuffled;
all farmers must conform to rules governing the use of water; they
may be required to grow specified crops by specified techniques.
Thus the local culture, the farmers' patterns of living, is bound
to be drastically remolded. The administration of the irrigation
project must plan and enforce these far-reaching changes. This is
precisely where so many irrigation schemes have failed in the past:
The dam is well built but the farmers are not organized and the
services are not provided to make efficient use of the water pos-
sible. The success of the project diminishes in proportion to the
distance from the site of the dam. By raising the organizational
question early in the planning stage the state may find that it
does not have the needed human resources, and it may then abandon a
project that is feasible in every other dimension. Other areas in
which the organizational issue is especially important are pesti-
cides and land settlement schemes, both of which often involve a
high degree of social control.
Pilot Projects
Any organizational scheme should be tested on a pilot basis
before it is generally adopted. Like the concept of bureaucratic
feasibility, the idea of field tests in bureaucracy needs far wider
acceptance. As we pointed out in Chapter Two, the case for adaptive
research in institutions is similar to that for adaptive research
in crop varieties. Our knowledge of all the factors involved is
not great enough to transplant crop varieties without testing.
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This statement is even truer of institutions. Our knowledge of
the complexities of local cultures and of their interaction with
any proposed innovation is far too limited to permit us to design
in the laboratory an organizational structure so sure of success
that it can be generalized without running unacceptable risks.
Alternative ways of approaching the farmer with an innovation may be
possible; he may, for example, be approached either as an individ-
ual1 or collectively through the village leadership. Which alter-
native is more effective should be determined by field tests, not
a priori in the ministry offices.
Pilot projects have other advantages. They accord well with
the concentrated regional packages that we have already advocated.
Pilot studies do not engage the prestige of the national bureaucracy.
If one proves unworkable--and it should be stressed that a high
proportion of such experiments will probably fail--it can be aban-
doned or drastically altered without serious loss of face. An
important characteristic of an organizational "plastic bag" is
that it is disposable. Thus inertia is less likely to force the
continuation of a scheme that has failed but to which the nation's
leadership has committed its prestige. (The failure of an agri-
cultural project to make barely visible changes on countless fields
in remote areas is less likely to be widely noticed than, say, the
failure of a steel mill to produce steel.) It is easier to find ca-
pable people to staff a pilot project because it is small. Finally,
if the project involves radically new values or reforms, it is
likely, again because it is small, to arouse less resistance from
entrenched interests or bureaucracy than a large-scale project.
This was the case in Comilla.
Yet the success of a pilot scheme does not necessarily mean
that it can readily be generalized. Institutions grow more slowly
than most plants. There is a difference in kind--not just in scale--
between a pilot and a national scheme. The advantages we have just
cited tend to vanish when the pilot scheme is generalized. Manpower
needs multiply. When one examines existing pilot schemes, one typi-
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cally finds a very high extension-farmer ratio: a relatively great
number of skilled people is being used to provide new knowledge
and services to relatively few farmers. Usually the manpower is
not available to generalize the scheme at that ratio, and it may
not work at a lower ratio of skilled people to farmers. (This prob-
lem suggests the need to devise and test schemes using a low ratio
of skilled manpower.) Bureaucratic opposition, skirted at the pilot
stage, may arise when the scheme becomes large enough to be per-
ceived as a threat to the customs or status of the civil service.
That it is possible to unite a small group of bureaucrats devoted
to development in the special conditions of a pilot scheme does
not prove that it is possible to animate a whole sector of the
civil service.
A pilot scheme is by definition an exception to the rule.
When it becomes the rule instead of the exception, then a whole
new set of considerations emerges. Thus the expansion of a pilot
scheme, no matter how successful, must proceed slowly and in full
awareness of the new problems to be faced. This also has been the
experience of Comilla; it has gradually expanded as its techniques
improved and opposition diminished.
Farmer-Bureaucracy Communications
Two-way communication between farmer and bureaucracy is essen-
tial for bridging the present gap between the producer and the agent
of change. The stress here is on the need for return communication
from farmer to bureaucrat. Extension is often seen as a one-way
process in which the educated person instructs the ignorant farmer,
a view that accords all too well with the despised status in which
agriculture is usually held. Communication is all one way and down,
from research to extension to farmer. Research does not listen to the
relatively "lowly" extension agent; nor does the agent listen to the
"ignorant" farmer. The agents do not discuss; they instruct. New in-
stitutions, such as cooperatives, are imposed on the farmer without
consulting him.
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Lack of two-way communication undoubtedly is a major cause of
the farmer's reluctance to listen to his advisers. It is often ob-
served that the better farmers get yields on their fields that are
higher than those at the research station, and that "the farmer
knows more about local conditions than the extension agent." In
such situations the farmer is unlikely to value the agent's advice.
Nor is the farmer likely to accept advice that--in its form
if not its content--is either offensive or irrelevant to his own
way of life. This may be particularly true of subsistence farmers,
who do not respond to economic motives as much as farmers who are
already in the market economy. To reach subsistence farmers, to con-
vince them that a better life is in fact possible through innovation,
the agent of change must thoroughly understand the workings of the
local culture--the forces that motivate the farmers. Such an under-
standing can be gained only by lengthy dialogue in which the agent
of change listens more than he speaks.
We have emphasized the need for innovations that respond to
the farmers' felt needs and for research directed to that end. It
is clear also that the method of introducing an innovation that
clashes least with local customs or values has the greatest chance
of success. Finally, people of different cultures perceive words
and ideas in different ways; it is therefore essential that communi-
cation with the farmer be in such terms that he, as well as the agent
of change, perceives th3 utility of what is being offered. If these
criteria are to be satisfied the agent of change must learn as well
as teach.
The process of two-way communication must be institutionalized.
Again the agents of change must be viewed as a class rather than as
individuals. Exhorting the agents to listen will not be enough, for
if educated people as a class despise agriculture and farmers, then
extension agents will be reluctant to listen to those they consider
ignorant and primitive no matter what they have been told. The
channel of feedback must be built into the system as a function as
necessary as the instruction of the farmer, which may require drastic
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change in the values prevalent in the educated class.
Once it is a part of the system, feedback can automatically
correct the mistakes of research and extension. When the gap between
farmer and bureaucracy is effectively bridged and information and
opinions flow automatically from farmers to decision makers who
must take them into account in their decisions, then the latters'
policies are far more likely to be adapted to local physical condi-
tions and to local social structures and to respond to the farmers'
felt needs. Mistakes are more quickly identified and acted upon if
there is pressure from below, and a package of innovations can be
varied to suit a multitude of local conditions. An example is the
Package Program in India, which offers a complete package of new
inputs in selected small areas. By experimenting with the ingredi-
ents of the package (more or less fertilizer, for example), farmers
are constantly refining the package, producing new combinations
better suited to their areas. Thus when two-way communication
exists, the chances for a viable package of innovations--for a
fruitful encounter between farmer and bureaucracy--are vastly
increased.
Local Leadership
The strain on scarce supplies of skilled manpower can be
lessened by local leadership. This principle is a corollary to the
bridging of the communication gap between farmer and bureaucracy.
Often the question is befogged by ideological controversy over
"statism" or "paternalism" as against "democracy." We attempted to
look at it from a pragmatic viewpoint. It is true of course that new
programs require impulsion from a decision-making center. Static
local cultures require a constant input of outside initiative in
addition to technology. Such forms of development as major irriga-
tion works require a high degree of regimentation since all farmers
must adopt the new practices.
Yet the pragmatic arguments in favor of using or developing
local leadership, combined with outside stimulus, seem to us com-
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pelling. Since the human resources of bureaucracy are so scarce
any technique that would stimulate local energy for development
would have the welcome effect of reducing the burden on the center.
It can also reduce the financial burden by making it possible to
raise capital locally. To the extent that village initiative can be
aroused, overcoming apathy based on the pessimistic view that man is
helpless before his environment, the responsibility for development
passes in part to the local community. An excellent example, cited
earlier, is that of marketing. Providing rural merchants with tech-
nical assistance and training in innovation can make them powerful
and continuing agents of change in the village community.
In an overly paternalist program in which all decisions are
made for the farmer at the center, village apathy may persist, and
any progress may be viewed as a gift from outside. Development then
is a fragile plant that is dependent on the constant input of stim-
ulus from the center. On the other hand, a village participating in
decisions concerning the program may sooner become committed to
development and innovation, and the process may eventually become
self-sustaining in human if not in financial terms. The farmer par-
ticipates in development as a partner of the elite, not as a client
or dependent. Once this stage is reached, lapses on the part of the
elite need not necessarily halt the process of development.
The use of local leadership combined with outside initiative
characterizes three of the successful programs that we examined. The
JCRR works through elected farmer associations. Farmers themselves
choose fellow farmers to attend the Academy at Comilla; these farmers
are key agents of change. At Vicos, where the Cornell team success-
fully stimulated a rise in farm yields on a former hacienda, opinion
leaders among the Indian serfs were sought out and given a share of
the responsibility for designing the program. These three projects
differ in their techniques, as they differ in many other respects;
we do not advocate that any of their techniques be adopted as such.
In many places existing Local leadership may be a brake on develop-
ment; this would be likely where land is held in latifundia. Finding
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useful community leadership may then require an overturn of the
local power structure.
The principle we advocate holds true in all three projects
despite differences in technique. Farmers are given an essential
role in deciding what is to be done and in carrying out the decision.
By using farm leaders as agents of change, the influence of the
scarce supply of skilled manpower may be multiplied. As suggested
earlier, any such technique that expands the effective supply of
agents of change may help a developing nation break a particularly
tight bottleneck. Moreover, any method that results in stimulating
village decision making, in releasing human energies now bogged
in apathy, is more than a technique of development. It is a goal
itself, the goal of human development.
The principles we have stated here are not likely to be put
into practice without profound and painful changes in attitudes.
Successful innovation in agriculture, as we suggested in Chapter
Two, ultimately depends on diffusing through the society a spirit
that welcomes innovation. Applying the principles we have stated
will at times prove painful, for they run counter to attitudes
that are now prevalent. Establishing two-way communication with
farmers implies a respect for their opinions that is often lacking
today; granting responsibility to local leadership means taking
power away from the center; raising the status of agriculture
implies lowering the prestige, at least in relative terms, of the
elite. Such changes cut deep into a society. * They will not be
effected by technicians or researchers, and still less by for-
eigners. They can be accomplished only by a determined political
leadership.
*
Appendix D discusses possible ways of reducing the risk to
bureaucrats of innovating. This scheme is analogous to the innova-
tion insurance for farmers described in Appendix B.
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Thus we have traveled from physical inputs to nation building.
That this sequence is logical--that putting fertilizer on a remote
farmer's field is intimately linked to the values of officials in
an urban ministry--is an illustration of the extraordinary com-
plexities of the agricultural problem. What makes it particularly
difficult to grasp these complexities in a useful manner is that
no common measures exist. We can calculate the relative value of two
kinds of fertilizer, or fertilizer and pesticides, but on what scale
can we weigh both pesticides and politics? This interaction of dif-
ferent kinds of factors was the keynote of our conference.
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Part III
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES: FOUR ECOLOGICAL REGIONS
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INTRODUCTION
The following four chapters report on the studies made by
conference subgroups on four major ecological regions: the region
of wet rice cultivation, the rain-forest tropics, the monsoon and
subtropical region, and the mountain valley and plateau region of
the tropics and subtropics. These regions are shown on the map that
follows.
Taken together, these regions contain a majority of the
world's inhabitants. However, each subgroup focused its discussions
on those parts of each region with which its members were particu-
larly familiar. The areas actually reported on are stated in each
chapter. The areas studied and the wider regions shown on the map
are both approximate and overlapping. Ecological regions shade
imperceptibly into each other, and, as the inset map shows, wet
rice cultivation occurs in the rain-forest tropics and in subtrop-
ical regions.
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Chapter Seven
THE WET RICE REGION
THE REGION AND ITS PROBLEMS
Wet rice regions predominate in the rainy tropics and sub-
tropics of East and Southeast Asia where the rainfall is adequate
for paddy cultivation. Here we consider the rice growing regions
of Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam,
Laos, Cambodia, Burma, East Pakistan, and Southeast India.
Projections of the demand for food in most of these countries
indicate that, assuming the present regional population growth rate
of about 2.4 per cent and the present degree of self-sufficiency,
an annual increase in food production of from 4 to more than 5 per
cent is necessary to meet the demand associated with a modest rate
of economic growth. But the actual rates of increase have averaged
only about half this required rate. Little additional land is
available, and yields are increasing slowly because changes in tra-
ditional methods of farming and water management are slow.
We therefore set ourselves the task of identifying the "pack-
age" of measures--of technological improvement as well as socio-
economic policy--that could increase production per acre more
rapidly over the next few years and at the same time provide the
foundation for sustained growth over the longer run.
Although this report concentrates on means to increase pro-
ductivity per acre we recognize that measures to promote equity are
very important and should receive special attention. Such measures
are valued in themselves; they are required to maintain social and
political stability during the period of agricultural development,
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and in some situations they make a necessary contribution to incen-
tives for increasing production. It is also our belief that raising
the level of living over the longer run requires that measures to
control population growth be coupled with measures to increase food
production.
An important objective for the wet rice region should be
diversification of the human diet. The need for proteins and vita-
mins is acute in these areas. Therefore the program should aim at
a progressive shift from rice monoculture to diversified agricul-
ture as well as at an increase in the volume of rice production.
Such a shift is also an essential condition for any substantial
long-run growth of output in these areas.
Five types of problems were identified as being of general
importance in the region. They are economic incentives, the use of
fertilizer and other improved practices, multiple cropping and
water, improved organization for agricultural development, and land
tenure. Significant differences exist among the wet rice countries
in the effectiveness with which they have handled their problems.
These differences and the associated differences in productivity
underline their critical importance to the effective intensifica-
tion of agriculture in the wet rice region.
Economic Incentives
The ratio between the market price of rice and the cost of
fertilizer and other purchasable inputs is much less favorable to
the farmer in most of these countries than in Japan or the United
States. The price-cost ratio is particularly unfavorable in the ex-
port countries of Thailand and Burma, where domestic rice prices
are held substantially below world export prices. In India the
spread between the prices in producing and consuming regions is
high, and price fluctuations are wide because of regulations ham-
pering grain movements and the lack of effective price guarantees.
Wide variations in rice prices are characteristic in several other
countries, whereas price supports have stabilized rice prices in
Taiwan and Japan.
136
The Region and Its Problems
In contrast to the relatively low price of rice, fertilizer
prices are substantially higher in most of these countries than in
the United States or Japan. In several countries the price reflects
import regulations or higher-cost domestic production. High distri-
bution costs represent another important factor in the cost of
fertilizer to the farmer.
Measures to improve economic incentives will be necessary.
These may include raising rice prices, price supports, reduction
in input prices, and innovation insurance schemes, depending on
the situation in the various countries. (See Chapter Four.) How-
ever, in exporting nations where domestic rice prices are signifi-
cantly below the export price, and in importing countries where
the price is low relative to other imported goods, we believe that
a case can be made for raising prices. We feel that higher prices
will promote the use of yield-increasing practices and are simpler
to administer than input subsidies. The general association of
prices with yields and fertilizer consumption is shown in Table 6.
TABLE 6. RICE: PRICE, YIELD, AND FERTILIZER CONSUMPTION
Total Con-
Price of Kgs. of Rough sumption of
Rough Rice Rice Equiva- N, P, K Yield
(U.S. Cents lent in Price (Kg. Per (Kg. Per
Country Per Kg.) to 1 Kg. of N Hectare) Hectare)
Japan 18.5 1.44 204 4,750
Taiwan 10.0 4.10 144 3,080
India 8.6 4.40 2.43* 1,510
Malaya 8.3 3.98 23 2,390
Vietnam 7.1 5.98 5.0 2,120
Philippines 6.3 4.83 11.0 1,100
Indonesia 6.1 5.39 13.2 1,720
Thailand 4.7 6.70 .012 1,390
Burma 3.0 9.53 1,620
*
Average for all crops.
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Fertilizers and Other Improved Inputs
Present usage of fertilizer on rice is much higher in Japan
and Taiwan than in the rest of the region. The importance of
fertilizer and improved practices in increasing production, how-
ever, is recognized in virtually all countries, and in several of
the countries fertilizer production is being rapidly expanded.
Substantial results can be obtained with known fertilizer and tech-
nology. For example, the Indian Council of Agricultural Research has
recently summarized the results of an extensive series of ferti-
lizer trials on farmers' fields. For rice they indicate returns of
roughly 200, 120, and 20 pounds of milled rice, respectively, for
20-pound inputs of N, P205 , and K. Comparing these figures with those
in Table 6 shows that the 10 to 1 return on N provides an economic
incentive in some countries but not in others.
Effective distribution and pricing of fertilizers, pesticides,
and improved seeds require study and action. Both the availability
and costs of fertilizer present major problems; improved varieties
of seed have been developed, but seed multiplication is a major
problem.
Multiple Cropping and Water Management
This factor deserves special emphasis in the wet rice region
area. Most rice is still grown under a system of uncontrolled
annual flooding that limits production to a single crop a year.
Multiple cropping of rice and other changes in the cropping pattern
can be introduced only if water management is improved, which
would give much wider scope for increased fertilizer use and vari-
etal improvements. However, water management also increases the
needs for research extension and credit.
The use of irrigation and multiple cropping varies greatly
in the region. Most of the riceland in Taiwan is irrigated and
multiple cropped; in some parts of India and East Pakistan there
is considerable flooding and supplementary well irrigation together
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with substantial areas serviced by improved canal irrigation,
drainage, and tube wells. In most other wet rice areas, irrigation
development is under way, but the portion of the land benefiting
from the controlled use of water remains small.
Organization for Agricultural Development
In contrast to the rain-forest tropics (see Chapter Eight),
considerable fundamental research has been done on the problem of
the wet rice region, particularly in Japan, Taiwan, Thailand,
India, and the Philippines. This research effort has recently been
bolstered by the establishment of the International Rice Research
Institute. A major gap in the research program, however, appears
to be in providing a continuum from fundamental research to applied
research and to use in agricultural development. Much more applied
research is needed on crop rotations, high yielding varieties that
will respond to fertilizer and water management, the use of high-
analysis fertilizer, and pest control.
The organization of government services in the wet rice
countries generally displays three characteristics: multiple minis-
tries and departments servicing agriculture; commodity-oriented re-
search and extension; little involvement at the local level. In-
creased governmental responsibility in agricultural development
has given rise to several experiments with ways of improving
coordination and making local assistance to farmers more effective.
We found four kinds of organization particularly noteworthy: the
JCRR organization in Taiwan, which has the role of planning, acting
as a catalyst, and providing financial support for programs of agri-
cultural development at all levels working through public, coopera-
tive, and farmer organizations; the Comilla project in East
Pakistan, which has successfully emphasized a program of training
farmer leaders and the development of integrated local pro-
grams; The Indian Package Program, which is attempting, but with
*
JCRR and Comilla are described in Appendix A.
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considerable difficulty in some areas, to work through the exist-
ing agency structures in securing adoption of a package of
improved practices in selected regions; the community development
programs in the Philippines and India, which have attempted to
achieve coordination of a broad spectrum of programs relating to
rural development.
The experience of these programs indicates the importance of
organization at the local and the national levels. In most coun-
tries further improvements in administrative machinery and in
training workers are needed to implement effectively rapid agri-
cultural development.
Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity
The region is characterized by a large agricultural popula-
tion and large numbers of small farms, and in most of the area a
substantial land-tenure problem exists. We believe that these two
questions--size and tenure--are decidedly different in character.
A change in farm size was not felt to be of priority impor-
tance. Available evidence suggests that small farms now make more
intensive use of the land than larger farms. The relevant inputs
for increasing agricultural productivity, such as new varieties
and improved water and crop practices, involve no substantial
direct economies of scale in terms of land. Much of the mechaniza-
tion needed--irrigation pumps and transportation, for example--
will not involve change in farm size. Increased use of tractors is
desirable in places, but group ownership and custom rental can
effectively provide power for the critical operations on small
farms.
The existing structure of land tenure, on the other hand, is
an important barrier in many wet rice areas . * Japan, Taiwan, South
See Appendix F on land reform and Chapter Four on the
economics of land tenure.
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Vietnam, Thailand, and Burma, nations where the percentage of
tenancy is low, are the major exceptions. In the other countries
the prevalent tenancy practices, such as the payment of share rent
without any sharing of the purchased inputs, are important deter-
rents to increased productivity.
In India, Pakistan, and the Philippines, land reform legisla-
tion has been passed but not fully implemented. Owing to the com-
plexity of the individual cases and the need to determine the
specific modifications that are both required and feasible, we do
not recommend a detailed program for immediate action. Empirical
study is needed and should be given high priority.
General Considerations
Our review of current problems suggests that actions need to
be taken to alter the physical, economic, organizational, and knowl-
edge environment of the wet rice region. We also suggest that these
actions must take account of the varied cultural and communications
problems existing in the different areas and villages. The differ-
ences in cultural values, village attitudes, and family and social
organizations are great, and these variations directly influence
the means used to attack the problems we have discussed.
The major question is not what in general should be done in
the wet rice region; rather, it is how a more effective program
can be mounted in specific countries and areas. What this means is
that any action program must take into account limitations of
human, financial, and other resources and the nature of the or-
ganizations that now exist. It should involve the design of a
minimum effective package fixing the priority and complementarity
of different measures, setting the timing sequence for action and
study, and the identification of specific methods that will be
both effective and feasible.
Since the design of the package will vary among areas and
countries, the study group analyzed specific situations in order
to gain insight into the critical elements of the package. We
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examined the history of the successful program in Taiwan. We then
outlined a program for the Central Plain in Thailand.
AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: THAILAND'S CENTRAL PLAIN
We selected the Central Plain of Thailand as the area for
our attempt to outline the relevant variables and priorities in a
"systems" approach to agricultural development. The program we
present here is not a blueprint to be applied in other situations.
It is neither the only nor perhaps even the best possible program.
It does, however, illustrate the factors that go into the package.
Most of the rice cultivation in this area depends on annual
flooding. The total area under rice in Thailand is about 15 million
acres; in spite of the existence of an extensive network of irriga-
tion, dams, and canals serving about 4.3 million acres, a second
crop of rice is raised on not more than 100,000 acres. However,
irrigation projects that are now under way with aid from the World
Bank are likely to make multicropping possible in the near future
on over 1.5 million acres of paddyland in the Central Plain and to
provide or improve wet-season irrigation on almost 4 million acres.
Traditional farming methods persist. Many farmers hesitate
to use fertilizers both because of a lack of water control and be-
cause of their belief that the fertilizer they apply will flow over
to other farms. The marketing and milling of rice also continue to
be traditional. Rice exported from Thailand has the reputation of
being poor in quality. The government levies an export "premium"
tax of about $50 on each ton of rice, which, by depressing the
price received by the farmer, discourages an increase in fertilizer
consumption.
Many credit cooperatives have been organized by the govern-
ment, but they are small and do not adequately provide production
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credit. The Rice Department of the government has also organized
farmers' clubs in some villages. They help spread the knowledge of
better farming practices, and in some places they engage in infor-
mal lending and group marketing.
Traditionally the government supplies free irrigation water
from its works. The Rice Department carries on a number of research,
pest-control, and educational activities.
Assumptions of the Program
Keeping this perspective in view we have outlined two pack-
ages of measures that should be taken, the first in the shorter
run and the second in the longer run. The measures are classified
under five headings: physical, economic, organizational, knowledge,
and psychocultural. We must emphasize that most of the measures
suggested are highly complementary; they can increase productivity
much more in combination than in isolation. It is also necessary
to state the basic general assumptions of the program for agricul-
tural development. These are as follows:
The national leadership will be committed to such devel-
opment.
The administrative system will be reorganized to meet
its needs.
The need to create local structures to secure the maxi-
mum participation of the people will be recognized.
The following criteria have been used in selecting and timing
the recommended measures: Priority is given to measures that can
bring about immediate increases in crop yields and that will pro-
vide strong economic incentives to farmers to increase productivity.
Immediate action should include measures that may have enduring
long-range effects, in particular, research to prepare the ground
for measures to be taken on a large scale at a later date.
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Short-Term Measures
Rice production could be substantially and economically
increased by the greater use of fertilizer and other improved
practices. Short-run measures should be directed toward the eco-
nomic , organizational, and knowledge environment of the farmer in
order to increase the use of these inputs. Equally important will
be the steps taken now to provide the basis for the longer-term
development of an intensive irrigated agriculture.
Physical
1. Fertilizer. The principal measure concerning
physical inputs should be the use of fertilizer. Since this
input depends largely on the ratio of the price of ferti-
lizer to the price of rice, the main action to be taken is
economic and is discussed below under "Economic" heading. How-
ever, studies should be undertaken immediately to determine
yield responses to fertilizers and to explore economies in
their mixing, handling, and distribution.
2. Seed. Supplies of the presently known improved
rice varieties should be multiplied and distributed more
extensively. These varieties are expected to increase yields
by 10 per cent. Existing seed multiplication stations should
be used, and outstanding farmers in the farmers' clubs should
also be enlisted to produce approved seed.
3. Fish and livestock. The practice of raising fish
in rice paddies, now prevalent in some areas, should be
expanded, and farmers should be helped to expand home
poultry flocks.
4. Pest control. Immediate action should be taken to
strengthen pest-control research and regional pest-control
services. Additional pest specialists should be trained and
posted to rice areas.
5. Water management. In anticipation of further irri-
gation development, one or two farmers in each district,
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chosen from among those who already receive off-season
water, should be assisted to become pilot farmers within
about two years. (See fourth measure under "Knowledge"
heading.)
6. Public works. Old local roads should be repaired
and maintained and new local roads built to link up with
roads constructed under the irrigation development program.
This construction would reduce underemployment in the short
run and facilitate the marketing of additional produce in
the longer run.
Economic
l. Price incentives. One of the most effective meas-
ures would be to increase the domestic price of rice to the
world level. The farmers' price would thus be raised from
the present level of $40 to about $74 per ton of paddy and
would make it profitable for the farmers to use moderate
amounts of fertilizer, as the following calculations show:
Cost per acre of 200 lbs. of fertilizer @ .04 per lb. $ 8.00
Value of 500-lb. yield increase @ domestic price $10.00
Value of 500-lb. yield increase @ world price 18.50
Thus the farmer's net return per acre would increase
fivefold from $2 to $10.50. The application of pesticides
would also become more attractive, and farmers would be
induced to invest in irrigation pumps and the leveling of
land.
The question of the advisability of maintaining or
dropping the export tax is a complex one that involves fis-
cal and other considerations on which we cannot pass an
*
The use of public works programs to reduce rural
unemployment is discussed in Chapter Four.
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informed judgment. If the Thai government feels it neces-
sary to keep the tax, an alternative would be to grant a
subsidy of about 50 per cent on the price of fertilizer. In
the preceding example this subsidy would result in a farm
income gain of $2.30 for each $1.00 spent on fertilizers,
and the cost to the government would amount to $20 for each
ton of increase in paddy production. Since nearly all the
increase would be exported, the government would receive a
tax revenue of $34 per ton of paddy exported.
2. Supply of inputs. The domestic price of fertilizer
is unduly high in Thailand--nearly twice the world price--
because of the deficiencies of the transport and distribu-
tion system. Therefore a study of the processes of fertilizer
transport and distribution should be undertaken with a view
to removing the deficiencies discovered.
3. Marketing. A similar study of rice milling opera-
tions should be made with a view to improving the efficiency
of the marketing system and the quality of milling.
4. Credit. The comparative efficiency of various
alternative farm credit agencies--production credit associa-
tions (cooperatives), state-aided local private banks, and
farmers' clubs--should be evaluated. In anticipation of fu-
ture needs, supervised credit experiments should be organized
in cooperation with each type of lending agency.
Organizational
1. Discussions and negotiations should be initiated
for the establishment of rural development boards and related
institutions in accordance with proposals outlined under
"Organizational" in the section on longer-term measures.
2. The number and the functions of farmers' clubs
should be expanded, and a few pilot farmers' associations
should be organized. Each association would serve a number
of farmers' clubs, channel credit and farm supplies through
them, and eventually undertake marketing.
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3. A cadastral survey and a survey of landownership
should be organized to expose such problems as imperfect
titles and fragmentation.
Knowledge
1. Applied research. Government support should be
obtained for the establishment of a general regional re-
search center to study all aspects of the cultivation of
rice and other rotation crops relevant to Thailand--soil
fertility management, engineering, farm management, market-
ing, and possibly livestock production. This center may be
one of those recommended in the World Bank program for
Thailand.
2. Local units. Government support should be obtained
for the establishment of farm research units in the dis-
tricts. These units would be directly associated with the
regional research center, and each would be operated by a
farmer.
3. Extension officers. Recruiting and training of the
substantial number of additional officers needed for the ex-
panded extension program in the area should be begun.
4. Training. One or more district centers should be
established for the training of extension officers, farm-
ers' club leaders, and farmers' association leaders and for
the training of key farmers selected by local clubs as pilot
farmers. Initial training courses for these men should be
started within a year.
5. General education. Plans should be made to expand
general adult education and to improve the use of mass media
for rural education.
Psychocultural. A series of studies should be launched with
the following objectives:
1. To determine optimal approaches and points of at-
tack (or nonintervention) for the program.
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2. To help identify potential rapid innovators (both
individuals and groups), who can be effective in the
diffusion process.
3. To identify, encourage, and enlist local leader-
ship, both formal and informal, and local institutions in
support of the program.
4. To identify locally "felt needs" as well as exter-
nally perceived needs.
5. To identify existing channels of communication and
if necessary suggest new ones.
6. To provide on-going evaluation and feedback on
program impact for possible reorientation, substitution, or
recombination of program elements.
The knowledge gathered through these studies should be continuously
used to iaprove the priorities of the program, the methods of intro-
ducing innovations, and the administrative and institutional struc-
ture of the program.
Longer-Term Measures
In the longer term the physical milieu will be characterized
by an enormous increase in the supply of dry-season irrigation
water and better water control in the rainy season through irriga-
tion, flood control, and drainage. Efficient use of this added
resource will require large increases in all physical inputs. In
the following list of measures required to achieve this balanced
increase in inputs, it is assumed that the short-run measures will
be continued and that the results of studies undertaken in the
earlier phases will be translated into action programs.
Physical
1. Fertilizer. The use of fertilizer should be in-
creased to about 80-100 pounds of plant nutrients per acre
on suitable soils. Progressive use of mixed higher-analysis
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fertilizers can greatly reduce fertilizer costs; it should
be stimulated.
2. Seed. Research on new varieties of rice and other
crops will have to be accelerated. New varieties should be
able to stand high-analysis fertilizer doses and should
have early maturation and other characteristics required by
a multiple-cropping system.
3. Multicropping. Multiple cropping of rice and new
crops should be extended on the basis of studies of their
economic and agronomic feasibility. Green manuring should be
introduced wherever feasible.
4. Mechanization. Increased farm output will require
a re-examination of the role of mechanization. It may be
advisable to introduce mechanical power and equipment for
pumping, for deep plowing, for turning green manures, for
shelling, threshing, and drying, and for transportation.
The specific processes to be mechanized and the equipment
to be used will have to be determined on the basis of
engineering-economic studies.
Economic
1. An effort should be made to evolve a consistent tax
and price policy consisting of a lower rice export tax and/or
higher minimum price guarantees. Then the fertilizer sub-
sidy can be reduced, and perhaps a charge for irrigation
water can be levied. Alternatively the fertilizer subsidy
and the free water policy will have to be continued, and
perhaps new subsidies will have to be added. It will always
be necessary to minimize the cost of fertilizer distribu-
tion.
2. With the expansion of new crops, some of which will
have only national or regional markets, action will be nec-
essary to limit price instability of a few selected crops.
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3. A market information program should be inaugurated.
Organizational
1. The main long-run organizational proposal is an
approach to coordinated rural development in the Central
Plain. The irrigable land under the existing or planned
irrigation projects will comprise all or parts of fourteen
provinces. An effective system of farm services will be nec-
essary to capitalize on the opportunities for an intensive
irrigated agriculture. These opportunities justify a special
concentration of effort in this area.
Diffuseness characterizes the ministries and technical
departments that would be involved in irrigation develop-
ment. The present Coordination Committee for Rural Develop-
ment is concerned only with the rural development program in
the northeast. Some liaison and coordination of technical
services are provided by governors at the provincial level
and by the district officers at the district level.
Traditionally in Thailand water is free to the cultiva-
tor, and there are no irrigation districts or devices other
than a few land development cooperatives of limited effec-
tiveness to elicit self-help from farmers for constructing
or maintaining small local works.
In connection with the World Bank loans for the
Chaophya and Petchburi projects, to help farmers utilize the
water the Thai government has proposed action along the
following lines:
(a) A water management staff, including a supervising engi-
neer for each major canal and one for each lateral canal,
and part-time ditchriders selected by the farmers but paid
and supervised by the Royal Irrigation Department. (b) For
crop improvement and farm management two experiment stations,
involving some pilot-farm features, near Chainot and Petchburi.
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(c) For extension advice to farmers more extension offices,
and some farm management advisers may be added.
In view of the major expansion in agriculture that is
required and the new crops to be introduced, a major expan-
sion and coordination in government services is called for
in order to assist farmers in the use of improved practices
and in the selection of crops on the basis of scientific
knowledge and economic feasibility. Farmers' organizations
are needed to help farmers plan their operations and make
known to the Irrigation Department their water demand
schedules. More outlook and marketing services will be re-
quired, as will extension advisory work on production prac-
tices and farm management. As economic development proceeds,
there will be additional demands for improved health and
social services. Any plan that involves group action at the
level of the farmer should be developed in consultation with
the farmers and local officials that will be involved in it.
The following recommendations are suggested to serve
as guides to the reorganization and coordination of the
agencies involved in rural development:
Provide for the identification of local farm leaders,
preferably by their fellow farmers.
Provide for these leaders to receive training for the
responsibilities of group action and leadership in educa-
tional programs relating to improved production practices.
Encourage farmers to form associations or clubs (per-
haps building on the present farmers' clubs) in which they
can work together to plan water deliveries and crop rota-
tions and to act jointly in the procurement of farm supplies
and credit and in marketing.
Provide for the federation of those clubs on a scale
adequate to permit high-quality management for farm supply,
credit, and marketing services.
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Establish a strong permanent national body to plan,
direct, help finance, and coordinate the regional program
for irrigated agriculture. This body might be specific for
this purpose, or it might cover rural development generally.
Leadership in this body should be outside any existing min-
istry. Each affected ministry should have membership on the
new board, which would be responsible for developing an
over-all plan and budget and for seeing to it that neces-
sary actions are taken by the appropriate agencies at the
right time. As required, it would provide supplementary
funds for the various agencies to perform the special jobs
called for by the program.
Emphasis should be placed on interministerial coordi-
nation at the provincial and district levels, utilizing and
strengthening the present arrangements for such coordina-
tion.I
The central board should make maximum utilization of
existing agencies. It should be primarily a coordinating
and perhaps a financing body for the work done by the
technical ministries.
A credit system should be provided so as to facilitate
new inputs in accordance with approved farm plans. If a
central agricultural credit agency is not established, the
board should provide funds to local credit agencies such as
farmers' associations and local cooperatives.
2. Land tenure. Action should be stepped up to clarify
titles, and provisions should be made to exchange land needed
for irrigation works.
3. Local government. Steps should be taken to
strengthen local self-government by giving local bodies
greater responsibility for the administration of local af-
fairs. The farmers' associations and clubs should be encour-
aged to press local government units to build and maintain
local public works.
Research and Research-Oriented Activity
Knowledge
1. The regional research center should be developed.
2. Applied research and training centers will be ex-
pected to provide a continuous flow of adapted and proven
new information and to give in-service training to the ex-
tension workers of the area in subject matter and teaching
techniques.
3. Farmer leaders will themselves act as vital dissemi-
nators of new ideas absorbed in the course of training at
the district training centers and at farm demonstrations run
by the pilot farmers.
Psychocultural. Eraluation of current programs and feeding
back the results of evaluation should be a continuous aim
of the psychocultural studies suggested in the short-run
program.
RESEARCH AND RESEARCH-ORIENTED ACTIVITY
Despite an extensive literature on various aspects of wet
rice production, wide gaps in knowledge still exist. Research is
needed in the areas of agricultural technology and economics as
well as in rural social organization and the behavioral sciences.
A selected list designed to help fill the gaps between present
research efforts and the knowledge needed for effective action is
presented here. It should be pointed out that the items are not
listed in order of priority. Morever it is assumed that, no matter
how narrowly stated, the broader social aspects of any problem will
also be investigated. It is recognized, for example, that in de-
veloping locally adapted varieties of rice an investigation of the
social milieu in which the new varieties would be introduced is
also necessary in order to resolve the attendant problems of deal-
ing with farmer attitudes and formulating effective extension
techniques.
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To derive conclusions that will be relevant to specific situ-
ations and will also have some generality, we suggest that, wherever
possible, research projects with a common design be undertaken in
several regions. What is already known must be collated and evalu-
ated both to provide some guidance to actions that must be taken
now and to limit research to the critical unknown factors.
On some of the topics listed we suggest that experimental
action research be undertaken in addition to the usual survey-and-
analysis studies. * Thus, for example, the yields of different farms
deliberately organized on different patterns and following dif-
ferent sets of practices can be analyzed; village plans with dif-
ferent priorities and institutional structures can be implemented
and evaluated; alternative subsidy, price support, and insurance
schemes can be administered and evaluated; alternative marketing
agencies, fertilizer distribution agencies, and tenancy and loan
contracts can be promoted and their performance evaluated.
Suggested Research in the Natural Sciences
Crop improvement
1. Cereals. Local adaptive, problem-oriented research
coordinated with the regional research on rice, wheat, maize,
and sorghum being conducted in the Philippines and India.
2. Other food crops. (a) Vegetables: coordinated re-
gional research on the development and production of disease-
resistant, nutritive, and high-yielding varieties. Special
attention should be given to crops that could be used along
with rice in multiple-cropping systems. (b) High-protein
crops: coordinated regional research on pulses and oilseed
crops for human consumption, with emphasis on disease resist-
ance and yield potential.
The topic of adaptive research in institutions is discussed
in Chapter Two.
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Soil and water management
1. Local adaptive research on the nutrient status of
soils and on the use of local and chemical fertilizers. This
should include trials on rates, kinds, and methods of apply-
ing chemical fertilizers.
2. Research on the development of more intensive farm-
ing systems. This will involve a range of crop rotations
going up to four crops per year and will require major ad-
justments in the use of land, water, fertilizer, labor, and
management.
Farm power and equipment
1. An aggregate engineering-economic study of current
and prospective requirements for farm power. It should in-
clude the costs and benefits of using off-farm sources of
energy, as compared to on-farm sources, and the effects of
mechanization on land productivity.
2. Farm equipment suited to small as well as large-
size operations should be improved or developed.
Storage and processing
1. Storage: local adaptive research on improved stor-
age at the farm and in market centers, which would include
studies on the control of insects and rodents.
2. Processing: adaptive research on the processing and
utilization of by-products.
Research Projects in Economics
Six major problem areas in economics are considered to war-
rant high priority in any program of research designed to aid the
formulation of agricultural policy:*
*
See Chapter Four for a general discussion of economic
factors.
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Farm yield variations. In almost all rice regions, yields
realized by farmers vary widely. Sometimes the best farmers real-
ize yields that are higher than those at experimental stations.
The reasons for interfarm variations in yields should be studied.
The high-yield farms need special attention in order that trans-
ferable items in their practices may be identified and incorporated
in recommended "packages" for general diffusion. In India the
high-yield, innovating sector of ex-landlord farms should be
surveyed.
Supply response. More wide-scale quantitative studies of the
responsiveness of acreages and yields of individual crops and
groups of crops in specified regions to movements in the relevant
prices as well as to important nonprice factors are urgently needed
to guide price policy decisions. Studies of the responsiveness of
yields--particularly in areas where they have registered signifi-
cant upward trends--will involve, first, the identification of
input changes associated with yield variations, then the effects
of price changes and other factors on the use of inputs. Studies
of supply response will reveal how far the responsiveness of sup-
ply to price movements is related to the stage of development that
different regions have reached. The comparative efficacy of input
subsidies and product price guarantees and of alternative forms of
"innovation insurance" also needs to be investigated.
Marketing. Empirical analyses of the cost of marketing (the
so-called "spread" between the farm harvest prices and the whole-
sale market prices) major staple crops and of the individual com-
ponents of the total cost of marketing are badly needed to indi-
cate the type of marketing reform really required. Price varia-
tions from year to year, from month to month within a season, and
from region to region need to be analyzed and accounted for in
terms of the costs of processing, transportation, and storage,
borrowing practices, interest rates, and public policies. The
nature and extent of monopoly in marketing should be identified.
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Where alternative types of marketing agencies operate side by
side, it is necessary to quantify and compare their respective
marketing costs and efficiency.
Fertilizer distribution. In many countries substantial
quantities of chemical fertilizer have become available from im-
ports and/or domestic production. But the fertilizer distribution
machinery is reported to be very inadequate. As a result, ferti-
lizer supply cannot have its full effect on production. The cost
and efficiency of fertilizer distribution by different kinds of
agencies should be studied. The extent to which existing agencies
can handle--or new agencies are required to handle--fertilizer
distribution should be determined. Recommendations should be
developed for coordinating sales, demonstrations, and the supply
of credit. Measures required to improve mixing, storage, delivery,
and application facilities should be highlighted.
Tenancy. Although there is a large body of literature on
the evils of existing tenure systems and on the laws enacted to
remedy these evils, very little empirical material is available
about the actual tenancy arrangements prevalent in different areas
and the particular schemes of sharing output, inputs., and manage-
rial decisions implicit in them. (See Appendix F.) Often tradi-
tional tenancy arrangements of various kinds persist in spite of
their legal abolition; legislation changes only their formal de-
scription, not their actual content. If large numbers of actual
tenancy contracts are empirically documented, their productive
and distributive effects can be analyzed with a view to selecting
the ones that are the least undesirable and at the same time are
enforceable in practice in specified areas, assuming the short-
run limitations of public administration and the bleak prospect
of changing the man-land ratio.
Credit. The knowledge of loan contracts is not very much
better than that of tenancy contracts. Therefore similar empirical
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studies of actual lending terms in a large number of actual trans-
actions are needed. The extent of monopoly in moneylending should
be determined. The risk element, the real interest element, and
the cost of collection in the actual interest rates charged need
to be separated. These data would provide a basis for improving
the operations of the new agencies created to channel government
funds.
Social and Organizational Studies
Maximum value will be derived from the studies proposed here
if they are carried out in farm communities in which comprehensive
understanding of social organization has been obtained. Ideally
then they should be made in selected communities representative of
key types in the wet rice regions (for example, subsistence and
cash crop, and monocultural and diversified land use) where inten-
sive community analyses have been initiated. There is little need
to present a detailed outline of the subject coverage of community
studies; they are sufficiently well known. However, it should be
stressed that any research program leading to actions designed to
obtain increases in agricultural productivity must take into ac-
count the existing social system with its local interlocking of
religious, political, economic, and cultural features and must
assess new knowledge factors in the program of change with respect
to their possible harmony, neutrality, or incongruence with pres-
ent cultural beliefs and practices. This presumes the availability
of ethnographic and sociological information about the community
or about similar communities against which consideration of pro-
posed new knowledge or new technique inputs would be made. In the
many wet rice regions where such data are scant or do not include
recent cultural changes, systematic studies are necessary. Even
when ethnographic information is available, special studies are
generally needed on the methods of program implementation and on
the agents of change.
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Methods of program implementation. Studies are needed in a
number of areas, but only a few are suggested here:
1. The timing, sequence, and combination of program
elements.
2. The applicability of various extension techniques
and methods, such as working with individual "farm coopera-
tors" versus traditional groups.
3. The determination of effective incentives for
change--communication, health, economic factors, and the
like.
4. Experimentation on motivation and social effective-
ness in innovation with those who conform to and press
others to conform to local ways; those who conform but would
readily change if motivated and not subjected to negative
sanctions; and the local innovators (deviants and nondevi-
ants).
Agents and agencies of change.
1. Analysis of agricultural information-transmitting
agencies such as extension services and community development
agencies, including their relative success or failure at
the village level; farmer perception and evaluation of their
programs and personnel; role analysis and experiments to
secure optimal criteria for selection of village-level
workers.
2. How needs for agricultural research are communi-
cated from the village level to researchers.
3. Experiments in training requirements of village-
level workers.
4. Analysis of local institutions and leadership, both
traditional and externally created, with respect to potential
roles in an action program.
5. Study of the farmer's encounter with bureaucracy.
In the final analysis the effectiveness of any program depends
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upon its facilitating the farmer's effort to innovate, ena-
bling him to absorb more knowledge and resources. It is nec-
essary to articulate his experience with bureaucracy--his
cost in time, money, energy, and self-respect in his efforts
to obtain permits, loans, supplies, water releases, and res-
olution of disputes.
Integrated Research Studies
Village planning. It would be extremely instructive to at-
tempt some experimental planning for a single village. Such plan-
ning would reveal the changes in a given situation that can and
should be made at the individual farm and those that can be made
more effectively through group action at the village level. The
spheres of efficient micro- and macro-activities can thus be de-
marcated clearly. Experimental planning would also indicate the
resources that can be mobilized for development by individual
farmers and village communities and the resources that have to
come from outside the village. Finally, an institutional structure
most suited to the needs of development can be designed as a part
of village planning.
Farm research units. Experiments should be made with the
development of owner-operated farm units in selected key commu-
nities that would put into practice the results obtained from
small-scale research trials and combine them into a farming sys-
tem. Such a unit, associated with agricultural research stations,
would provide a larger-scale test of various practices for crop,
poultry, livestock, and fish production and of their compatability.
It would make possible an economic analysis of the new system and
serve as one proving ground for the development of program "pack-
ages."
Chapter Eight
THE RAIN-FOREST TROPICS
THE REGION AND ITS PROBLEMS
The region consists for the most part of a belt around the
world some five degrees north and south of the equator interrupted
in places by higher elevations or by the effects of those elevations
on the movement of the tropical air masses. It includes much of
Indonesia and Malaysia and the delta of the Ganges in Asia, a strip
across most of Africa including the basin of the Congo, the Amazon
basin and the western lowlands of Ecuador and Colombia in South
America. We examined in detail the present status and relative
importance of the factors affecting agricultural productivity in
Malaya and in southern Nigeria. Some attention was also given to
the needs of the Amazon basin, and the situation in Malaya was
compared with that in Sumatra and Java.
The climate of the region is characterized by high temper-
atures during the whole year, generally high humidity, and high
rainfall that tends to be distributed throughout the year.
Most of the soils are latosols--very old, highly leached, low
pH, and low organic matter types. Characteristically, few available
plant nutrients are held in the soil. Nutrients must be captured by
growing plants as they become available and held in the biological
cycle; otherwise they are rapidly lost by leaching. Interspersed
with these latosols are smaller areas of younger allu'vial and hydro-
morphic soils.
Agriculturally the region may be subdivided into four major
types:
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1. Wet rice culture, where feasible because of availability
and control of water. This part of the rain-forest tropics is dis-
cussed in Chapter Seven.
2. Tree crop agriculture, where primary emphasis is placed
on tree cash crops (rubber, cacao, oil palms, coconut, bananas)
with food crop production as a minor, ancillary sector for subsist-
ence purposes. Such areas are densely populated, have well-defined
farm units and well-developed local social and other institutions.
They are typical of much of Sumatra, Java, Malaya, and parts of East
and West Africa.
3. Traditional agriculture based on the "slash-and-burn" or
land-rotation method. It is dependent largely on subsistence crops.
Only a fraction of the total area is cultivated at any one time.
Soil productivity declines very rapidly under cultivation, and years
of "bush fallow" are required to restore productivity. In general
such areas are sparsely settled. Enterprises that can be identified
as farm business units, as the term is commonly used, generally do
not exist. Existing social organization and structure tend to be
those characteristic of the extended family and tribal systems.
4. Vast areas of unsettled jungles that contain nomadic iso-
lates. Such areas are found in parts of the Amazon basin and in
parts of Africa. Even in the regions of settled tree crop and tra-
ditional agriculture there are substantial areas of unsettled land
that can potentially be developed.
The Primary Problem
The primary problem appears to be the development of a system
or systems of mixed crop-livestock farming suitable to soil and
climatic conditions that will make it possible to (1) expand food
production in the settled areas of tree crop and traditional agri-
culture, (2) provide profitable diversification in these areas,
and (3) develop in the presently unsettled areas a settled agri-
culture that is not so critically dependent as at present upon
the tree cash crops.
The Region and Its Problems
Historically agricultural development in the rain-forest tropics
has depended largely on the introduction of tree cash crops or the
superimposing of these crops on traditional agriculture. This has
generally been successful because, first, the tree crop agriculture
closely approximates the original ecology of the region and it has
therefore not been particularly difficult to develop cultural and
soil management patterns conducive to maintenance of high levels of
productivity and, second, the products of the tree crops have been
important sources of revenue owing to world market demand.
In the settled areas predominantly dependent on tree crops
several factors point to the need for change. First, rapid popu-
lation growth is placing severe strain on domestic capacity to meet
food requirements. Food imports in some nations have already reached
a significant proportion of total imports. Food imports obviously
reduce the foreign exchange available for the capital inputs needed
for the modernization of agriculture as well as for industrialization.
Second, the tree crop sector has largely been oriented to export
markets and has been concentrated in one or two crops. In many
instances it has become the dominant force in the economy. Export
dependence on one or two crops has made these countries highly
vulnerable to international demand and to market factors beyond
their control. Fluctuations in prices and income have had important
consequences for government revenues and rates of capital formation.
Third, several of the tree crops face an adverse or undecided future
due to the development of synthetics or competing natural substitutes
from temperate zone agriculture. The gradual erosion of the market
for tree crop exports and the development of synthetics threatening
further decline lend special urgency to the need for diversification.
Most of the future growth in output should be in food crops. Never-
theless exports from tree crops will continue to be a major source
of foreign exchange for many years, provided the efficiency of pro-
duction can be increased. Continued attention must therefore be
given to improved technology and to lowered production costs in the
existing tree crop complex, and to measures for stabilizing the
163
164 The Rain-Forest Tropics
international markets in these commodities. Extensive opportunities
exist, for example, in the form of new, higher yielding varieties
that would permit lower production costs. Important as such efforts
are, however, they should not deflect attention from the long-term
goal of diversification.
Population pressures are also beginning to be felt in the areas
where traditional slash-and-burn agriculture predominates. With
presently known methods the increasing food needs of the rural popu-
lation tend to be met by shortening the "bush fallow" part of the
cycle. In areas such as Eastern Nigeria the point has already been
reached where yields per acre of cultivated land are declining.
Although food deficiency is not as acute in Africa as it is, for
example, in India, serious problems of malnutrition, particularly
protein deficiency, already exist. Growing population and the decline
in productivity with overcropping in the slash-and-burn system will
rapidly bring about a desperate situation unless remedial measures
are taken soon. Modernization of the traditional agriculture by
superimposing tree crop agriculture, the only procedure that is now
known to be effective in the tropical rain forest, will lead these
areas to the situation faced by the settled areas where tree crops
now predominate. The tree crops will not provide for their increasing
food needs. A diversified food crop-livestock agriculture seems to be
the best answer.
Development of unsettled areas is an immediate necessity in
some countries, such as Malaysia, to relieve the population pressures
in the settled tree crop areas and to provide food for the growing
urban population. In still other areas, such as the vast reaches of
the Amazon basin of Brazil, there is less urgency for settlement
except along the fringes of the rain forest.* However, the demands
created by growth of the world population will in less than a
*See Chapter Ten on migration from the Andean highlands to
the rain forest.
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generation make necessary the development of some of these zones for
food production.
The great need in the rain-forest tropics, then, is a system
or systems of diversified agriculture based on appropriate mixes of
tree, food, fiber, fodder, and soil-improvement crops and the neces-
sary associated livestock enterprises. Such systems of mixed crops
plus livestock are needed in all three zones of the region: for
diversification in the settled tree crop areas, for modernization
and increase of production in the traditional "slash-and-burn" areas,
and for providing a stable productive agriculture in the new land
settlement areas.
The Knowledge Gap
Our studies revealed that many factors and institutions required
for agriculture are poorly developed or lacking. Some are immediate
impediments; others are potential impediments that can be expected to
assume substantial importance as soon as the immediate impediments
are removed or reduced. Three factors of special relevance in the
rain-forest region--extension, roads, tenure--are discussed later
in this chapter.
The major immediate requirement is research on the biological-
physical and socioeconomic factors prerequisite to the development
of the system or systems of mixed cropping plus livestock just de-
scribed. Tree crop agriculture has benefited from close ecological
similarity to natural conditions and from relatively extensive
research. As a result, improved varieties of rubber, cacao, and
other crops have been developed. Cultural practices are available
that result in good levels of productivity. Fertilizer needs and
responses are well enough known to justify fertilizer use. Many of
the major insect and disease pests have been identified, and control
measures have been developed.
In contrast very little is known about the annual food and fiber
crops beyond the accumulated wisdom of the traditional cultivators.
No one has yet found a method of growing such crops successfully over
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a period of years except in the traditional bush-fallow manner. No
one knows how to handle the latosols under culture of annual crops
without disastrous losses in productivity and irreparable damage
to soil structure. There are few improved varieties for these soils.
Disease and insects are prevalent, but little is known about their
control. Power sources other than human are essentially unused.
Productive livestock as an adjunct to a mixed cropping system is
almost nonexistent. Its effective use will require much more knowl-
edge than is now available about management practices, adapted
breeds, nutrition with local feedstuffs, and disease and parasite
control.
The deficiency of knowledge on the economic farm management
aspects of developing a viable mixed cropping-livestock agriculture
is equally great. Little is known about the economics of specific
practices. As the individual enterprises are developed from the
standpoint of their biological and physical feasibility it will be
necessary to test their economic feasibility and their social accept-
ability both alone and in combination with other enterprises. Market
demand studies are needed to guide those working on developing enter-
prises and combinations of them. No one yet knows the size of an
economic farm unit. Information is vitally needed on two questions:
What should be the pattern of "farm" organization? Given the desir-
able pattern how can it be developed out of the existing patterns?
The socially acceptable units of operation for a diversified agri-
culture may conflict with the agroeconomically determined optimal
form. Special care should be taken to allow for the continued evo-
lution of farm patterns. It must not be assumed that a single revo-
lutionary pattern will serve for all time.
An important question is whether diversification should be
regional or within the individual farm. No clear answer can be
given at this time, but several factors may be important in the
final decision, including:
1. Single-enterprise farms resulting from regional diversi-
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fication may require less managerial skill and may have economy-of-
scale advantages over multiple-enterprise diversified farms.
2. Conversely, multiple-enterprise farms may be less affected
by economic fluctuations of single commodities.
3. Inadequate roads and infrastructure may make regional self-
sufficiency a short-run necessity and microdiversification a temporary
but important stage toward eventual specialization.
4. Soil and microcLimatic considerations may favor regional
diversification with food crops grown on the "good" soils and tree
crops relegated to soils unsuited for food crops.
5. Conversely, it may prove impossible to develop soil-crop
management techniques for sustained food-crop production except in
rotation with tree crops, thus making microdiversification mandatory.
Faced with the existing vast deficiencies in knowledge, we
concluded that only relatively minor improvements in food production
can be made with what is now known. Under these circumstances we
concluded that the single most important requirement at this time
is a research program to provide the required knowledge and materials.
This is not to deny the potential importance of, for example,
farm and village storage structures, cooperatives and other farmers'
organizations, extension and community development, arrangements for
providing and financing inputs, marketing systems, land tenure prac-
tices, transport systems, support prices and subsidies, and many
other requirements for productivity increases. It is simply that such
factors can have little impact until the farmer can be shown how to
diversify his tree crop enterprise, to increase the productivity of
his food crops, and to develop a related and integrated livestock
enterprise. Once the requisites of production technology are pro-
vided by the research-education-extension program, immediate steps
will be required to provide the other necessary factors. Research
to determine the optimum time sequence of these steps would be
valuable.
Closely related to the needs for research and its utilization
in the agricultural sector is the need for large numbers of trained
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people: research scientists, teachers and professors, managers and
administrators, technicians, extension workers, and, finally, edu-
cated farmers.
Fortunately the development of the necessary knowledge and the
development of the trained people are complementary enterprises that
can be designed to work hand in hand at the various levels at which
research must be conducted.
THE RESEARCH AND TRAINING PROGRAM
Scientific principles have broad applicability and are generally
transferable from one part of the world to another. On the other hand,
specific technologies must commonly be developed for or adapted to the
ecological, economic, and social context in which they are to be used.
The degree of transferability and hence the place along the continuum
from basic research to adaptive research at which research in agri-
culture in a particular area must commence is determined by the magni-
tude of the differences between that area and another in which knowl-
edge and technology are far advanced. In this respect the problems
of the tropical rain-forest area are quite different and for their
solution require more basic research than is characteristic of most
other underdeveloped areas. Less of the knowledge and fewer of the
technologies from developed areas can be transferred profitably to
the rain-forest tropics. For example, soil management practices
adapted to the temperate zones are not useful and are actually harm-
ful in the tropical rain-forest areas.
Research in agriculture is a continuum from the basic biological
studies of soils, plants, and animals to demonstration and research
trials in farmers' fields of fertilizer or pesticides or new varieties.
A parallel continuum also exists for the economic and social sciences.
Moreover the continua for the biological, physical, and social
sciences are closely linked and interrelated, with the usefulness
of any one limited by the lack of the other. By its very nature,
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research on the problems of agriculture is an enterprise requiring
long-term commitments of support and often many years for the ulti-
mate solution of important problems. Small quick gains may be avail-
able, for example, from generalizing the practices of the better
farmers. But planners must not allow such gains to distract them
from the need to develop immediately the institutions and people
required to provide the much greater benefits that in the longer
run can accrue from an intensive research and education program.
The integration of research and training at all levels is par-
ticularly pertinent in the rain-forest area. There is of course the
usual symbiotic effect of the two: The research man is a better re-
searcher if he has the disciplinary benefits of teaching; the teacher
is a better teacher if he has the intellectual stimulus and the prac-
tical realities provided by research. In-service training at all
levels in the research program will increase the number of hands
available for research and will provide effective training for
future research and extension workers and technicians. But in most
countries in the wet tropics another factor is even more important:
The supply of well-trained, competent agricultural scientists and
teachers is pitifully small. If the best of them are sealed off in
separate research institutes--an all too common practice--they become
academic eunuchs.
Institutions for Research and Training
The nature of research and training requires that these functions
be institutionalized for effectiveness, continuity, and perpetuation.
The kinds of institutions required and their interrelationships with
one another will differ in different countries depending upon local
factors. Since one is unlikely to find any country in which some
institutions are not already carrying on agricultural research and
training, it will always be necessary to plan the future in the light
of what exists. Insofar as possible, new developments should build
on and be related to already existing structures. Only when it is
clearly shown that existing institutions cannot be modified and
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enlarged to meet the need should planners yield to the temptation
to start something new.
In most countries of the wet tropics the existing agricultural
research has developed mainly along commodity or problem lines. The
central thrust of agricultural research has generally been directed
by government rather than universities. In fact, in many of these
countries, colleges of agriculture with research potential are
recent developments, and research programs at the universities are
uncoordinated with those of other universities or government. In
countries that have a federal government, both it and state govern-
ments usually sponsor agricultural research.
Aside from shortages of facilities, funds, and research per-
sonnel, an urgent problem is this lack of communication, coordination,
and mutual planning among existing research institutions. In Nigeria,
for example, we find the following kinds of more or less independent
research efforts:
1. Three of the four regions have agricultural research sta-
tions, but there is little planning and indeed little interchange
among them.
2. Each region has a federal agricultural research station with
general substations. In addition there are a number of special re-
search institutes supported jointly by the federal government and
the regions:
Forestry Research Institute (Ibadan)
Rice Research (Badeggi)
Oil Palm Research Institute (Benin)
Trypanosomiasis Research Institute (Kaduna)
Cocoa Research Institute (Ibadan)
Stored Products Research (Ibadan)
Rubber Research Institute (under construction)
3. Universities. (1) The University of Ibadan is expanding
its agricultural research program, (2) the University of Nigeria in
Nsukka is preparing to do agricultural research for which the EDI
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(Economic Development Institute) serves as a semiautonomous agent
in association with the Eastern Region government and the university,
and (3) the University of Ife in Western Nigeria intends to partici-
pate in agricultural research but plans to coordinate existing re-
search in the Western Region and in time anticipates becoming the
focal point of regional research.
In other African countries the research units are similarly
dispersed, though they may be fewer in number. In Brazil each uni-
versity is doing research; however, there is great diversity and
much variety in quality and relevance. There are also federal re-
search institutes and state research institutes with similar or
other defects. In Malaysia there are research institutes in rubber,
pineapples, fisheries, and agronomy. Research is also carried out
by the Faculty of Agriculture at the university.
In this context we recommend that the planning of research
institutions be guided by these general principles:*
1. Each country should develop a research-education plan
detailing the research problems in order of priority and the
desired institutional structures with definition of priorities
for their establishment. There are many external sources for fi-
nancing research and education on a grant or loan basis. Often
these external sources seem to be in competition, providing dupli-
cate financing for separate and not well-related parts of the total
institutional structure. Much of the fault is to be found in the
lack of a well-defined plan within the country.
2. A joint research commission consisting of government, uni-
versity, and private (including farmers and business) and foreign
personnel should be established immediately. Its job would be to
define problems, allocate responsibilities, determine terms of
reference, and sort out the administration, resources, and appli-
cation of the research to be conducted.
*See Chapter Five for a general discussion of research.
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3. The size and complexity of the research-education insti-
tutions should be determined by, first, the complexity of agri-
cultural problems and the nation's ecological diversity and, second,
the potential ability of the country to staff and finance the insti-
tutions. Whereas external financial resources of considerable magni-
tude are available, the size of the research-educational complex
should not exceed that which the country itself can reasonably be
expected to finance sometime in the near future--say, ten to twenty
years. Countries may be expected to range all the way from those in
which two or more central locations are indicated (for example, in
each of several states in Brazil), with the related network of
regional stations and local fields, to those countries that can
support no more than some local field trials.
4. In countries or regions where agricultural universities
are prepared or can be developed to carry out research, governments
should gradually provide them with support and facilities through
grants in aid and cooperative research so that main experimental
stations can be developed in association with the university.
5. Administrative arrangements and facilities should also be
established to permit the research workers in the country to meet
at least annually in groups according to disciplines and according
to the problems on which their research is focused.
International Cooperation in Research
Many countries will not be able to support even one central
location of the depth and complexity required to solve the basic
problems of agricultural diversification in the rain-forest tropics.
In fact some countries will not be able to support even regional
stations of the needed magnitude. Yet regional stations must be fed
with basic knowledge, concepts, and materials from central locations,
and local field trials must be fed with further refinements and
adaptations from the regional stations. International cooperation
Immediate Research Possibilities
can solve the problem of the smaller nations and can strengthen the
total research effort in the rain-forest tropics. These are some
possibilities:
1. Completely international institutions such as the Inter-Amer-
ican Institute of Agricultural Sciences (IIAS) of the Organization
of American States.
2. An institution in one country that undertakes to serve its
neighbors. The international activities and services of the insti-
tution could be financed by multilateral, bilateral, or foundation
sources.
3. An agreement between a number of countries whereby each
country agrees to a joint plan of research and to the pooling of
research results. An intercountry research group would meet period-
ically to review progress and to make plans. Such intercountry
groups could be served by one or two specialists who would act as
the secretariat and who would be available to give expert advice.
A model of this kind of international cooperation is the FAO grain
improvement program in the Near East.
IMMEDIATE RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES
The kind of research required to raise knowledge to minimal
standards is extremely broad and basic. Indeed any listing of the
elements requiring research in the wet tropics appears to embrace
all the traditional categories for agricultural research in the
biological, physical, and social sciences. Thus overriding priority
must be given to organizing a research system capable of conducting
basic research in each category and in the interrelations and inter-
actions among them. This is a long-run effort. In the meantime, how-
ever, some short-term research can provide quick benefits. Among the
short-term possibilities are the following:
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Collecting and Organizing Unpublished Material
Although little published or organized information is available
on the problems of annual crop and livestock production in the rain-
forest tropics, many ideas have been tried and useful observations
made by the research and agricultural development officers of the
colonial services. Unfortunately in countries where these research
and development activities were disrupted and the personnel returned
to their home countries, much of the information was stored in inac-
cessible places, left in unpublished reports and records, or taken
home by the departing officers. We believe that the assembling and
synthesis of this unpublished and often fragmentary information would
be useful in providing the basis for immediate action programs and
guidance for expanded research efforts.
All information that is not now in published form in the li-
braries should be located, classified, and organized for the use of
current researchers. For this purpose the rain-forest tropics might
well be divided into four or five areas, each including two or more
countries. In each region a researcher with a broad knowledge of
agriculture might visit all research institutes, universities, li-
braries, and ministries of agriculture and organize all relevant
unpublished research findings. In addition he might obtain the names
and current locations of earlier researchers and inquire of them as
to what may be in their files. This information also should be
retrieved and organized for current use.
As a first step in this process of retrieving and assembling
currently available information a series of symposia might be held
to which expatriates and others with research experience in the area
would be invited as the key participants. Among the topics of such
symposia might be the following:
Soil management, fertility, chemistry, and microbiology
with annual crop production.
Crop potentialities for diversification and their uses.
Crop rotations, intercropping, mixed cropping.
nmmediate Research Possibilities
Diseases, insects, weeds, and other pests of food, fiber,
and fodder crops and their control.
Problems and potentialities of livestock production.
Management, breeding, nutrition, disease, and parasite control.
Farm organization and management for diversified agri-
culture.
Evolution of farm types; cultural and social barriers
to change.
Power sources, tools, and equipment.
A Survey of Land Settlement Schemes
Land clearing and settlement are now going forward in most
countries in this region--usually without benefit of systematic
analysis of the most efficient methods of land clearing, land prep-
aration, and settlement based on experiences in other countries
having similar climatic conditions and forest cover. A research
program to evaluate the procedures, experiences, and outcomes of
land settlement schemes that have been carried out in the past or
are currently in progress would provide valuable information on
alternative land clearing and settlement practices. The results of
the research should be summarized as rapidly as possible and made
available to all interested countries in the region.
Other Short-Term Research
Many other short-term research activities might be undertaken
with the prospect of being able to make use of their results in the
next few years. These include the following:
Surveys of existing production practices.
Surveys of existing marketing practices.
Surveys of existing peasant attitudes and felt needs.
Crop variety yield tests.
Simple fertilizer trials.
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Analyses of the economic effects of specific changes
in production and marketing practices.
EXTENSION, ROADS, AND TENURE
As we have seen, the agricultural prospects of the wet tropics
are limited by a host of factors. In our discussions we found that
three of these factors--extension, roads, and tenure--are particularly
important barriers in the wet tropics.
Agricultural Extension
Change in agricultural practices requires informed decision
making in the adoption of new technology, in farm organization and
operation, and in adjusting to change in the economic and physical I
environment. This is also true of nonfarm agricultural businesses
providing inputs and markets to the primary producers. I
A necessary (but not sufficient) condition to the improvement
of the "batting average" of the fan sector in this respect is the
existence of an educational service that effectively performs two
functions. First, it improves the ability of the decision-making
unit of the farm and business accurately to recognize problems,
seek and obtain information relevant to the solution of such
problems, analyze alternative courses of action, decide, and act.
Second, it provides the decision makers at low real cost with a I
continuing and reliable source of the kinds of technical, economic,
and institutional information essential to improved decision making I
and subsequent change.
There are several administrative and organizational structures
within which such an educational function might be performed. The
particular organizational structure that will be most effective in I
a given situation will depend on the specific nature of the agri-
cultural sector and its ancillary institutions. However, any success-
ful agricultural educational service must have, regardless of its
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administrative organization, certain fundamental characteristics.*
Some of the more important ones are:
It must be conceived as a continuing educational func-
tion designed specifically to improve the ability of the
rural population to solve its own problems on a sustained
basis with an ever-increasing degree of efficiency.
It must be staffed with adequate numbers of profes-
sionally competent, dedicated educators who clearly conceive
their role in these terms.
Its structure must include a system of rewards based
on this same criterion of improving rural self-reliance.
It must be concerned with the real problems of agricul-
ture and have the flexibility to adjust to the ever-changing
set of problems with which agriculture is faced.
It must have direct access to a "research arm" that
effectively provides the kinds of information needed in deci-
sion making at the production unit level in a form and at a
time most appropriate to the existing set of problems.
It must have the ability to influence, directly or
indirectly, the content of the research arm.
It must be able to influence, directly or indirectly,
the policies and programs of educational institutions produc-
ing the manpower required for sustained development in agri-
culture.
It must have access to a training program that continu-
ously upgrades its staff.
We strongly recommend that consideration be given to the cre-
ation of an adult education service integrated with the research
and training institutions in such a manner that the above criKteria
can be met.
*
See also the discussion of institutions in Chapter Six.
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Roads and Agricultural Development
The tropical rain-forest region contains the world's largest
undeveloped land area. Successful development of a settled agri-
culture in regions such as the Amazon basin, Borneo (Kalimantan),
and others, will require considerable public investment in roads
and agricultural infrastructure.
Although there are a number of unresolved empirical issues as
to the role of agricultural infrastructure in the development process,
there is general agreement that some level of infrastructure is an
absolute precondition to the development of a settled agriculture with
surplus production that can be siphoned off to urban areas. Of all
the forms of such infrastructure we believe that roads are probably
the most important both in already settled areas and for the develop-
ment of new areas.
The general nature of the contribution of roads is readily
appreciated: Roads open up wider markets to the producer and increase
the efficiency of price communication and product distribution. They
reduce the delivered cost of farm produce to the urban areas. They
facilitate the provision, at lowered costs to the farmer, of urban-
produced farm inputs such as chemical fertilizers, machinery, equip-
ment, and fuel. They reduce losses in the transport of perishable
farm products by shortening delivery time and by lessening damage in
shipment.
Despite our general and intuitive knowledge of the importance
of roads in the development process, several issues and questions
of strategy are as yet unresolved and require empirical research.
Very few empirical studies have been made to measure the economic
role and value of rural roads. What criteria should be used to
determine when a road should be built and where it should be located?
Information is needed as to the proper timing and sequence of road
construction. For example, should main roads be built prior to the
development of settled agriculture or before an agricultural surplus
emerges as a stimulus to agricultural development--or should the
construction of roads follow agricultural development of the region
Extension, Roads, and Tenure
and the consequent pressures for improved transport systems? When
and where should access and feeder roads be built?
Further, very little information is available on the rates
of return for capital investments in road construction. Such esti-
mates have an obvious use in the allocation of governmental expendi-
tures among various other public works such as irrigation and drainage
schemes, storage and warehouse facilities, and electricity and power
installations.
Land Tenure
Discussions of land reform and tenure generally center on
conditions in Asia and Latin America. The argument usually turns on
conflicts of interest between landlords and tenants and on the dis-
incentives that flow from these relationships and depress agricultural
production. The equally urgent land tenure problems of sub-Saharan
Africa are therefore bypassed since these conditions do not fit the
African situation.
The basic point to be made about Nigeria and much of West and
Central Africa is that form rather than "reform" is at the core of
land tenure problems. (The discussion here is based on southern
Nigeria, but similar land tenure patterns are common in the African
rain-forest region). It is more a matter of actually piecing together
as it were viable farms out of vast areas occupied by tree crops,
mixed food crops, land in bush fallow, and land that apparently is
relatively empty. The difficulty in attacking this problem is sug-
gested by the disorderly layout of tree crops and cultivated patches
of food crops; by the practice of shifting cultivation and accompany-
ing bush fallow; and by the fact that every foot of land in southern
Nigeria is owmed whether or not it is used for agriculture. It is
becoming clear that customary tenure practices are incompatible
with rapid increases in productivity and that they fail to provide
sufficient legal protection for farmers now that land is becoming
scarcer as population grows and agriculture is gradually becoming
more commercial.
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Tenure of land in southern Nigeria centers on the extended
family, including chiefs' families, within the social context of a
larger community (usually a village or a small group of villages)
that in effect holds loose trust rights. Use rights in land are
allocated by heads of extended families to nuclear families. The
chief, representing the community, holds loose trust rights to
farmland surrounding the village, but the historic allocation of land
for use was to families. These rights were inheritable. As sons grow
up and marry, the father (family head) provides them with land for
cultivation from family holdings. The extended family never becomes
completely independent of the larger community, nor is there clear
independence of younger generations within families. Up to the pres-
ent at least, southern Nigeria has no landlords and consequently no
tenants on farms. Rural land is seldom bought and sold outright.
In parts of southern Nigeria there is considerable population
pressure on farmland with as many as 1,000 rural inhabitants per
square mile. It seems clear that under traditional tenure, available
land is poorly distributed, a problem that may become intensified;
and tenure practices possess built-in disincentives and difficulties
of adjustment to higher production.
Competing Interests in Customary Tenure
Land rights in southern Nigeria are customary rather than
legally sanctioned. In the normal course of agricultural development
such customary rights tend to crystalize into property rights.
Southern Nigeria is now approaching this critical point in tenure
practice, and much of the success of general agricultural development
may depend on how the transition is guided.
A basic dilemma to contend with is that the existing system
tends to make for group security and survival at the expense of
economic progress. For example, while land is inheritable, making
for family security, the ownership rights that attach to a person
within the family are seldom strong enough to leave him entirely
free to dispose of his holding by lease contract or outright sale.
Extension, Roads, and Tenure
He may within limits exercise the right to pledge his allotted land
or abandon it, but the family holds the right of redemption and
reversionary rights. This in effect discourages one who acquires
land by loan-pledge from making improvements. The burdens that
customary tenure places on transfers and alienation of land outside
the family make it extremely difficult to gain economies of scale,
while family farms are becoming smaller through inheritance and
population growth.
In southern Nigeria there is a tradition that anyone who plants
a crop should be permitted to harvest it. When this idea is extended
to tree crops, the person who is allowed to plant cacao or palm trees
may claim a permanent right to harvest. This means in effect that a
stranger to the village would hardly be permitted to plant trees on
land where he is a temporary occupant.
The process of inheritance within the family, restraints
against the alienation of land outside the family, and restrictions
on permanent plantings by strangers on family lands were all well
chosen devices to preserve family cohesion and survival. They would
perhaps continue to serve this purpose and maintain a reasonable
balance among families in the village if the community were completely
static.
In Nigerian villages a higher order of prestige and influence
and corresponding access to additional land were always available to
chiefs. This caused no difficulty so long as land was in plentiful
supply. But in recent years the increase in population, the growing
commercialization of agriculture, the growth of cities, and the
demand for agricultural development have all combined to make land
scarcer and consequently more valuable. The basic contradiction
between tenure measures for group survival and economic development
is increasingly exposed. The old devices of tenure are preconmercial;
their design never anticipated the consequences of an exchange economy.
Being customary, many tenure practices have no clear-cut sanction in
law and may leave peasants unprotected against the pressure of new
commercial forces.
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Excess village lands were traditionally held in trust for use
in event of need. In their role as trustees of such village reserve
land some chiefs appear to be sealing it off as their property, thus
circumscribing the traditional right of others to occupy it on the
basis of need. It is clear that a few individuals with above-average
knowledge and resources are finding ways to evade customary tenure
and are accumulating land in their own behalf. These signs of con-
verting customary rights in land into negotiable property rights,
if allowed to continue unrestricted, could lead to a few large
landholders instead of many small ones. We would have an explosive
situation similar to those in Asia and Latin America.
The transition to a viable form of tenure must be made while
there is still time. Among the creative tasks of research would be
the discovery of ways whereby the combination of tree crops and
mixed farming, now without design, could be transformed into a
pattern of viable farm units, each with the prospect of generating
adequate income. In Nigeria at least it would be a mistake to push
other research and development of institutions very far without
attention to the fundamental problem of land tenure. Conditions in
Asia and Latin America have not revealed insights for solving this
problem in Africa.
Chapter Nine
MONSOON AND SUBTROPICAL AGRICULTURE
THE REGION AND ITS PROBLEMS
The monsoon and subtropical region includes most of the Indo-
Gangetic plain, the northeastern part of Thailand, much of the
Philippines, belts across Africa north and south of the rainy
tropical belt, the Near and Middle East, northeast Brazil, and
other smaller regions. Those areas where rainfall is sufficiently
high that wet rice cultivation is currently the predominant form
of agriculture are dealt with in Chapter Seven.
This is a region of long growing seasons; temperatures in
most of it are never so low that crops cannot be grown through-
out the year. But almost nowhere is the rainfall sufficiently
high or well distributed through the year to take full advantage
of these favorable temperatures and abundant sunlight without
irrigation during at least part of the year.
It is a region in which the lands at present under culti-
vation are in general cropping, with grain crops other than rice
predominating: maize, sorghum, millet, wheat, barley; peanuts,
cotton, and sugar cane are common, as are grain and forage legumes.
Wherever rainfall is sufficient for at least one crop a year
and the soils and topography are suitable, most of the land in this
region is already under cultivation; in much of this part of the
region population is dense, farms are small, and the level of tech-
nology is relatively low. In these areas agricultural development
must be evolutionary, starting with the present pattern of culti-
vation and the already established population with its accumula-
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tion of traditional values and forms of social, legal, and adminis-
trative organization.
Elsewhere in the region there are substantial areas, mostly
arid to semiarid, with soils and topography that are amenable to
cultivation if irrigation can be provided. Here the capital costs
of establishing a productive agriculture are high, but there is
far greater opportunity to choose the type of agriculture and the
type of economic, social, and administrative climate within which
it can operate.
We did not attempt to consider all the varied sets of con-
ditions to be found in different parts of the region. Instead we
concentrated on areas of which the members had personal knowledge.
These were for the most part the Indo-Gangetic plain, East Africa,
the Middle East, and the Philippines.
We concentrated our attention primarily on three problems.
We gave most of our attention to measures to increase agricultural
production in the regions of high population density. We examined
also the problems, alternatives, and requirements for development
projects to establish or intensify production in semiarid to arid
regions of low population density, usually through the introduction
of large-scale irrigation. Because of the limited or maldistributed
rainfall and the importance of irrigation throughout the region,
we went also into the multiform problems of water management. (See
Chapter Three.)
We found in considering these two sets of circumstances--
high population and already settled agriculture on the one hand,
and the possibility of a wholly new pattern of development proj-
ects in low-population regions on the other--that a different set
of first-priority problems emerges in each case. In the first the
predominant problems center around the task of reorienting social
and administrative patterns locally and nationally in order to be
able to conduct effectively the variety of developmental activities
that are essential to the evolution of presently existing agricul-
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ture. In the second a precondition to being able to begin is a very
substantial amount of agronomic, economic, and cultural research.
HIGH-POPULATION REGIONS ALREADY UNDER CULTIVATION
The farms are already there, and they are small. The farm
operators are already there, and they are members of established
cultures with their own distinctive values, customs, and forms of
organization. The better farmers are already making the best use
they can of existing resources, techniques, and knowledge. Only a
very limited (though not.to be underestimated or ignored) in-
crease in production might be brought about by raising the per-
formance of the less able farm operators closer to that of the
best. For the most part, agricultural development in these areas
must depend on the availability of new physical inputs (seeds,
fertilizers, pesticides, implements, and sources of power), new
knowledge and skills in husbandry and management, new attitudes
with respect to the nature of farming, new interconnections
between farming and the rest of the economy, and adequate incen-
tives to farm operators to adopt both new, more productive inputs
and cultivation and management practices.
While the monsoon and subtropical region cuts across many
countries, few countries lie wholly within it. More frequently part
of a country is in wet rice cultivation, part of it may be in up-
land or mountain agriculture, and part of it, lesser or greater, is
in the type of ecological region we are considering here.
For some of the measures bearing heavily on the rate of agri-
cultural development the nation must be treated as a unit, and
uniform policies or national programs must be established. Research
and manufacture of inputs are examples. For agricultural develop-
ment not to be inhibited by imposing national patterns that do not
meet the specific needs of different ecological regions within the
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country, certain activities should be designed specifically for
each of the major regions. Even within ecological regions in each
country there are substantial differences that call for varying
patterns of public programs if a maximum rate of agricultural
development is to be achieved in each varying part of the region.
The principles governing national policies and organization
for agricultural development are discussed in Chapter Six. In this
section we shall focus on these questions:
What are the activities for which particular attention
must be paid to "locality-units" of public services to agri-
culture? What do experience and existing knowledge indicate
should be the size and operating characteristics of these
"locality-units"?
By "locality-units" we mean the unit of each activity closest
to farm operators and village communities. These are the "cutting
edge" of any program to accelerate agricultural development. Only
through effective locality-units can any regional or national pro-
gram succeed. The operating unit in agriculture is the farm. In-
creases in agricultural production come about only as each of many
farm operators makes decisions to change his farming practices.
In part the farm operators may be encouraged to do this by the
climate of general economic conditions and policies of their
national government, but the necessary instruments must be readily
available to them where they live and work if they are to take
advantage of this general climate and actually increase their pro-
duction.
Some Functions of Locality-Units
Six functions need to be performed through appropriate local-
ity-unit activities: arrangements to give farm operators ready
access to new purchasable inputs; ready access to markets for in-
creasing amounts of farm produce; a program to encourage and stim-
ulate farmers to adopt more productive inputs and practices and to
train them in the new skills of husbandry and management involved
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(the function commonly called "extension education") and to organ-
ize their cooperation for such enterprises as water management and
pest control, a program of local verification trials of proposed
new practices, access to adequate supplies of production credit,
and access to a new power source or sources for activities related
to production and marketing.
In addition to these functions, but not unique to any one of
them, is the need to develop stronger incentives for farm operators
to adopt more productive methods and incentives for members of the
staffs of the locality-units to perform their duties with increas-
ing vigor and competence.
Access to purchasable inputs. Two functions are absolutely
essential at the locality-unit level: One is making improved seeds,
fertilizers, pesticides, and equipment readily available for pur-
chase by farmers; the other is equally accessible markets for the
increasing farm produce that the new inputs make possible. There
can be little agricultural development without increasing involve-
ment of farmers in a market economy. Most farm operators in the
region already sell some products and buy some consumer goods, but
only the more progressive farmers in the more progressive areas
now buy production inputs. For all farmers agricultural development
will require more and more buying of production supplies and equip-
ment and more selling of farm produce.
The question arises as to whether any governmental program is
needed in these fields. Private merchants are one alternative.
Farmers' cooperatives are another.
In the case of production inputs a special problem at the be-
ginning, when a new input is recommended, is that there is not al-
ready an established demand sufficient to attract private merchants.
Moreover, if a merchant has previously handled only consumption
items, he has not had experience with the building up of inventory
to meet special highly seasonal demands, in many cases for items
that, if not available at a precise time, will remain unsold for a
long subsequent period.
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Under these circumstances widespread experience indicates
that, even where there is preferance for the handling of production
inputs by private merchants in the long run, it is essential to
have these inputs made available through a governmental program
when their purchase is first becoming established (and to have
their use stimulated by a program of extension education). One
practice successfully employed in parts of Latin America has been
for each extension office to stock farm supplies for sale to
farmers at a price slightly above what a private merchant would
have to charge to make a reasonable profit. As demand increases,
private merchants begin to stock the supplies, charging slightly
lower prices. From that point on, the small stocks (if any) still
kept by extension offices serve only as a standby reserve, a
source if the private merchants run out of supplies.
Whether this function of providing purchasable inputs can
be performed by a farmers' cooperative in the beginning is dis-
cussed later in this report.
The two distinctive features of the region on this point
are that the small size of the individual farms means that pur-
chasable inputs must be available in small amounts for individual
sales, and that the general lack of any road transport vehicle
faster than a bullock cart owned by individual farm operators
means in practice that the locality-units for the sale of pur-
chasable inputs are useful only within the radius of easy walking
distance.
Access to markets for farm products. The other essential
function that must be adequately provided by locality-units is
access to outside markets for increasing amounts of farm produce.
Here again options are available: private merchants, govern-
mental programs, and farmers' cooperatives. The problem of low
initial demand does not arise for this service as it does for
purchasable inputs because in most parts of the region a network
of private merchants already exists for farm produce. Instead the
predominant problems are:
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1. A lack of feeder roads to reduce the costs of haulage
and therefore to increase the at-the-farm price of farm products
and to widen the area within which perishable products can
profitably be grown.
2. A lack of competition between primary buyers, and a
lack of central market information to ensure a "fair price"
being paid to the farmer.
3. A large number of intermediaries in the marketing
chain.
4. A lack of good farm or village storage facilities
to allow farmers to hold nonperishable products after harvest
until an advantageous time to sell.
Extension education. Whereas access to inputs and markets is
essential to expanding production, extension education is an
important accelerator of this process. Innovations, if they are
effective and profitable, spread slowly under almost any circum-
stances; extension education accelerates their diffusion by stimu-
lating and encouraging individual farm operators to adopt new prac-
tices and helping them learn the necessary new skills of husbandry
and management.
Generally speaking, there is no one preferable form of
locality-unit for extension education valid under all circumstances,
or any one ideal amount of agricultural land that it should try
to "cover." Instead, both the form and the area served by such a
unit should be adjusted in accordance with two controlling factors.
One is the size and degree of previous commercialization of indi-
vidual farms (two features of farms that are closely associated
throughout most of this region). The other is the laws of learning
as established by long experience in many countries both in ex-
tension education and in schools. These laws apply at two points in
the extension education process: in contacts between the extension
teachers and the farm operators and in the training of extension
teachers.
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These considerations point to two alternative forms of
locality-units for extension education in the high-population
small-farm areas: the central training unit, and a staff of ex-
tension agents who go to farm operators on their farms and in
their villages.
The central training unit has substantial advantages in
localities made up almost exclusively of quite small farms. In such
a locality there are so many farmers per square mile that taking
extension to all of them becomes prohibitively expensive. Moreover,
where farms are too small to have their own work animals, it
appears that cooperative effort by small groups of farmers is
essential if the rate of development is to be accelerated. Under
these circumstances extension education can be conducted through
these same forms of cooperative organization, as in the Comilla
project. (The Comilla project is described in Appendix A.)
The Comilla pattern of extension education is to have each
cooperative union (described later in this section) select one
"model farmer" to attend weekly training sessions at the federa-
tion (thana) headquarters, then for him to pass on to other
farmers of his union the knowledge and skills he has acquired.
These model farmers are depended upon to serve the extension func-
tion to other farm operators within their village.
In this type of locality-unit the crucial size factor is the
number of model farmers per class. In Comilla this number may approach
50, but educational experience elsewhere indicates that classes of
30 to 35 are preferable.
In localities where the farms vary more in size, with an
appreciable number as large as 10 to 20 acres, a staff of extension
agents is the alternative to total reliance on a training center
but should not necessarily entirely displace it. On farms of this
size, already somewhat more commercial, there is more scope for each
individual farmer to try out new methods without so much joint agree-
ment by his neighbors. This possibility is even greater where farm
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operators live in dispersed farmsteads, each on his own holding.
Since each farmer has more land, new learning by one farm operator
can have a larger productive effect, and therefore the visits of
extension teachers to individual farmers become less costly in terms
of potential increases in production.
There are two crucial points in determining the optimum size
for locality-units of extension education operating primarily through
a staff of extension teachers. The first is that there should be
one member of the extension staff for each three hundred farm opera-
tors. This is an approximate figure based on experience; it takes
into account the fact that for teaching to be effective, for learn-
ing to occur, there must be frequent contacts between each farm
operator and any one new idea. While these contacts need not all be
individual visits (some may be meetings) and need not all be
personal (some may be by radio, printed matter, or pictures),
frequent contact between potential innovators and the extension
teacher is essential. No extension teacher can normally have effec-
tive teaching contacts with more than perhaps 100 farmers per week,
even using several group meetings, and effective influence at
early stages of agricultural development requires at least one
personal contact every second week. This would indicate 200 instead
of 300 farm families per extension teacher, but many farm operators
will not be responsive.
The other factor in the optimum size of the locality-unit for
extension education is the number of extension teachers working to-
gether in each unit. This optimum number is 30 to 45. With more than
45 the "staff conference" form of combined in-service training and
administrative device becomes unwieldy, and there cannot be enough
learning by each member of the staff to be effective. With fewer
than 30, training by administrators can be more intensive, but there
is likely to be less learning from each other among the extension
workers themselves; the latter point is at least as important as
the former.
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Just as effective teaching and learning between extension
teachers and farm operators depends on frequency of contact, so the
staff conferences of extension teachers, a prominent feature of
in-service training, need to be frequent: at least once a month
and preferably every two or three weeks. Frequent staff conferences
at the headquarters of the locality-unit have the additional advan-
tage of providing extension teachers with a periodic recreative
withdrawal from village conditions to a larger town.
Thus one locality-unit for extension education, using a paid
staff of extension teachers going to farmers, would ideally cover
as much area as is farmed by 9,000 to 13,500 farm operators. Where
such a unit must cover a wider area, greater use must be made of
radio and other mass media to try to compensate for too-light
coverage.
Where extension education depends entirely on training model
farmers at a training center, the size of the area will depend on
how much is covered by the farms of members of each union and on
how many classes of 30 to 35 model farmers each can be accommodated
weekly by the center.
The teaching at the center must honor the laws of learning.
If farm operators are actually to learn, the staff of extension
teachers must also constantly be learning, and the system must be
so devised that this happens. Frequent in-service training is
imperative. So is intimate constant contact with the latest find-
ings of agricultural research.
Verification trials. Some members felt strongly that wherever
there is a program of extension education another essential locality-
unit is one devoted to conducting verification trials, under condi-
tions faced by local farm operators, of changed practices being
recommended to farm operators by extension teachers. These include
comparative yield tests of varieties of crops already being grown
in the locality and tests of allegedly "improved" varieties being
recommended by experiment stations. These trials should also include
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fertilizer and water application recommendations. The results of
these trials should be analyzed economically in terns of costs and
returns at local on-farm prices as well as agronomically.
The purpose of such verification trials is threefold:
First, to find out whether the recommended practices
are really valid under the conditions of that particular
locality.
Second, to provide a constant example and reminder to
extension teachers of the nature of experimental science,
and a caution as to the necessity of being absolutely sure
about what is being recommended.
Third, to have available in the locality technicians
who know how to lay out plots, how to apply new inputs with
precision, and how to measure results in order that they
may assist extension teachers in setting up valid and ef-
fective result demonstrations on the fields of farm operators.
In addition to verification trials the staff of this unit
should conduct surveys of crop yields at regular intervals. It
might also handle the analysis of records of their activities
kept by the extension staff.
Each locality-unit for verification trials would need a staff
consisting of one trial plot technician, one interviewer, one survey
and records summarizer, and one research methods technician who
should be somewhat more highly trained and would be the director of
the unit.
Since the kind of personnel needed for such a staff is not
normally produced by existing institutions, they could be trained
largely by in-service apprenticeship, first working as assistants
to experienced locality-unit staff and then being promoted and
transferred to start another unit, with each such unit having a
new apprentice staff each year as long as may be necessary to multi-
ply the number of units.
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Whether or not there should be one locality-unit for verifi-
cation trials associated with each extension education locality-
unit or whether one unit for verification trials could be associated
with two or three units for extension education would depend on the
homogeneity or heterogeneity of the different adjacent extension
areas and the distance to the farthest part of each extension area,
since the verification plots should be accessible for observation
by farmers on occasional inspection tours.
The verification trials might be conducted on the farms of
cooperating farmers. Where farms are small, however, it may be
necessary to conduct them on separate fields operated specifically
for this purpose.
The program of the verification trials locality-unit should
be worked out in consultation with the extension education unit and
with the technical advice of research specialists from the regional
research station.
Access to adequate supplies of production credit. We feel that
the pattern of organization for credit developed at Comilla is an
excellent one for a high-population locality of predominantly
small farms. The features of that scheme relevant to our considera-
tion here are the following:
1. The locality-unit for credit in the Comilla project
has two dimensions:
a. Cooperative unions of 20 to 60 members each.
b. A "federation" of unions that supervises the
accounting of, holds deposits for, and makes loans to
the unions. A federation can service up to perhaps 300
unions by having a staff of appropriate size. One in-
spector or supervisor is needed for each 10 or 12 unions.
2. The union is a democratic cooperative in which:
a. Each member must attend each weekly meeting.
b. Each member must deposit some savings in the
union at each meeting.
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c. The union decides on the amount of the loan to
request from the federation, the loan being secured by the
joint unlimited liability of all members.
d. The union decides how much of each such loan will
go to which members for what productive purpose and is
responsible to secure payment of the loan.
e. The union decides what loans to request from the
federation for such joint purposes as a tube well or a pump.
f. Only members of the union may borrow from the
union, and only unions may borrow from the federation.
g. The union ascertains that loans by members are
used for the productive purpose or purposes for which they
are made.
3. The federation may not be a cooperative in the be-
ginning. With respect to credit it is a bank that borrows from
the government and lends to cooperative unions. As unions
purchase the federation's stock it can become a cooperative.
4. While one federation might be able to service more
unions than exist in the beginning in a single minor govern-
mental administrative unit (in the case of East Pakistan,
the thana), it does not do so; it restricts its operations
to the thana. One reason for this is to be able to utilize
officers of the government's technical departments at the
thana level in its training activities.
5. No effort is made to try to enroll all farm operators
in unions or to establish a union in every village. It is con-
sidered satisfactory if after five years 75 per cent of the
villages in the area have unions and 50 per cent of the
farmers in villages with unions are members. When more than
60 farm operators in a single village wish to be members,
a second union must be formed.
Access to new power sources for activities related to produc-
tion and marketing. We devoted considerable discussion to the role
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of mechanization in localities with dense population and exclusively
small farms. We took as a given the impossibility of reducing the
absolute size of the labor force in agriculture in such localities
in the next generation. We therefore ruled out any type of mechaniza-
tion that is primarily "labor saving."
There are, however, types of mechanization that may be highly
beneficial in such localities, namely those that are complementary
with the use of large quantities of labor: pumps to provide irriga-
tion water, and engines (or motors) to run them; tractors to allow
plowing when the soil is dry or to speed seedbed preparation during
critical short periods; tractors to be used for road transport.
These are examples of types of mechanization that allow more pro-
ductive and more intensive cultivation and the use of more, not
less, labor.
In introducing new power sources in such localities it is
important both to think broadly of the uses to which they may be put
and to seek to introduce types that can be versatile. It is also
important to take into account their impact on drudgery and on the
nature of agricultural operations from the standpoint of social
status. From these standpoints "riding" tractors are preferred to
those requiring the operator to walk, particularly in the cultiva-
tion of wet rice and for road haulage.
In localities of small farms, availability of tractors on
hire is necessary in order to make their use economic. In most such
localities the key factor in the size of the locality-unit for
mechanization is the necessity for adequate repair and servicing
facilities. Where these must be provided, a pool of 12 to 15 trac-
tors is probably the minimum number.
Particularly with regard to mechanization it is important to
realize that the operation of tractors will involve a financial loss
over at least one to three years while farm operators become accus-
tomed to it and find additional uses for the new source of power,
though it should be adopted only where it can ultimately pay its
own way.
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Coordination of Locality-Units of Different Activities and a Minor
Administrative Unit of Government
We have discussed the need for locality-units of each six
activities and some of the considerations bearing on their effective-
ness. Two points should be stressed in conclusion:
One is the importance of organizing each activity in locality-
units appropriate to its own function rather than forcing each of
them into the strait jacket of a "block" of predetermined size. In
some cases, having each locality-unit of a size optimum for its own
function may mean that several locality-units of one activity may
operate over the same geographic area as a single locality-unit of
another activity. For example, the area covered by one federation
for credit might be the same as that for two to four extension
units, one or two verification-trial units, or one for mechanization.
The second point is that some adjustment may need to be made
in these specific optima in order that all activities can be
coordinated by a single minor administrative unit of the government,
whether pre-existing or newly created.
It cannot be stressed too strongly that an effective local
"cutting edge" is unlikely if each of the six activities is ad-
ministratively related to only a more central unit of that same
activity. The complementarity and interdependence among these
activities is so strong that all of them must be administratively
integrated in a minor administrative unit of the government if any
one activity is to be even reasonably effective.
Progressive Initiation of Program in Different Localities
We noted earlier that the localities within any one country in
the region vary markedly in agricultural potential, size of farms,
present degree of commercialization of agriculture, and other
characteristics.
A program of well-articulated local programs of locality-units
of optimum size and intensity cannot be initiated everywhere simul-
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taneously. We feel that the priorities in initiating programs should
be as follows:
1. Start with integrated sets of locality-units of
optimum size in one or a few contiguous localities within a
region (a) of high agricultural potential, (b) possessing a
reasonable proportion of larger, more commercial farms (what-
ever the range in sizes of farms may be).
2. Proceed next to multiplying the locally integrated
program in other similar localities of the same type and add
one or a few integrated programs in other localities where
somewhat smaller farms predominate.
3. Move next, while multiplying integrated programs in
the above areas, into a few localities where only farms of
the smallest size exist.
4. Having established the full range of locality units .
of all six activities in a few localities having only small
farms, extend the services not made available in the be-
ginning in localities with larger farms to those localities
also.
The reasons for this order of initiation are two. First, the
potentiality for early increases not only in total production but
also in marketed production is greatest in localities having the
larger farms. Second, a smaller, simpler combination of activities
may be reasonably effective there. For example, while adequate
supplies of purchasable inputs and market access for farm produce
are always necessary, these may be easier to provide for farms that
are already partially commercial; credit may not have to be provided
through special new agencies in the beginning; and operators of
larger farms are likely to be more responsive to extension education.
On the other hand, in localities made up wholly of quite small farms
it may be nearly useless to provide any service until all can be
provided and integrated in a manner similar to that of the Comilla
project.
Low-Population Cultivable Regions
This progression in initiating programs in different types of
localities is depicted in Chart 3.
LOW-POPULATION CULTIVABLE REGIONS
Just as it must be taken as given that the density of the
population at present dependent on agriculture for a livelihood
cannot be reduced in the next twenty years in the high-population
areas of this region, so it must be recognized that with minor
exceptions large-scale development schemes in areas with a low
population at present will not decrease the density of the agri-
cultural population in the high-population areas. Emigration is
seldom sufficient to have this result, particularly where farm
units in the new scheme are larger, as they must be in most cases
if efficient and maximum production is to be achieved.
The case for development schemes in low-population cultivable
areas is not based on emigration. It is based on the fact that
there are places in which modern technology, frequently including
irrigation, can add substantially to the present land resources of
a country, thereby allowing for extension of agricultural produc-
tion. With this end in view the development of new lands, particu-
larly in association with irrigation, is going on in many countries
of the region of the world with which we are concerned--in India,
Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Sudan, Mexico, and elsewhere.
It is also going on without irrigation in Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Assam; in many parts of East and West Africa; and in Brazil and
other countries in Latin America.
Two considerations make it important that extensive and inten-
sive feasibility studies precede any such program. One is that the
capital costs are always high, and frequently the same level of in-
vestment would yield greater returns if applied to increase pro-
ductivity in regions already under cultivation. The other is that a
wide variety of factors affects the actual productivity to be an-
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Chart 3
INITIAL ACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC SERVICES AS INFLUENCED BY SIZE OF FARMS
FARM SIZE
ACTIVITY ALL UNDER 3 UP TO 8 ACRES; 40% UP TO 25 ACRES; *60%
ACRES OVER 3 ACRES OVER 3 ACRES
TRAINING TRAINING CENTER CENTER OR EXTENSION AGENTS PLUS
ONLY EXTENSION AGENTS SOME TRAINING AT CENTER
VERIFICATION
TRIALS YES YES YES
(RESEARCH)
CREDIT YES ? USEFUL, BUT NOT OF HIGHEST
PRIORITY IN THE BEGINNING
PROVISION OF YES YES YESNEW INPUTS
MARKETING YES TRAINING FOR TRAINING FOR MARKETERSOF PRODUCE MARKETERS
CULTI ION MOST USEFUL USEFUL ? IN BEGINNING STAGES
VILLAGE
WELFARE START HERE - - - +MOVE INTO THESE - - - - -+THEN MOVE INTO THESE
ACTIVITIES
IF A WIDER REGION CONTAINS SOME LOCALITIES OF EACH OF THE ABOVE THREE TYPES, THEN:
2. THEN START SOME UNITS1
HERE, PERHAPS ADDING
I POWER CULTIVATION
3. START UNITS
HERE AFTER OTHERS
ARE GOING WELL
4. EXTEND CREDIT AND
MARKETING TO THESE
1. START THE FIRST
UNITS HERE
5. EXTEND CREDIT, MARKETING,
AND POWER CULTIVATION
TO THESE
*THE OMISSION OF CREDIT, MARKETING ACTIVITIES, AND POWER CULTIVATION HERE IN THE
FIRST INSTANCE IS NOT BECAUSE THEY WOULD NOT BE USEFUL BUT BECAUSE THEY MAY
NOT BE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO GET SOME DEVELOPMENT STARTED.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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ticipated from the settlement of new lands. A somewhat similar
situation arises whenever and for whatever reason it is proposed
that large estates be broken up into smaller units with a
changed pattern of cropping.
The major types of feasibility studies and major questions
with respect to the organization of the new production, and the
scope and administration of the project itself, are es follows:
Agronomic Potential
The first step is to estimate the agronomic potential of
the area being considered for development.
This is influenced, first, by factors of the physical en-
vironment: climate, topography, soils, water supply (both surface
and underground supplies and a hydrological survey of river waters
potentially available for irrigation), sources of power, and the
accessibility of the region.
Taking these factors into account the next step is to con-
sider what crops might be grown in the region, what yields of
these crops might be anticipated, what pests and diseases would
have to be controlled, and what market is available or might be
developed to absorb the new production.
In making these estimates it is a serious mistake ever to
omit the setting up of a number of model farms at points repre-
sentative of different sets of microsoil and climatic conditions
within the region to test whether the proposed crops can in fact
be grown successfully and in what crop combinations. Research is.
a continuous process and takes time, while time in itself often
seems a pressing factor in the consideration of new development
schemes. It is not easy to choose between waiting for research
and getting something going in the present known circumstances.
It may be wise in one case to start by recommending both the
seeds and the practices of better farmers already in the area
without waiting for the improved varieties that research may later
bring. In another case it may be fatal not to know the hydrology
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of a river, or the readiness of people to move into a new area, or
the system of farming on a consolidated unit that will really
bring them a better net income, or the degree of extra effort
in new practices that people will tolerate.
For these reasons a pilot farm is a useful device to test
intelligent guesses and to condition both organizers and people
to change. Moreover, the function of a pilot farm need not be
limited to the start. There are advantages in regarding it as a
Site for continuing to test processes of improvement. Although
its first task is to gauge initial difficulties and possibilities,
it can work after the project is fully in operation as a site for
training institutions as well as for further modifications in both
administrative and production methods.
Cultural Feasibility
Before proceeding to determine what types and sizes of farms
should be established within the area, it is important to take
cognizance of whatever cultural restraints may be present. One set
of restraints has to do with current political, social, and ideo-
logical pressures. Another involves the genuineness of the govern-
ment's desire for planned development and its readiness to accept
the patterns of management essential to the scheme' s success. A
third has to do with the degree of willingness of farm operators
to exert effort and accept both the technological and the mana-
gerial routines that will be necessary.
Types of Farming
The cropping patterns, rotations of crops, and feasible
degrees of diversification that can be projected are functions of
the foregoing considerations. Emphasis on one or two cash crops
is imperative if modern technology, involving the use of pur-
chasable inputs, is to be introduced. There is seldom justifi-
cation for starting a development scheme that simply reproduces
the low-technology agriculture of already settled areas. Such a
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procedure only expands the area of presently difficult problems,
and once such patterns become established they are hard to change.
While diversification has advantages in some places, it
multiplies the problems of providing appropriate purchasable inputs
and new technical knowledge and skills. The simpler the pattern
of cropping can be kept in the beginning, the easier it is for the
project to be successful. The initial cropping pattern should be
based only partially on considerations of maximum production; it
should also take into account the current level of skills of farm
operators in husbandry and management.
Size and Organization of Individual Farm Units
Generally the sizes and types of individual farm units to be
considered are large-scale private enterprise units, large-scale
state or collective units, and smaller-scale family farms supported
by common public services.
At one end of the scale protagonists of large-scale private
enterprise units may claim that their contribution to national pro-
duction and to taxation and savings will be greater than that of any
other system and that, because they find their own capital, national
resources can be devoted to other purposes, primarily infrastructure.
Opponents may point to many private estates that have been any-
thing but productive and may deprecate the extreme inequality in
incomes among the large estate owner, the workers on it, and
the rest of the rural population.
A desire for social equality leads many who believe that a
large unit is the best base for modern production to favor state
or collective management. The efficiency or inefficiency of this
solution, and indeed the claim that large estates are best, might
well be a subject for research if it could be divorced from
ideology. A negative answer in Russia may be due to transitory
factors like poor management and unattractive price differentials
between town and country products. A positive answer in Yugoslavia
may be connected with decentralization and independent contracts
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between farm and factory. Israeli experience, on the other hand.,
where freedom of choice is available and where the purely collec-
tive kibbutz has been largely superseded by the more individual-
oriented moshav, may suggest that individual incentive is a vital
ingredient and that, when combined with supporting services, it can
include both efficiency and a reasonable distribution of benefits.
Although all three methods may well continue in many countries,
the huge numbers of the rural population, the constant increase in
these numbers, and the fact that they are mainly small subsistence
farmers make the selection of a family farm unit attractive, pro-
vided that supporting services and suitable layout can enable
efficient production and satsifactory income. In choosing the size
of the family unit, however, a dilemma sometimes arises, as re-
cently occurred in Kenya, between satisfying more people in smaller
units (a solution that may lead only to equality in poverty) and
planning units that can produce higher incomes, savings, and taxes--
but not enough units for all. Where land is plentiful a ladder of
farms of increasing size can provide farmers with a progressive
opportunity as they emerge from subsistence into increasing com-
petence.
Provision for Supporting Services
Particularly if the decision is to establish family-sized
farms of reasonable acreage, an integral part of the scheme must be
the provision of adequate supporting services. Far too often when
the search for greater equality has led to the breakup of large
estates, no adequate supporting services have been provided to the
peasant inheritors so that no improvement in income or production
has taken place. Examples are the Potemkin reform in eighteenth-
century Russia and the present situation in Iran and other countries.
By contrast the supporting services provided after land reform in
Japan and Taiwan are a striking example of what can be achieved under
a family farm system in spite of small units and great shortage of
land. Even in the Punjab, in one of the biggest settlement movements
in history, where irrigation enabled great improvement at first, the
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absence of supporting services was one of the factors responsible
for the result that the largest irrigated region in the world now
gives one of the lowest returns from auxiliary water. It seems
clear that to permit farmers to settle new land or old estates with-
out an organization plan and without supporting services is likely
to be a major mistake.
Many irrigation projects have included only canalization,
leaving farmers to make their own field distributaries and do their
own land leveling. Often this is ineffectively carried out, and
an expensive national investment in dam and canalization ends in
high water loss and low yield because field distributaries and
leveling were omitted from the supporting services.
An example outside irrigation is that of the Malayan settle-
ments where no provision was made at first for schools, and the
farmer was expected to clear the jungle himself. Having no school,
he sent his children to school elsewhere and was frequently absent
visiting his wife and children; nor were they available to help
him. Reliance on the farmer to do the clearing resulted in delay
and costly irregularity in what needed to be a uniform planting
pattern for rubber production. Only when clearing, planting, and
schools were included in the combination did the settlement begin
to be a success.
One of the lessons from crowded areas has been the sometimes
baneful influence of the large landowner-moneylender-trader. It
would seem that credit should be closely allied with other inputs,
but this requires trustworthy supervision and accountants.
Yet another lesson from settled areas is that the owner of
the store or processing factory, or means of transport to market,
or pump, or machinery for the preparation of land tends to have a
stranglehold over the farmer. Should the organizational pattern for
a development scheme therefore be so arranged that these key entre-
preneurial points are operated at cost for farmers (as in the Gezira
scheme) pending transfer to their ownership? If this is the choice,
is the capital available to create these assets and are qualified
personnel available to manage them and to handle the marketing
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beyond them? If not, provision for additional capital input and
additional training has to be envisaged. Lack of foresight in these
areas and a tendency to assume that private enterprise is in all
circumstances competitively beneficial may wreck the whole invest-
ment of the other services because if the farmer does not receive
a substantially higher income his interest will cease. But such a
result may equally emerge if the management of these operations by
the responsible organization is inefficient and uneconomical.
The proposal to embark on a development scheme therefore in-
volves not only the provision of one or a few major capital invest-
ments such as irrigation, land clearing, and drainage to make a
region physically cultivable; it also involves designing a total
pattern of cultivation, the creation of a wholly new network of
supporting services, and provision (direct or indirect) for a
whole range of facilities and arrangements for settled human
habitation.
Not every settlement scheme need include within it govern-
mental provision for all of these. However, the feasibility studies
prior to starting such a scheme need to include consideration of
all of these factors, and hard decisions must be made with respect
to each of them. Moreover, the cost of all the elements that must
be financed by the government needs to be taken into account in
estimating the capital needs for the project.
How Much "Paternalism"?
Here the issue is really one of deciding on the extent to
which reliance should be placed on providing opportunities for
higher productivity to farm operators, leaving the decision
whether to seize these opportunities largely to them, and on the
extent to which the new agriculture should be managed by officials
of the scheme itself. To leave decisions largely to farm operators
is likely to result in lower productivity in the early years of
the scheme because of the lack of experience of farm operators
with the new agriculture if for no other reason. To have all major
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production decisions made by officials of the development scheme,
on the other hand, defeats itself in the end because farm operators
lose all initiative and wait for the government to do everything.
At the same time, it is abundantly clear that the weakest link in
the development chain is actual implementation, and farm operators
may willingly accept a considerable amount of regulation provided
that it actually results in steadily rising net incomes.
The decision is therefore a difficult one to make. Surely
some participation by farm operators needs to be fostered from the
beginning. Naturally where people are highly educated and experi-
enced they can freely participate without loss in efficiency, al-
though even in Japan and Taiwan, no less than in Southern Italy,
strong inducements, like monopoly purchase of the main crops or
monopoly access to credit, were necessary to fortify the loyalty
of farm operators to the cooperatives that in the first instance
were set up by the government. Where resources in competent man-
power are scarce, it is open to question whether the competent or-
ganization of at least supply, processing, and marketing by some
external instrument should not be the first priority, leaving the
grafting in of full participation by the people themselves to some
later time when successful routines have been established.
Implementation of the Plan as a Whole
Very often, and particularly in ex-colonial countries, the
instrument at hand is that of the routine government services. In
many cases these services were not designed for implementing develop-
ment, a comparatively new field for government action (as opposed to
mere advice) that before World War II was left largely to private
enterprise. The regulations and attitudes prevalent in regular govern-
ment services, and the type of man they recruited, are thus not
automatically those that might be chosen to implement development
schemes by a business institution. Yet the modernization of agri-
culture, and especially the provision of a package of inputs, is
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primarily a matter of competent managerial organization. It also
requires a continuity of policy and a staff geared to the objective
of increased rural production and incomes. Frequent transfers of
staff, preoccupation with other objectives, varying interests or
indifference of staff members, and absence of coordination among
departments or between national and provincial administrations make
it difficult to get things done through regular governmental services.
The question is whether to try to adapt the government services
to development purposes or to set up some alternative instrument
such as an autonomous corporation that can establish a routine
and a cadre specifically suited to the job. Since each procedure
has advantages and disadvantages, the choice is one to be made with
extreme care. (See Chapter Six.)
Economic Feasibility
Only after all the foregoing considerations have been fully
explored has the time come to make a study of the economic feasi.-
bility of the scheme. How much will it cost? Not for capital in-
vestments alone but for all the supporting services that it has been
decided must be provided under the particular local circumstances.
Is this amount of capital available or can it be secured? Could it
be made available for alternative investment in measures to in-
crease agricultural productivity on lands already under cultivation?
In which case would the national gain be the greater? Or can both
be done?
Administrative Feasibility
Assuming that the economic costs and returns suggest going
ahead with the scheme, are adequate administrative resources of
trained personnel available to operate it? Here the problem is not
so much one of supervising the construction of dams, canals,
drainage structures, and so forth; that kind of managerial talent
can be hired from abroad if necessary. More important is the
administrative talent required to operate the scheme after it
has been launched.
Water Management
Circumstances in many places in the monsoon and subtropical
region probably warrant such schemes to bring new lands into
cultivation. But any such scheme is a costly, risky, and complex
undertaking to be decided upon only after all of the facts are in.
WATER MANAGEMENT
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the region is
one of year-round temperatures favoring plant growth but with rain-
fall less than optimum at least part of the year and excessive,
leading to the need for drainage, during part of the year in some
areas of the region.
Under these circumstances efficient water management is a
primary need throughout the region. Although much of the region
has some irrigation already available, much of it is in systems
designed more to prevent total crop loss in bad years than to
support maximum agricultural production.
Substantial new research is needed on water management in
the region. This must include experimentation to find ways to use
local rainfall to better advantage, ways to evolve from protective
irrigation to irrigation for maximum production, surveys of ground-
water aquifers and the hydrology of rivers for new storage
irrigation facilities, improved methods of water distribution,
and a host of other problems.
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Chapter Ten
THE HIGH-ALTITUDE REGION
THE REGION AND ITS PROBLEMS
Agriculture and Economic Development
High-altitude valley and plateau areas in the tropics are
found in South America, East Africa, and parts of Asia. Here we
shall discuss only the Andean regions of South America.
The three countries in which most of the Andean region lies--
Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia--include, in addition to the Andean
highlands, the lowland areas on the Pacific coast (except Bolivia)
and the largely unsettled lands to the east of the mountains.
A large part of the population of the Andean countries is
made up of agriculturists and their families. The proportion ranges
from 53 per cent in Ecuador to 72 per cent of the total popula-
tion in Bolivia. More farmers live in the mountain areas than in
the lowlands. In Peru the ratio of population of the highlands to
that of the lowlands is over 2:1, and in Bolivia the ratio is even
wider. The per capita income of the highland people is much lower
than that of the lowland people. Peru, for example, with a rela-
tively low average per capita annual income of $179, has a coastal
lowland/highland per capita income ratio of 3:1.
In Peru in particular the agriculture of the Pacific coast
is highly productive and responsive to economic conditions, while
the Andean highlands, with 60 per cent of the population, are
characterized by a traditional agriculture, less favorable ecologi-
cal conditions, and much less responsiveness to market demand. In
this kind of an economy the possibilities of developing highland
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agriculture are very much conditioned by two factors: Economic
development of the national economy can proceed without participa-
tion by the area of traditional agriculture, and the development
effort in the highland agriculture needs to be tailored to empha-
size products in which the Andean region can compete with the more
developed coastal area.
Economic development in Peru has not been held back by lag-
ging agricultural production. Coastal agriculture has provided the
agricultural production for both increased domestic demand and
increased exports of sugar and cotton to the rest of the world.
Incomes of those who remained in traditional agriculture probably
have not changed, since there has been no increase in yields and
thus no increase in production and income per worker.
Since the three countries are similar ecologically and face
similar social problems, opportunities exist for applying research
results and administrative techniques to the whole region. Lessons
from experience in settling eastern lowlands in one country are
likely to be relevant to settlement in other countries. Ecuador
and Peru face similar problems in reorganizing highland haciendas
under land reform programs. Intensive approaches to local develop-
ment, like the one in Vicos,* provide lessons of general appli-
cability in aiding highland Indians in all three countries.
The Andean countries not only contain three distinct ecologi-
cal zones; the high ranges of the mountains also divide each
country into many smaller zones. It is a costly task to develop
transportation that would better integrate small producing areas
with cities and link up larger regions with the major city markets.
Even when transport is more fully developed its costs are likely
to remain greater than in regions with less difficult terrain.
In such circumstances it might be worth while to direct some
research to the opportunities of stimulating nonagricultural in-
vestment in the highlands and in areas of settlement to the east of
The Vicos project is described in Appendix A.
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the Andes. The purpose would be to increase local demand for farm
products as a stimulus to agricultural development. In principle
the attempt would be to build stable regional economies with re-
gional agricultural and nonagricultural sectors providing markets
for each other and with a proper mix of products, both agricul-
tural and nonagricultural, exported out of the region to pay for
importing necessary products into the region. The point is that
with a difficult terrain the optimum proportion of interregional
trade to total production of the region might economically be
smaller than with the same resources and more level topography.
Local demand for agricultural products is more important as a
stimulus to local production where the terrain is difficult than
in places where transportation costs are lower.
Diagnosis of the Region's Problems in Agriculture
Physical and economic factors are discussed in this section.
Important problems exist also in tenure patterns and in the human
environment, which are discussed later in this chapter.
1. Limitations of the physical environment. Mountain agri-
culture exhibits a great deal of variability in types of crops and
their yield potential as one proceeds upward from the lowest alti-
tudes to the highest. At lower altitudes mean temperatures are
higher, frost is absent or very unlikely, soils are deep, flat,
and productive in valley bottoms, and irrigation exists or is
possible. At higher elevations frost danger and the likelihood of
hail damage increase; the growing season is shorter, and average
temperatures are lower. Usually the soils are less productive if
they are on slopes; if flat they suffer from conditions also associ-
ated with low productivity. At very high altitudes in the punas or
jaleas (regions above 3,500 meters in Peru and Bolivia and above
3,000 meters in Colombia) and in the altiplano (above 3,800 meters
in Peru and Bolivia) there are extensive areas where only very
hardy range grasses and creeping vegetation prevail. Due to the low
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quality and productivity of the range grasses, millions of hectares
of range land are adaptable to sheep and auchenid (for example,
llama and alpaca) raising only with very extensive grazing areas.
Throughout the Andean highlands of Chile, Argentina, Bolivia,
and Peru the rainfall, in addition to being low, with local rates
ranging from 497 mm (Jauja, Peru) to 1,144 mm (Cajamarca, Peru), is
highly variable (up to 25 per cent--around mean values--from year
to year), with irregularities at the planting periods that cause
delays in planting and increased likelihood of harvest losses due
to frost.
The reduced length of the growing season and the low average
temperatures and short photoperiod require crops with short vege-
tative seasons. Since these crops are more vulnerable to environ-
mental hazards and require more care and greater labor inputs, they
bring forth a lower output/labor input ratio than crops in lowland
tropics or temperate zones. Large absolute yields are possible,
however, with grain, tuber, and forage crops under irrigation and
with the addition of improved seed, fertilizers, pesticides, and
appropriate cultural practices.
2. Physiographic limitations. The rugged Andean terrain is
characterized by considerable fragmentation of agricultural zones
and a continuum of finely graded differences in ecologies over
short distances. It is not an exaggeration to state that farms
located less than 300 meters apart on a slope may require different
varieties and cultural practices for efficient crop production.
These mountains are formidable barriers to commercial traffic
in the magnitude required for the establishment of modern integrated
markets. The highway systems in the mountains of Bolivia, Peru,
Ecuador, and Colombia are inefficient, of limited mileage, poorly
maintained, and leave most of the area without intraregional road
communications other than pack trails. Most highland agricultural
areas lack feeder roads transitable by trucks, resulting in the
isolation of large areas from potential markets. Even some of the
best roads leading to large towns are made intransitable during
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extended periods of the rainy season by landslides and other mis-
haps. Perishable produce may often be lost when the nonrefrigerated
trucks on which it is carried are detained by roadblocks. Very high
freight rates are the result of slowness of traffic, rapid rates of
deterioration of vehicles over mountain roads, and high maintenance
and replacement costs.
3. Economic limitations. The great majority of farm units
in the Andean highlands are small and located on less productive
lands. Small farmers living at the subsistence level cannot effect
any savings. Having in most cases no title to the land, they are not
eligible for credit, and, even if they were eligible, they either
are too far from a government agricultural lending agency office
or they do not know how to proceed to request a loan. Often they
would not know how to use it. In many instances the risks and un-
certainties involved in growing crops in the highlands and the
requirement of land mortgages as collateral discourage knowledgeable
farmers from requesting loans. They operate either without addi-
tional purchased inputs or with moneylenders' credit at high rates
of interest. Furthermore such purchasable inputs as fertilizers,
seeds of improved plant varieties, and pesticides are available
only in large towns.
The highland farmers on most small farms use their own power
or oxen on the less steep slopes or level land. According to the
1961 census in Peru, in three typical highland departments (Cuzco,
Cajamarca, and Ayacucho) only 0.7 per cent of farm units were
tractor operated, and 36 per cent used human power alone. Data from
the Economic Commission for Latin America for Ecuador indicate that
early in the 1960's upland farmers produced 1.2 kilos of maize per
man-hour, while a farmer in Argentina produced 21 times as much.
Marketing is a major stumbling block to increasing the produc-
tivity of highland Andean farmers. With many varieties of potatoes,
corn, wheat, and other commodities, each locally preferred, with
small quantities of produce being marketed by the majority of small
farmers who are usually uninformed about price fluctuations, the
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receipts of small farmers are much lower than they would be under
other market conditions.
Despite their limitations the highlands could be more produc-
tive. Skillful entrepreneurship and investment can be observed in
many medium and large farms with irrigation that crop corn and
potatoes, and in some of the large sheep-raising haciendas. Produc-
tivity on these farms is much higher than on the community-held
lands or the properties of small farmers.
There are, on the other hand, large haciendas where land is
greatly underutilized, while nearby there may be extreme concentra-
tion of population and fragmentation of land property. In ten high-
land departments of Peru the 1961 census figures list over 300,000
hectares of land in fallow and 800,000 hectares of cultivable land
currently not being farmed. With redistribution of population,I
change in tenancy status, and the addition of physical inputs such
as fertilizers on fallow lands, much of this acreage could be made
agriculturally productive.
RESOURCE SURVEYS AND RESEARCH
Lack of knowledge and information about the essential charac-
teristics of the physical environment and the biological types that
are best adapted to it is a controlling bottleneck in most of this
region. The Andean highlands have not been properly surveyed in
regard to soils and hydrological and natural vegetation resources.
Soil type maps of a rough first approximation nature exist only for
whole countries. Areas that have been surveyed make up a very small
proportion of the region.
Soil capability and correlation studies with fertilizer inputs
are being organized at the present time. Ecological maps based on
the Holdridge ecological system (rainfall, evapotranspiration, and
temperature) have been completed for Peru and Colombia and will
shortly be available for Venezuela and Ecuador.
Resource Surveys and Research
The development of a productive agriculture in the Andean
highlands will require a better knowledge and use of scarce re-
sources, both native and introduced. For the best use of natural
resources it is essential to know their dimensions and whether they
are quickly depleted or are renewable or reusable.
Agricultural programs in the rough mountainous terrain of
the Andes are risky at best, but they can be made more successful
by assigning the land to its most appropriate use. Natural re-
sources surveys lead to conclusions regarding land capability. The
farmer and his advisers will perform their tasks of production more
efficiently when the farm plan includes a land capability map backed
up by full information on its endowment in natural resources.
Surveys are generally carried out by plotting field data on
aerial photographs. Some of the factors mapped in agricultural
resources surveys are soil types, geologic formations, surface
waters, groundwater, climate, vegetation, human resources, infra-
structure, existing land use and tenure, and finally land capabil-
ity. For specialized agricultural surveys it is necessary to gather
additional kinds of data.
The resources survey of a region is usually general in na-
ture, leading to further detailed investigations later. For example,
discovery of good soils, adequate stream flow, and suitable sites
for diversion dams may lead to the close examination of an area
for irrigation. Another area may combine forest resources and a
railroad, which might suggest detailed forest inventories leading
to the development of sawmilling. Surveys of several different
kinds of resources simultaneously tend also to reveal hidden re-
lations between one kind of resource and others. Some basic tech-
nological knowledge of fertilizers, cultural practices, and vari-
eties has been obtained at agricultural experiment stations in the
Andean area, making possible a beginning in the organization of
productivity-increase programs on regional bases. There is, how-
ever, a dearth of the information needed for more elaborate,
countrywide action on package programs in specific fields, such as
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range management, improved corn varieties, frost-resistant and
drought-resistant crops, management of irrigation water, residual
effects of fertilizers, and sheep, cattle, and auchenid husbandry.
Agricultural experiment stations with a supporting network
of substations for verification testing should be created in each
major ecological region of agricultural importance. They should be
provided with ample land resources, should be well funded, should
have freedom of action, and should be staffed with well-trained and
well-paid personnel. These are the primary centers for the accumula-
tion of knowledge on the agricultural problems of the region, and
additional knowledge is a more acute priority in the highland areas
than in most other parts of the world.
The best existing Andean research program has been established
in Colombia with outside advice and assistance provided by the
Rockefeller Foundation Agricultural Program. It has produced valu-
able improvements in technology in the areas of grains, potatoes,
vegetables, and pastures. Many of the improved varieties from this
center are suited to the Andean highlands of the neighboring coun-
tries of Ecuador and Peru. These successful crop adaptations sug-
gest that a single central research institution for the Andean
highlands, provided with satellite substations representing the
major ecological subregions, could achieve plant breeding goals for
the entire tropical highland region of Latin America and perhaps
for other continents as well.
Existing knowledge is poorly diffused as well as insufficient.
Present problems of diffusion of available knowledge are:
Written reports on research results from existing ex-
periment stations are not available or are produced in very
small numbers and so do not circulate widely.
Extension specialists are not available or are scarce.
Extension agents are few and concentrated in or near
the larger towns. They are confronted with serious transporta-
tion difficulties, in general are poorly motivated, lack
depth and perspective in their knowledge of their subject
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matter, and are not familiar with research results from their
own regional experiment stations.
University-trained and intermediate-trained (subprofes-
sional technical assistant) personnel are not available in
sufficient numbers.
Mass-media devices for extension are not sufficiently
used.
Not enough farmer demonstration plots exist, and the
organization of package demonstrations and their field
operations is deficient.
Intensive training courses for farm leaders are too
few.
Educational resources are diluted in extension as well
as in universities by unnecessary duplication of systems or
institutions.
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN ANDEAN AGRICULTURE
There are many types of farming in the Andean highlands. It
is possible to group them according to the major crop associations
and livestock enterprises. Or land use systems may be classified
according to the existing systems of land tenure. A third way of
looking at agriculture is by the markets or consumers for which
the production is intended.
After considering all these criteria and looking at the re-
sources picture in the Andes, it seems desirable to divide the ef-
fort to develop agriculture into several compartments. These com-
partments must be considered as closely related development proj-
ects that should proceed concurrently in each of the Andean coun-
tries if possible. These projects are:
Land tenure: migration and reform
Irrigation
Grazing and pasturage
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Forestry development
Market-oriented production
Land Tenure: Migration and Reform
Land available for development. The Andean nations of South
America possess several kinds of lands that are available for the
development of a more productive agriculture.
Apart from the Andean highlands themselves, areas of vacant
land in the lowland regions are available for resettlement of sur-
plus farm families from the Sierra. * Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colom-
bia, and Venezuela are blessed with extensive reserves of public
lands, especially on the eastern slopes and lowlands. These vacant
forest and savannah regions are already being used for resettlement
of surplus farm people from the highlands. Roads have reached the
llanos of Colombia and Venezuela, where farming and ranching have
expanded and have created settlement nuclei.
Ecuador has one road into the Oriente from Ambato in the
central highlands, reaching Puyo in the eastern foothills. The
main agricultural opportunity in Puyo is the Andean fruit crop,
naranjilla. Settlement is spreading to many other Oriente communi-
ties that still lack motor roads. The Ecuadorian Institute of
Colonization is increasingly faced with urgent requests from groups
of established settlers to send surveying teams into this region
to adjudicate farm boundary disputes and to arrange for granting
of titles.
Peru has located 50,000 people along the Central Highway to
the eastern Selva. Other penetrations by roads into the Selva have
been made in the Maralion valley, San Martin province, San Ramon,I
Peren6, Satipo, Quincemil, and Tambopata. These roads are effec-
tively promoting the marketing of both agricultural products and
timber.
Though developing a stable agriculture in the lowland rain
forests presents major problems, described in Chapter Eight.
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Bolivia has the most ambitious program of spontaneous land
settlement in the eastern lowlands. This settlement has come about
during the last few years as a consequence of the construction of
new highways from La Pax and from Cochabamba. Agricultural markets
for the products of new farmers already exist in eastern Bolivia;
sugar cane, rice, coffee, cacao, cotton, and corn are beginning to
move on the roads. Market and land are a magnet to underprivileged
farmers from the highlands, especially those who are landless or
who have undersized plots. The government is assisting with limited
extension activities in the newly settled areas. Migration to low-
lands has been going on for some time, but it may be possible to
speed up the rate of settlement. Technical and social science re-
search oriented toward problems of settlement may be an important
factor in increasing the rate of migration. Research on size of
farm, tenure institutions, and the organization of service agencies
to aid settlers may help to make the opportunities in settlement
areas more equally shared.*
However, because of the size of the highland population,
migration is unlikely by itself to enable the people who remain in
traditional agriculture to participate in the benefits of economic
development for some time to come. The Andean highlands themselves
have the potential for greater productivity. The lands may be
classified by the nature of their ownership. All can be examined
and evaluated by resources surveys.
Public lands. The governments of the Andean countries have
already acquired large areas that are available for agriculture,
grazing, or forestry once their capability is known. Some are from
the residual public domain and others have been expropriated. These
lands are ready for assignment to private homesteaders or communi-
ties, or to be held and managed by the government for public bene-
fit, as in the case of national forests.
See the discussion of settlement schemes in Chapter Nine,
and the research proposal in Chapter Eight.
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Institutional lands. Such semiprivate institutions as the
Social Security Agency, universities, and the Church are holders
of extensive highland areas, usually in the form of old haciendas.
These lands are becoming available for more desirable forms of land
use. The institutions are often willing to consider sales in the
form of family farms in order to promote the establishment of a
sturdy farming people working their own land. The institutions are
usually better off with investable capital than in trying to
operate the haciendas for their own profit.
Vacant private lands and underutilized haciendas. The Andean
highlands have barren stretches of grasslands and moorlands for
which a truly productive agricultural use has never been found.
Similarly, on Andean slopes there are forested areas that contrib-
ute little economic benefit to their owners. These private lands
can be inventoried by resources surveys and adapted for development
at low cost. A watershed covered by heavy vegetation can be ex-
tremely valuable as a regulator of stream flow, though its forest
products may remain inaccessible and unutilized for lack of roads.
The more intensively cultivated farms. Cultivated lands are
divided between private holdings and communal holdings. The large
private haciendas have historically secured labor by binding agree-
ments with their peons, who farm an acre or two of land and in
exchange work a few days each week on the hacienda. In other areas
the prevailing land tenure pattern is small private holdings, as
among the coffee growers of Puno province and the small potato
farmers of the altiplano.
Communal lands are the joint property of Indian people in
the ancient villages of the highlands. Such community-owned land
is parceled out for cultivation or may be used for grazing by the
animals of the whole village.
Modern technology is lacking, and yields are generally low.
One of the best ways to increase productivity would be to provide
farmers with farms of 20 to 30 acres legalized by land titles. On
the well-cultivated haciendas there is still great potential for
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improvement in productivity from modern inputs of fertilizer,
pesticides, improved seed and plant materials, and machinery.
The Bolivian revolution and agrarian reform in 1952 was a
drastic change that transformed land tenure and the social struc-
ture. Peru and Ecuador have not gone through a social upheaval
like that in Bolivia. They have a chance to accomplish a more
peaceful and better planned change in land tenure, which would
accompany measures for wider distribution of landownership with
the provision of the necessary government service agencies to stim-
ulate production and income of highland farmers. Peru passed a land
reform act in 1964, while in Ecuador the issue is under serious
consideration.
Land redistribution. The passage of such legislation for
agrarian reform makes it possible to plan development projects on
the large haciendas that will be acquired by the government for
redistribution to small farmers.
The experience of the Cornell project at Vicos suggests the
advisability of retaining two major organizational elements:
Management and advisory leadership supplied from out-
side the local community. This leadership might have to be
shared by several haciendas.
Retention of a substantial block of productive hacienda
land that can be worked by the community under the direction
of this outside leadership. This land is the source of commu-
nity income that made Vicos distinctive and successful.
The large hacienda is the main object for agrarian reform
and redistribution. As mentioned earlier, there are public lands,
institutional lands, and private lands that may be redistributed.
An example from the institutional lands is the 77 haciendas in
Ecuador that now are held by the Social Security Agency, which in-
tends to carry out a program of redistribution and resettlement.
These haciendas extend over 140,000 hectares of the Ecuadorean
highlands, not including 60,000 hectares of grazing lands that are
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closely related to the properties themselves. The present occupants
of these 77 haciendas are 30,000 families, most of whom are located
on relatively small plots separated from the main hacienda lands.
There is a need to improve the living conditions of these
30,000 families and at the same time to make use of the land re-
sources to benefit significant numbers of other underprivileged
people in the same area. This will require:
1. An aerial survey of the haciendas.
2. A survey of land capabilities.
3. A determination of adequate family-farm size.
(Ecuadorian and FAO experience suggests 10 hectares per
family, as a rough estimate.)
4. A determination of the size of residual hacienda
land to be retained for cooperative or community use. If
possible, its use should be established during the survey.
5. A selection procedure and method of judging
capability of new settlers.
6. A cadastral survey and map showing the ultimate
land tenure layout.
7. An assured source of agricultural knowhow and in-
puts. This will include credit, supervision, and help in
marketing.
Reorganization of undersized farms. This is much more diffi-
cult and less promising than the redistribution of hacienda lands.
There is a good reason for carrying the two out simultaneously,
however. There will never be a better time to entice a poor man
off his inadequate plot of one hectare than when other lands are
available for his use. Ideally farmers should be selected for such
thinning out operations by ability, family need, industry, and good
character but not by their financial means.
The undersized farms might be acquired by the government or
sold to adjoining holders of undersized plots. Any procedure that
would eliminate bureaucratic delays is preferable. The experience
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in Japan, where the local villagers conducted their own land reform,
suggests that there might be a considerable degree of local partic-
ipation after which governmental action would be more in the na-
ture of a ratification. In Japan the local boards essentially were
able to award land to tenants. In the Andes their role would be to
help in choosing able and industrious (but underprivileged) people
in their community to be given an opportunity to transfer to a
better land tenure status.
In every country, then, it is possible to visualize two pos-
sible places where Indian farmers, now in the grip of the mini-
fundia problem, can find land for a new start. These are: resettle-
ment on public lands in the lowlands, and resettlement on institu-
tional or government-held haciendas in the Andean highlands. These
possibilities give to the land-hungry Andean people an economic
opportunity that requires only limited amounts of technical assist-
ance and credit for success.
Irrigation Projects
Irrigation more than any other single agricultural practice
sets the stage for use of all inputs favoring higher productivity.
The Andean highlands are well endowed with permanent streams and
a scattering of snowy peaks and glaciers. Water resources are
highly valued, and irrigation is an ancient art. Development of
additional irrigated land consists in overcoming the obstacles
that have been limiting in the past. Presently feasible schemes
involve four major types:
Construction of diversion canals. In many stream valleys
the opening of diversion ditches has been prevented by hard-rock
sections that are beyond the capabilities of either hacienda or
village capital. With government help, the use of dynamite, air
hammers, and heavy machinery may become feasible.
Construction of diversion tunnels. The distribution of river
water and rainfall in different basins of the Andes occasionally
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permits the use of tunnels from one humid hydrographic basin to
another where irrigation is lacking. Such tunnels have become more
feasible in recent years because of improvements in rock-breaking
tools and tunnel technology. The sites are usually known., and ac-
tion may wait only upon the availability of external capital.
Construction of storage dams. When a market can be found for
hydroelectric power, multipurpose dams to store water during peri-
ods of high stream flow become attractive. Where natural lakes are
drained by small rivers, building relatively small structures at
the outlets will provide storage. Full exploitation of this poten-
tial awaits thorough aerial surveys of dam sites and irrigable
areas and the completion of newly initiated hydrographic and mete-
orological measurements in the watersheds.
Development of groundwater resources. The presence of en-
closed physiographic basins and lakes in the Andean highlands makes
possible the storage of water underground as well as on the surface.
Around the Titicaca and Junin basins there may be important poten-
tial for tube wells for irrigation. These areas, which are rela-
tively deficient in rainfall, would benefit in the production of
potatoes, wheat, and intensive pasture if water could be pumped
from the underground reserves (providing this is economically
feasible).
Undeveloped hydroelectric resources in the same regions could
contribute to irrigation well development by supplying needed power
for pumping. Another applicable technique for pumping is the use of
windmills.
Where frosts are causing severe losses in the potato crop,
as at Puno, it is possible to protect the crop by night-time
sprinkling of the vines. This new technique has found wide use in
springtime frost protection of similar crops in the United States
and West Germany, where it is applied to berries, apple blossoms,
early peppers, and tomatoes. The standard equipment for sprinkler
irrigation includes a portable centrifugal pump and distribution
lines of aluminum pipe fitted with rotary-nozzle sprinkler heads.
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In each region offering a supply of water for irrigation
there will be a need for surveys to determine the potential of
the land for agriculture. The intensive production possible under
irrigation also requires careful consideration of the market poten-
tial. For example, potato production could easily reach a level
exceeding the urban market potential. It may therefore be necessary
to plan for alternate crops to utilize the irrigation water. Rota-
tion of crops may serve to avoid buildup of soil diseases and in-
sects. Food processing and food storage may help the farmer to
maintain a year-around ability to deliver produce to his urban
customers.
Grazing Improvement
The cold regions (tierra fria) of the Andes are located above
the 10,000 foot contour and may be divided between the drier alti-
planos and the humid piramos. In both regions the prevailing vegeta-
tion is grass, and grazing by sheep is the major form of present
land use.
Because of the extent of this cold region it deserves con-
centrated effort in several areas where the visible achievements
of demonstration projects could exert an influence on the surround-
ing people and farms. Animal husbandry fell outside the terms of
reference of the conference. Therefore, though we gave considerable
attention to the subject, here we shall briefly mention only two
points about the supply of animal food.
First, inventories should be made of the native and intro-
duced forage crops of greatest value for the specific areas both
in the dry altiplanos (with and without irrigation) and in the
moist psramos. The inventory must include legumes, which assume
crucial importance for livestock feed because their protein con-
tent is higher than that of the grasses. Northern Peru, Ecuador,
Colombia, and Venezuela have a high proportion of moist p6ramo
highlands on which legume production may be possible even without
supplemental irrigation.
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Meat, milk, and wool production is essentially a process of
converting protein. In the Andes this involves a long slow process
of protein accumulation by the animal from the grass upon which it
fed. Animals supplied with liberal amounts of legume protein may
mature twice as rapidly as their grass-fed counterparts.
Second, there is a novel and economical way to supply extra
protein and supplement the carbonaceous grassy intake obtainable
from present Andean pasture lands. This technique involves the
free-choice feeding of a special cheap mixture of molasses and urea
in tanks placed in the pasture with the animals. Developed in the
United States, it has permitted cattle feeders to fatten steers to
full maturity without using expensive grain or protein supplements.
This direct feeding of a cheap nitrogen fertilizer material,
urea, is a technological breakthrough of some importance for the
high Andean grassland areas. Any survey of grazing potential should
include provision for a few major pilot areas of beef, mutton, and
wool production.
Forestry Development*
Rough lands and stony soils, plentiful in the Andes, are
usually more suited to forestry than to other uses. Successful
forestry depends, however, upon the selection of adapted tree
species as well as sufficient skill and resources to prepare the
sites for planting. The long time required for growth of a market-
able tree makes forestry an unpromising field of endeavor for poor
subsistence farmers working alone as individuals. Recent experience
with tree-planting programs in the Andean countries has indicated,
however, that tree plantations can be established that benefit the
economy and the communities collectively.
*
As in the case of grazing, forestry falls outside our terms
of reference. Here again, therefore, we are not reproducing our
conclusions in detail.
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It has been found that a forest in the neighborhood benefits
all the people by providing cheap wood, contributing beauty, sta-
bilizing erosive soil, providing employment, and attracting indus-
tries. Forest planting projects have proved that the barrenness of
the Andean highlands is not a necessary condition.
The use of aerial surveys to pinpoint areas suitable for
aforestation is one of the cheapest and most promising long-range
projects for improving productivity of the land in the Andes.
These surveys may take place in conjunction with other studies of
land for agriculture, grazing, or irrigation. Usually the land
least favorable for farming is reserved for forestry if it has
proper soil and moisture and if an adapted kind of tree can be
obtained.
Forestry projects require local and urban markets for the
wood produced. Local markets for firewood, poles, and timber may
be satisfied by a few hundred acres of plantations per village.
Urban centers, railroads, mines, seaports, and construction proj-
ects are much greater potential outlets for well-chosen sites. One
thousand acres of a single species of timber planted alongside a
railway line is worth twenty times a similar forest 500 miles away
by road. Other advantages of plantations are uniformity of product,
uniform age, and accessibility to the laborers who will cut and
deliver the timber.
Some quick-growing species and the regions of the Andes to
which they are adapted are as follows:
Species Andean Region
Eucalyptus globulus Dry altiplano, up to 12,000 feet
Abies religiosa Pd.ramos (moist altiplano)
Pinus radiata Pdramos (moist altiplano)
Pinus ayacahuite Moist forest belt of northern Andes,
especially on steep slopes
Araucaria araucana Moist forest, 6,000-8,000 feet
Pinus montezumae Lower montane dry forest, around
5,000 feet
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Species Andean Region
Alnus jorullensis Lower montane wet forest, around
5,000 feet
Cupressus lusitanica Lower montane wet forest, around
5,000 feet
Pinus pseudostrobus Lower montane moist forest, around
5,000 feet
Market-Oriented Production
Urban markets of the highlands. The five northern Andean
countries have at least 34 important urban centers around which
it would be possible to organize agricultural production proj-
ects oriented toward economic and agroindustrial growth. Planning
in each country should take maximum advantage of such major con-
gregations of people and purchasing power.
The produce that could be grown for these markets would
require the efforts of millions of farmers. The evidence shows
that the food demand of the urban populations is highly elastic.
This means that a new class of modern efficient producers of such
products as fruit, grain, potatoes, milk, meat, cheese, eggs,
chickens, vegetables, and habas beans could expect to build their
sales without difficulty. The modern world of communications and
rising expectations has set the stage for a new kind of selling in
these high-cost markets. Packaging, grading, refrigeration for
perishables, and other advances in food preservation and process-
ing are within the reach of these fast-growing communities.
The procedure for market development begins with the basic
resources survey of accessible markets and agricultural potential.
Then detailed studies must be made of available land areas, public
or private, that lend themselves to the market production of good
salable foods. Soils, irrigation layouts, farming patterns, the
present marketing setup, and community services will need to be
examined in detail. Plans must then be made for supplying farmers
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with technical advice, planting stocks, essential inputs, and
credit.
The selected urban markets must be integrated with the new
farm enterprises in order to reduce intermediate costs and to as-
sure fast delivery of attractively packaged goods to the market
shelf. Alert urban businessmen should be encouraged from the outset
to set up supermarkets.
The farmers must organize in order to standardize a high
level of quality and must therefore be shown the advantage of uni-
form high-yield, high-quality produce. Marketing is the crucial
element in this kind of food production enterprise. Trucks owned
by the individual farmers or by their association may be purchased
under credit supplied by municipal, federal, or private banking
sources.
The agency conducting surveys to select areas for rural de-
velopment-marketing projects must choose for investment those
places that have the greatest opportunity for assisting small farm-
ers while satisfying strict criteria of economic returns on scarce
investment capital. Some clear opportunities for modernizing mar-
ket production must exist in the vicinity of every one of the 34
highland cities.
Marketing development will help diversify the economies of
the Andean countries. New centers of urban diversity will attract
rural populations as an alternative to the present mass migrations
from the highlands to coastal cities. The development of the high-
land economy will favor subsequent development of the eastern low-
lands as rural hinterlands with abundant land and a complementary
tropical agriculture for trade with the highlands.
Markets in the major lowland cities. In addition, important
cities in the lowlands of every country offer tempting specialized
market opportunities to producers in well-located farming areas of
the Sierras. The development of farm production supplying these
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markets is already under way. There are, however, unfilled needs
and opportunities. The physical barrier of the Andes mountain wall
and the unresponsiveness of Indian farmers to modern market oppor-
tunities are hindering both production and consumption of food.
Andean food production areas within transportation range of
the lowland cities can be selected for development. The technique
is similar to that described for the highland urban markets, with
certain notable changes and additions. Before undertaking a land
capability survey it is necessary to compile an imaginative list
of marketable Andean food items. The proposed new land-use scheme
should be built around the marketable items so that a balanced
individual farming and management plan can be devised.
Changes in government price and import policy would stimulate
Andean production for urban lowland markets. For example, Peru
might consider protection and/or support prices for wheat and
malting barley, both of which are imported in large quantities
though they are also produced domestically. A support price for
beef would undoubtedly result in an increased production of creole
beef in the highlands of Peru. As long as the policies of the
governments are directed at placating political pressures in the
cities--going to the extent of importing beef from other countries
at "dumping" prices well below domestic prices--beef cattle feeder
steers cannot be produced in the Andean highlands.
The following list of import substitution possibilities and
foods in rising demand (most of them already existing in the re-
gion) illustrates the opportunities that are open to well-located
Andean farming regions and the inputs they require:
Urban Food Andean Product Needed Inputs
Beer Malting barley Seed supply
Crop assembly
Bread Wheat Seed
Weed-control chemicals
Irrigation
Crop assembly
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Urban Food
Potato
Meat.
Milk
Broilers
Eggs
Small fruits
Deciduous fruits
Breakfast foods
Pulses
Vegetables
Andean Product
Potato
Dual-purpose cattle
Improved sheep
Dual-purpose cattle
Chickens
Poultry
Raspberry
Blackberry
Strawberry)
Apple)
Pear
Peach)
Corn
Oats
Quinoa
Wheat
Beans
Habas
Lentil
Chick peal
Tomato
Greens
Root crops
Asparagus
Artichoke
Sweet corn
Needed Inputs
Improved seed
Pest control
Cleaning and packaging
Storage and distribution
Fertilizers
Abattoir and cold rooms
Transport
On-farm grading
Collection and storage
distribution
Feed production
Credit
Marketing
Collection and grading
Plant stock
Spraying
Crop assembly, freezing
Adapted varieties
Pest control
Grading and packaging
Organized marketing
Varieties
Quality
High yield
Processing
Varieties
Pest control
Yield and quality
Grading and assembly
Cleaning and packaging
Grading and distribution
Yield and quality
Export markets. Some Andean products are readily salable on
the world market if produced in quantity and quality, accumulated
in exportable forms, and standardized. The more obvious ones are
wool (especially that of the auchenids), mutton, frozen trout,
Peruvian flour corn, quinoa flakes, pyrethrum flowers, and lupin
for tannin.
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In each case the Andean region can capitalize upon its abun-
dant labor force and its special climatic advantages. All these
products require a cool mountain environment for their production.
Rare and potentially valuable products such as the wool of native
Andean animals (llama, alpaca, and vicufia) should be made into
finished products for maximum return.
Integration of the production process with market needs and
fashionable demands overseas is important in deriving full benefit
from textiles if sold in finished form. The tourist industry, which
can render many other benefits in the Andean highlands, will un-
doubtedly create an excellent market for native textile goods and
handicrafts.
THE HUMAN AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Government and Bureaucracy
The governments of the Andean countries are aware that Latin
America's gains in agricultural productivity in the postwar era
are far from adequate . They know that the mountainous agricultural
areas are the major laggards and that, since those areas carry such
a high proportion of the population, the highlands must participate
in the further development of the national economies. Blueprints
for regional organization of government action or the beginning of
such action in a concentrated way exist or are being prepared.
The will to develop undoubtedly exists in the government
elites of the Andean countries. The difficulties confronting the
transfer of that will to a coordinated action program are phenome-
nally great and complex. The main limitations in government bureau-
cratic organizations are:
Dilution of trained manpower into too many autonomous,
uncoordinated, and often competing governmental corporate
bodies--ministries, state or local corporations, banking and
The Human and Institutional Environment
credit organizations, authorities, universities, state govern-
ments--each one promoting development in its own way, with
its own program, and with a small cut of the budget pie, and
each inadequate by itself to produce the desired effects.
Lack of incentive in the bureaucracy to apply itself
with the fervor and wholeheartedness it takes to get progress
moving and to organize, produce, and convey the information,
supplies, and credit needed by farmers to break through the
"old ways curtain."
Insufficient allocation of public funds to agricultural
development by government planning boards.
Allocation of public funds according to political pres-
sures rather than by rational economic priorities.
Incomplete or no governmental action on price control,
subsidies, or marketing of farm commodities.
Competition of government with commercial supply chan-
nels for physical production inputs.
Lack of cooperation or coordination at the local level
among research, credit, extension, and general agricultural
promotion activities.
Social Values in Highland Communities
There are in the neighborhood of 10 million peasant farmers
living on the high plains or the intermontane basins of the high-
land regions of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. About half of these are
Indians who are monolingual in one of the dialects of Quechua or
Aymara. The other half are Mestizos, who are for the most part bi-
lingual, speaking either Spanish and Aymara or Spanish and Quechua.
A number of dialects of Quechua exist, and a speaker of one dialect
frequently cannot understand another dialect.
For the most part the Mestizos dominate in the towns, and they
occupy the best bottom lands in the intermontane basins. The Indians
occupy the uplands and farm under harsher natural conditions. There
is, however, little difference in their respective farming technol-
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ogy. If the peasant Mestizo farmer is more productive than his
Indian compatriot, it is largely because he occupies better land.
The barriers that exist between the Mestizos and Indians,
although in part cultural and social (manners of speech and dress,
for example), were established in the colonial period and are likely
to persist for a long time to come. One such barrier is Indian serf-
dom. In Bolivia serfdom of the Indian was abolished after the land
reform was carried out, but it still persists, although illegal, in
the highlands of Ecuador and Peru where over a third of the Indian
population are living under systems of peonage on large haciendas.
The freeholding populations, both Indian and Mestizo, are or-
ganized in a variety of social units. For the most part Mestizo
farmers live in lowland nucleated villages with fields around them.
Indians live both in upland nucleated villages and on dispersed
farmsteads where a man may have widely scattered fields. In Peru
there is also a class of community called comunidad indigena that
enjoys a special legal status and whose lands are inalienable. Some
1,600 of these communities are legally recognized in Peru.
Sharp differences in fundamental values exist between the
Indians and the Mestizos. The former generally hold hard work and
frugality in high esteem, while the latter are much less prone to
manual labor and prefer to live ostentatiously. Indians, however,
display great mistrust of the outside world; its encroachments in
the past have largely involved exploitation in one form or another
by the Mestizo group.
The world view of both Indian and Mestizo farmers is funda-
mentally fatalistic and pessimistic. Levels of cooperation beyond
the family or immediate kinship groups are rare, and until recently
government concern for the fate of the peasant has been negligible.
However, the situation is not as bleak as it might at first
seem. Changes in the past few years indicate that the peoples of
the Sierra are in the initial stages of a social and economic trans-
formation. Roads and schools have been built. New ideas have pene-
trated the most remote villages through returning migrants and
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veterans of military service and the introduction of the transistor
radio. This has led to new expectations that another, less deprived
way of life may eventually be theirs.
The Andean peasants, in becoming aware of the privileges and
standards of living that others enjoy, are now beginning to feel
that they have for far too long been deprived of many things that
are rightfully theirs: some voice in the decision-making process;
a fairer share of the wealth; a position of respect; a right to a
decent education; communications with the outside world; and access
to modern medicine. Indeed, in most areas demands for some of the
benefits of modernization--demands sometimes expressed with vio-
lence--have forced governments to focus more attention and more
resources on the highland areas.
STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING CHANGE
Self-government at the village or community level is still
incipient and inexperienced. The political authoritarianism of the
landlords and the unilateral imposition of programs by the civil
service organizations on the farmers have barred the farmers from
becoming efficient cooperating subjects in the development programs.
Such treatment has tended to make them peons being moved on a
checkerboard crisscrossed by pathways supposedly leading to progress
but often blocked by interest groups.
In the few cases where liaison has been successfully estab-
lished between governmental agricultural agencies and associations
of small farmers the results obtained justify the pragmatic view
that constant flow and feedback between governmental agencies and
farmers' groups or independent farmers are prerequisites to any
successful program in the agricultural sector.
The crucial issue of bridging the gap between the extension
agent and the farmers is receiving attention, but experience is
still wanting as to how this can best be done. Extension agents
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seem to spend considerable time glueing farmers together in what
has the outward appearance of an organized association but in fact
fails to provide the members of the young group with sufficiently
strong material motives to make them soon become stable and self-
supporting and eventually models for other farmer groups.
New Means of Communication
In addition to expanded technical and extension services
there are other ways of reaching the peasant farmers, ways that are
not being currently employed to any great extent. There is, for
example, not a single radio station in the Andean area that beams
regularly planned agricultural programs to the people in their na-
tive languages, Quechua or Aymara. Given the fact that transistor
radios are now found everywhere, it would seem feasible (and cheap)
to beam agricultural information along with musical and news programs
to the Sierra villages in these indigenous languages. Research indi-
cates that most people who have access to a radio would gladly lis-
ten to a program oriented toward peasant life in the mountains.
A second mass approach that might have considerable effect is
the publication of an indigenous weekly or monthly newspaper or
magazine (in Spanish, since Quechua is not a written language) that
could be mailed to the personero (legal representative) of every
farming community. It could contain agricultural information, could
help solve problems of farmers and communities, or tell them where
they could go to get the information they desire.
A third approach might be to identify innovative community
leaders and bring them into central locations where they could re-
ceive short training courses in improved agriculture from a compe-
tent staff. On returning to their villages they ought to have con-
siderable innovating effect. Such leaders might even be entrepre-
neurs who could actually sell new inputs necessary for increased
agricultural productivity.
Finally, ministers of agriculture should make available on
request mobile teams of specialists in agriculture and associated
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activities who for short periods of time could assist villages that
are willing to help themselves.
Focusing Programs on Agricultural Productivity
Most of the development programs that have been initiated so
far in the highlands have not had agricultural productivity as the
central theme of their efforts. Yet all of the people concerned are
farmers whose greatest felt need is for more food. By dispersing
their efforts in such areas as political organization, literacy,
and welfare projects in general, past programs have failed to cap-
ture the interest of the peasant who saw in them no direct benefit
to himself. First and foremost, then, a program needs to be designed
with priority to increased food production so as to establish a
solid economic base for further development. This is an area in
which least resistance to innovation is likely to be met. Moreover,
most successful agricultural innovations have the advantage of
producing positive results to the farmer--and thus further induce-
ment to innovation--in the relatively short time of one growing
season. Programs in other areas do not often show such quick and
dramatic results.
Developing Community Organization and Leadership
Another central issue has to do with the organization of the
communities themselves. Researches on more than 50 peasant communi-
ties, Indian and Mestizo, indicate that an intense degree of indi-
vidualism and only a minimum (and often forced) degree of coopera-
tion exist at the community level. On such matters as irrigation
or the use of common pasture lands, cooperation does of course take
place because the very survival of the family depends upon it. If a
common effort is not made to clean and repair the major irrigation
canals, no individual farmer can receive his water; if he does not
join with his fellow villagers to maintain the common pasture area,
he will have no place to graze his animals. But beyond such minimum
levels of cooperation there is little sense of community to which
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one can attach a program at the present time. Villagers are very
suspicious of their own local authorities, who have so often bilked
them in the past.
Decision-making bodies have to be developed in these communi-
ties, bodies whose members will identify themselves broadly with
the welfare of the community as a whole, not with the special in-
terests of a few. Much research is needed in this area. We know lit-
tle or nothing of the functional power groups at the local level,
or of other levels of government that affect the village. Studies
of the provincial and national elites as well as of the bureaucracy
are very much in order.
Using Religious Values
All over the Andean area peasants are known as muy fiestero
(very devoted to religious festivals). Mestizos and Indians alike
spend much time, money, and effort celebrating feast days of patron
saints who are believed to control the destiny of man. Much fiesta
activity is related to the annual traditional cycle in agriculture,
the productivity of which depends on the proper celebration of the
fiestas; when crops fail because of frost, hail, or drought, it is
regarded as a castigation for "sins" committed in the community.
This view generally receives reinforcement from priests, whose
authority is highly respected in the community in spite of anti-
clericalism.
This deep commitment to religious values may in fact be uti-
lized as a way of increasing agricultural productivity. Most com-
munities have set aside certain lands or animals that belong to the
saints. The production of the saints' lands is generally used for
their annual fiestas; the priests usually work in close association
with the traditional authorities to decide how this money is to be
spent. If extension personnel were to work closely with parish
priests who have entry into the community, they might be able to
convince the traditional authorities to try out new techniques on
the saints' lands. The lands would thus serve as demonstrator and
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model plots for the many individual farmers who are obligated to
work these lands for the saint. Demonstrations on such lands would
have the advantage of introducing the new techniques through the
most prestigeful channel in the community.
Community Acceptance of the Development Program
The peasant community is not likely to be altered drastically
and rapidly in the near future. We therefore explored the degree of
cooperation likely to be forthcoming from peasant communities for
the projects we have proposed.
Land reform and land redistribution. Perhaps the strongest
single value of the Andean peasant is his great attachment to land.
Members of the indigenous communities generally feel that they have
lost their property to outsiders through exploitation by rapacious
landlords taking advantage of special privileges and power accorded
them by the political office. Although the land reform laws may
eventually change this, we cannot hope for very rapid progress on
the redistribution of land in the Sierra. Land-happy haciendados
are not likely to give up easily to land-hungry peasants even
though a law is on the books.
Any reform that is likely to enlarge the peasant's share of
the total pie will be enthusiastically welcomed by him. The proposal
to farm the lands expropriated from the haciendado through some
cooperative or collective institution is not likely to meet resist-
ance from local people.
Irrigation. There is fairly good evidence that the peasant
farmer in the Andes sees water as his biggest problem. And it is
precisely in this area that much cooperation has occurred in peas-
ant villages. Studies indicate that over 25 per cent of the free-
holding peasant communities in the highlands have constructed irri-
gation canals in recent years through communal effort.
The cost of getting more water to peasant communities is of
course more than any government in the Andes can afford. It must
continue largely to be a community effort. With some technical help
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it can be expected that cooperation in the form of communal labor
for the expansion of irrigation systems would be forthcoming from
most Andean communities.
Research is needed on current systems of distribution of wa-
ter and legal rights to it, which are by no means uniform in high-
land villages. At the present time, systems of water distribution
and legal problems of water rights have been thoroughly studied in
only a handful of Andean communities.
Grazing and stock-raising improvement. So important is the
ownership of animals to most farmers in the Andes that we can ex-
pect technical innovations related to improvement of breed or pas-
ture to be heartily welcomed. A man is frequently assigned status
in the community on the basis of how many animals he owns. Indige-
nous communities still contain rather large areas of pasture land
that is communally owned and to which every member of the community
has grazing rights. Given this type of organization, it should not
be too difficult, with adequate technical help and supervision, to
get the community to engage in stock and pasture improvement.
Forestry. Since there is a great shortage of wood for fuel
and construction in the highlands, we can expect that resistance to
forestation would not be high, particularly if food production is
tackled first. The great problem in the past has been a lack of
adequate stocks of seedlings and information about their planting
and care. The peasant knows the value of tree crops, but he has
been unable to take advantage of this resource up to now.
Production oriented toward markets. Once the Andean peasant
is able to grow enough food for his own nutrition, he will be more
responsive to economic incentives. That he already reacts to such
incentives is shown by the local markets that are held weekly in
every highland village and town.
We have very good studies of Indian markets in the highlands
or markets in Mestizo towns and villages to which Indians go. A few
careful studies of these markets by an economically trained anthro-
pologist might be a strategic first step in making recommendations
242
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for what can be done to make peasant farmers more responsive to
the market. It should be noted that many communities have already
constructed farm-to-market roads without help from central govern-
ment.
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FOUR SUCCESS STORIES
The following sketches, based on the descriptions presented
at the conference by representatives of the four programs, * are
intended to give the essential facts concerning programs that are
referred to frequently in the body of the report.
Our basic thesis that institutional methods are not transfer-
rable is illustrated here, for these four successful programs have
little in common in their structure. In no case can one point to a
single factor as the cause of success. On the contrary, what made
these programs succeed is that their operators took into account
all the major factors listed in our taxonomy chart in Chapter Two
as they applied to their local situations. A program may begin with
what appears to be a single input- -cooperatives at Comilla, for
example. But other factors, notably knowledge of local social struc-
tures, were provided so that barriers could be foreseen and over-
come as they appeared. Thus, though no technique can be transplanted
in itself from any of these programs, they have in common a basic
principle: planning that integrates all the necessary inputs in
terms of local conditions.
EAST PAKISTAN: COMILIA
The Academy for Rural Development at Comilla in East Pakistan
was founded in 1959. It took a thana (district) with 200,000 inhab-
itants and started a pilot scheme in this area characterized by
desperate poverty and overcrowding.
*
Comilla by Akhter Hameed Kahn, Gezira by Arthur Gaitskell,
Vicos by Allan R. Holmberg, and JCRR by Yien-si Tsiang.
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In 1959 the formal structures for development existed in
Comilla and in East Pakistan generally, but they did not function
effectively. Cooperatives and extension services were in place but
did not produce results. Research had developed and tested improved
practices; the farmers did not adopt these practices even when they
knew about them. Little coordination existed among the various
units of government and technical services. A general hopelessness,
a feeling that "nothing can be done," seemed to pervade both farm-
ers and bureaucrats.
The aim of the Academy was to apply social science to the
problems of the Comilla area, and its main operating technique has
been that of communication. The patterns of village life were I
studied to determine why improved practices were not adopted and
to discover, through consulting the farmers, what innovations were I
needed and how they could be introduced. The aim in communication
has been to provide an interchange of information and ideas among
farmers, bureaucrats, and the social scientists on the Academy's
staff.
Although Comilla does not replace existing structures, it
brings their personnel together in a new environment. Improved
practices are still provided by the existing research stations,
and programs are carried out by the existing bureaucracy. The I
Academy does not execute or administer; it analyzes, evaluates, and
catalyzes. The technicians who carry out the programs shift their
headquarters to the Academy, but they remain members of the regu-
lar bureaucracy and responsible to it. At the Academy the techni-
cians learn the results of the Academy's research and are exposed
to continuing evaluation of their programs. Less tangibly, in this
new environment they absorb new attitudes toward their jobs.
The Academy's first venture was in cooperatives and exten-
sion. Early research led the Academy to believe that lack of credit
was the prime bottleneck that prevented the adoption of innovations.
In addition the extension agent was not viewed by the farmers as a
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source of advice; instead, they turned to village opinion leaders
with whom the agent was not in touch.
The moribund cooperatives were restructured on the basis of
consultations with local farmers. The Academy provided the informa-
tion, but it was the bureaucracy that decided to promote the new
structures. The Comilla cooperatives have several distinctive fea-
tures, but the essential fact about the Comilla system is that the
basic responsibility for its design and operation rests with the
farmers rather than with the Academy or the bureaucracy. (The sys-
tem is outlined in Chapter Nine.) The same principle was applied to
the reform of the extension system. Since it did not seem possible
that the village extension agents could operate effectively, they
have been largely superseded by "organizers" and "model farmers,"
chosen by their fellow farmers, who attend the Academy weekly and
provide the essential link between research and the farm.
Comilla's institutional innovations have proved successful.
The cooperatives are growing, and their rate of recovery of loans
is high. Comilla has branched out into other fields, not all of them
agricultural: mechanization--tractors and irrigation pumps; mobi-
lizing the unemployed for rural public works; reorganization of
local government; and, most recently, family planning, educational
reform, and village electrification.
However, the Academy has been very cautious about expanding
beyond the Comilla area and has refused to supply plans for other
areas. Instead, it offers to take bureaucrats on at the Academy to
observe its methods and then apply or adapt them elsewhere on their
own initiative.
Thus Comilla remains a pilot scheme. Its distinctive features
are its constant self-evaluation, its studies of local society,
the communication it has established between the farmers and the
bureaucracy, and its effort to arouse the initiative of both vil-
lage society and bureaucracy.
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SUDAN: GEZIRA
The Gezira scheme is an intensive irrigation project in the
Sudan between the Blue and White Niles just south of Khartoum.
Planned early in this century, the dam and canalization for 300,000
acres were completed in 1925. Gezira now has some 70,000 settlers
and covers 1,800,000 acres.
Gezira has succeeded where all too many similar irrigation
schemes have failed. It has brought the benefits of large-scale
estate management to peasant communities. The settlers' income is
significantly higher than that of other Sudanese farmers. The scheme
has repaid its costs and now is a major source of foreign exchange
and development capital for the Sudanese government. Thus it bene-
fits the nation as a whole, not merely the settlers.
The Gezira project was launched as a three-way partnership
of the government of the Sudan (then British controlled); a private
company, the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, that provided management
and some financing; and the farmers. It was preceded by research
and pilot projects.
The land for the scheme was acquired by compulsory long-term
rental to the government at the previously prevailing rates. It was
then divided into standard parcels and leased to tenants, most of
whom already lived in the area. The tenants were required to follow
a fixed rotation of food and fodder crops and to grow a new cash
crop, cotton. The entire cost of the scheme has been paid from the
cotton crop; the food and fodder crops belong to the settlers. The
scheme was intended to benefit the peasants, not local landlords
or expatriate settlers.
Some of the factors that seem to have contributed to Gezira's
success, though once again the important point is that all the fac-
tors were taken into account, are the following:
1. The scheme concentrated on the part of the nation with
the greatest potential for development.
2. The economic objective was uppermost. The scheme was
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planned to make money for each of the three partners. No partner
had a prior claim on revenue, and none made a profit unless all did.
The claims of all partners were directly related to yield, giving a
common incentive for production. The division of the profits among
the partners was based on existing local custom.
3. The inclusion of private enterprise capital and manage-
ment filled a gap in capital needs and provided an element of drive
and efficiency often lacking in a bureaucracy to whose members loss
or gain is less immediately important.
4. The company accepted a time limit on its participation.
Under the contract the government regained full control of the
scheme after 25 years.
5. Long experimentation with pilot schemes preceded the
actual dam construction, which provided technical knowledge on
methods of production and made it possible to determine the optimum
farm size (30 acres). It also served to convert the peasants to the
scheme. When first proposed, opposition was almost total. A pilot
scheme, using pumped water, was conducted on 600 acres, and this
demonstration brought a shift in community opinion in favor of the
scheme.
6. The scheme was made as simple as possible. Of the three
crops grown by the settlers, two--the food and fodder crops--were
already grown in the area. The fact that only the cash crop, long-
staple cotton, was new to the farmers reduced the burden of innova-
tion on the farmer. It also made the job of extension much easier.
Since the new inputs were relatively simple, the extension person-
nel did not have to be highly trained. It was thus possible to com-
bine several functions in one person. The settler did not have to
wander from office to office. A single man in a single office, no
farmer being more than eight miles from an office, could provide
technical advice, credit, and any other information needed by the
farmer. And, since highly trained people were not needed, it was
possible to build up a permanent staff that could gain the farmers'
confidence.
251
252 Appendix A
7. The cash crop, cotton, was known to have a ready market.
8. The social controls imposed on the settlers were designed
to protect them against antisocial actions but not to suppress
individual initiative. The controls consisted of the planned family
holding, tenancy rather than ownership, prescribed rotation, a
prohibition on mortgage and fragmentation. Organized services--
research station and seed farm, fertilizer and pesticides, machin-
ery for cultivation and pest control, supervised credit and market-
ing--made the individual better able to cope with his environment.
Nonetheless each settlerts returns depended on his own initiative
and effort.
9. The elimination of landlord control and land speculation
prevented the scheme from benefiting only a few.
PERU: VICOS
The Cornell-Peru project, smallest of the four, had its origin
with Cornell anthropologists who were interested in the interaction
between technological and social change.
The project took place on an 18 ,940-acre hacienda at Vicos in
the highlands of Peru. In 1952 Cornell rented the hacienda. It had
about 1,800 inhabitants who were Indian serfs and it was being
operated under the traditional feudal system that required the
serfs to give three days of labor a week to the land of the patron--
3,850 acres of the best land in the hacienda. The Indians also had
their own plots of land.
In effect Cornell became the patron of the hacienda. Before
launching any development projects the Cornell group attempted to
gain rapport with the Indian community and to discover its felt
needs, motivations, and social structure. Projects were determined
by consultation with the community. The aim was to set in motion
the general process of modernization keyed to an increase in agri-
cultural productivity. I
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Contrary to expectations, the Cornell group found that the
Indians did not resent the three days of labor a week that they had
to give to the patron, but they did object, and bitterly, to the
extra services often exacted by him. The first move therefore was
to abolish all extra unpaid duties. This action gained support for
the new patron.
The three days of labor were used to introduce innovations on
the hacienda lands, the production from which was to provide capital
for other development projects. Potatoes were the staple food, but
the crops were being severely damaged by blight. Research had al-
ready established that the blight could be controlled, and pest
control was successfully introduced on the supervised fields of the
patron. In attempting to spread this and other innovations from the
patron's fields to the Indians' individual plots, the Cornell group
found that there was a vacuum in community leadership. Eventually
the leadership for innovation was found among the younger, disaf-
fected Indians--not in the existing leadership.
A rapid increase in potato production provided capital for
such economic inputs as a truck to carry the potatoes to market and
for social projects (education, for example). The project was highly
successful in purely economic terms. In ten years, per capita income
at Vicos rose from $40 to $250; the average for Peru as a whole is
$179.
The project also aimed to develop local initiative and self-
government toward the day when the Indians could replace the patron.
After the five-year rental period was up, Cornell felt that this
point had been reached. One sign of this was that the Indians, once
obsequious, were now willing to challenge the decisions of the
Cornell group. Cornell therefore suggested that the government ex-
propriate the hacienda from its absentee owner and sell it to the
Indians. Because of opposition from interests outside the community,
this process took five years. During this time it was observed that
production at Vicos rose and fell according to the Indians' expecta-
tion of getting title to the land. When at last it became theirs,
production almost doubled in a single year.
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Vicos has continued successfully since then under the manage-
ment of an elected council based on traditional groups in the
Indian community. Cornell now plays only a consulting role. The
patron's land is farmed collectively. Labor productivity has in-
creased so that it has been possible to reduce the time spent on
the patron's land from 152 to 35-40 days a year. The success of
Vicos, both economic and social, has even drawn back to it former
residents who had migrated to the cities.
Among the distinctive features of Vicos are these: The agents
of change were foreign to the nation as well as to the community
and were therefore completely outside the bureaucratic structure;
community attitudes were carefully researched before projects were
launched; the development of self-government was a primary goal;
and community structures such as the hacienda system were not de-
stroyed but adapted to development purposes.
TAIWAN: JCRR
The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction was created in
1948 by the governments of the Republic of China and the United
States. Of its five commissioners, two were American and three
Chinese.
The JCRR is distinctive among our success stories. It is the
only program that is diffuse--covering virtually the entire island
province of Taiwan of the Republic of China--rather than concentrated
in a single area. It is by far the largest of the four programs; its
staff now includes 89 specialists. It is the joint creation of two
governments. It is also a separate organization that does not form
part of either the Chinese or the U.S. bureaucracies, which has
given the JCRR a large measure of freedom from political pressures
and bureaucratic rules.
Agriculture is the main focus of the JCRR's operations, but
it is also active in such related fields as marketing and rural
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health. Agriculture on Taiwan has progressed dramatically in the
years that JCRR has been in existence, with a doubling of produc-
tion between 1952 and 1964. (One of JCRR's most noted successes,
the campaign against rats, is described in Chapter Three.)
Like the other successful programs, but on a much broader
scale, the JCRR has dealt with all the factors affecting agricul-
tural productivity. But few if any other nations in the underdevel-
oped world have the resources, especially the human resources, to
mount an operation like the JCRR. Some of the keys to the JCRR's
success are to be found in the environment in which it operates:
the availability of trained manpower, the relatively small size
(14,000 square miles) and population (12 million people) of the
island, and the farmers' existing skills and receptivity to inno-
vation. Taiwan is now so well supplied in manpower that it is able
to send technicians to aid other nations.
Like Comilla and Vicos, the JCRR has brought the farmers
themselves increasingly into the process of development. The JCRR
relies heavily on local farmers' associations. Many activities
launched at the center by the JCRR have been turned over to the
farmers to manage. Though the agricultural four-year plans are
drafted at the center, they are revised in consultation with farmer
organizations as well as with local government offices. Extension
agents are hired by the farmer associations, who bear two thirds of
the cost; the JCRR and the government pay the rest. Farmer coopera-
tives employ some 13,000 persons, many of them trained by the JCRR.
The JCRR has been able to plan and carry out a nationwide
program that provides all the inputs needed by agriculture. Chart 4,
which follows, shows the sequence in which these inputs were made,
from study to action, and going on in many cases to the turning
over of partial or primary responsibility to the farmers or local
government.
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IMPORTANT MEASURES TAKEN FOR AGRICULTURAL
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Government and/or JCRR action
DEVELOPMENT ON TAIWAN
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Action taken by the local people with assistance
of government and/or JCRR
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existing varieties
Renewal of rice seed once every
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Appendix B
INSURANCE FOR INNOVATORS
by Stephen A. Marglin
Given the widespread aversion to risk that apparently char-
acterizes peasant cultivators from Peru to Indonesia, insurance
schemes that shift at least part of the uncertainty attendant to
innovation from the cultivator's shoulders have obvious appeal.
The chief problems in designing an insurance scheme are to reduce
risks to the peasant without removing his incentive to produce,
and to keep the scheme's costs, in terms of both money and admin-
istrative personnel, within reasonable limits.
The kernel of the present proposal is insurance against the
failure of a recommended innovation to produce a sufficient in-
crement in output over the yield of traditional methods to cover
the cost of the purchasable inputs required for the innovation.
The cost of the inputs is also the limit of liability. In general
it is foreseen that this insurance will be offered as an induce-
ment to cultivators to participate in schemes of supervised credit
for the purchase of inputs like fertilizers and pesticides.
Before the farmer signs up for credit to cover the cost of
a "package" he and the insurance agent would agree on a base yield
for each plot on which this innovative package is to be introduced,
the base, fixed by mutual agreement, being the average yield of
the plot under traditional methods. The farmer would of course
have reason to exaggerate the base yield, but the insurance agent
would have, besides his general knowledge of the soils and climate
of the area and his access to revenue records, the ultimate sanction
of refusing insurance if the farmer's estimate of the base is far
out of line. In any event, small errors in the estimate of the base
yield are hardly disastrous if the recommended innovation is suffi-
ciently productive.
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Let us suppose the base on a particular plot of riceland is
set at 2,000 pounds per acre. The recommended innovation, let us
also suppose, includes purchasable inputs whose extra cost totals
$20 per acre, and the price of rice is $100 per short ton. Thus an
average yield of 2,400 pounds per acre would suffice to repay the
extra cost of the purchasable inputs. The insurance contract fixes
a target of 2,400 pounds for the cultivator upon compliance with
minimal conditions as to use of the inputs. If the target is ex-
ceeded, the insurance is inoperative. If the yield falls below
2,400 pounds, the insurer reimburses the cultivators at the rate
of $5 per hundred pounds of shortfall, up to a limit of $20. When
credit has been advanced to the cultivator to cover the cost of
inputs, insurance payments are credited to the cultivator's account
with the lending agency.
It is the responsibility of the cultivator to notify the agent
before harvesting the crop if it appears to him that he might have
a claim against the insurer. The agent would then attend the harvest,
and samples from, say, one to five hundredths of an acre would be
separately harvested, threshed, and weighed to determine the actual
yield per acre.
What is being proposed, it should be emphasized, is insurance
for innovators rather than innovation insurance. The insurance be-
comes operative in the event of a crop failure even though the
failure--from unseasonal cold, lack of precipitation, closure of
irrigation canals--may in no way be traceable to the innovation and
even though the innovation may still be profitable relative to trad-
ditional methods. The only condition that the cultivator must meet
is that he actually carry out the innovation with a minimum of com-
petence.
The limited liability of the insurer--the limit is the cost
of the new input--holds costs down to a manageable level. Only in
the event of a general crop failure would the insurance become
operative on a wide scale, and then some portion of the payments
might be looked upon as a kind of famine relief. The limited
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liability feature also maintains the incentive for the cultivator
to produce: He has relatively little to gain from collecting the
insurance.
The scheme should be administratively feasible provided that
the mean return from each dollar invested by cultivators in pur-
chasable inputs is sufficiently high--say, $3. A high mean return
will pretty well guarantee that in years of favorable growing con-
ditions only a small percentage of innovators will have occasion
to claim benefits. For marginal innovations that barely cover the
cost of inputs on the average, the ratio of inspections to inno-
vators would probably require an unfeasible density of agents. In
years of general failure, the agent may be able to grant a large
number of claims by visual inspection of the fields alone.
If we assume the rate of harvest inspections to be 10 per
cent of the number of innovators, the number of harvest inspections
to be one per day, and planting and hence harvesting to be spread
out over a three-week period, then a single agent might take
responsibility for as many as 200 cultivators. Of course this is
only a guess, and the optimal density of agents can be determined
only by a lengthy process of experimentation.
Even with high-return innovations, it might be impossible
to put a scheme like this on an actuarial basis in which the pre-
miums would cover the claims plus the costs of administration.
But this defect is not fatal. The government problably can better
afford to subsidize the risk-bearing that is attendant to agri-
cultural innovation than to have peasants hold back because of
these risks.
Perhaps more than other agricultural insurance schemes this
one is open to cheating by the cultivator and to collusion between
cultivator and agent to defraud the insurer. The cultivator might,
for example, apply only half the package to his plot and sell the
remaining half; or he might cut three or four tillers from each
rice plant before the harvest. Such devices might indeed prove the
undoing of the scheme, but some points can be raised in its defense.
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First, some dishonesty occurs in all insurance schemes and is
not fatal. Second, unearthing dishonesty should become easier if
the scheme proves its worth and gains the support of the commu-
nity. Third, the insurer need not be stung more than once by a
cultivator; if he suspects dishonesty he has the ultimate sanction
of refusing future insurance.
Collusion would be much more difficult to unearth; prevention--
by paying a sufficiently high salary to the agent to reduce the
temptation--rather than cure seems to be called for.
Prudence dictates that any divisible innovation be tried first
experimentally, and this rule is as valid for an innovation in risk-
bearing as for an innovation in fertilizer. A small-scale test in
a few villages would reveal in the course of a few seasons whether
an insurance scheme like this one can be administered, what it
might cost, and what effect such insurance might actually have on
the rate of adoption of innovations. Such an experiment would
moreover permit improvement in the details of operation. The
lesson of Comilla--to make haste slowly and experimentally--is
of universal applicability.
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MEASURING A GOVERNMENT'S "WILL TO DEVELOP"
IN AGRICULTURE
by John D. Montgomery and Stephen A. Marglin
Whatever may be the factual merit of the argument that the
West developed without government planning, laissez faire is not
the dominant model of action in the underdeveloped countries or
aid-giving agencies today. Once the central role of the govern-
ment is assumed, the "will to develop" becomes a critical variable
in analyzing a government's potential to raise the living standard
of the people. In most of these countries a will to develop is
expressed in national economic plans, but plans reflect as much a
desire to mobilize votes and foreign aid as to bring about actual
development; they do not necessarily measure the actual will to
develop, and possible donors are forced to rely upon intuition in
assessing the intensity of the commitment. The purpose of this
appendix is to explore the possibility of supplementing intuition
with evidence as a basis for judging the commitment to one phase
of development--the agricultural sector--on the part of government
in the less developed countries.
If it can be adequately measured, the "will to develop" might
be a useful addition to the list of criteria that determine the
allocation of external assistance to the underdeveloped world.
Given the limitation on the amount of aid that the developed world
appears prepared to render the underdeveloped states and given the
apparent need for a "critical mass" of aid to achieve positive
results in any one country, it would seem that hard choices must
be made if external aid is to contribute significantly to economic
development anywhere. In this light it seems reasonable to make
evidence of a will to develop a condition for aid--provided that
we succeed in pinning down this somewhat elusive concept.
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If actions speak louder than words, then current efforts to
use material and human resources in development may be taken as a
measure of will. Thus even rough comparisons of the level of in-
dexes among countries with similar levels of per capita gross
national product might help answer the question, "Does country X
demonstrate a greater national effort to develop its agriculture
than country Y?" A time series for country X might also help answer
the question, "Does country X reflect a changed commitment to
agricultural development?"
Preliminary study of the data available for such an analysis
encourages us to believe that significant evidence on these issues
can be obtained. A primary measure of governmental effort in
agriculture is no doubt the public expenditures in that sector,
including the budget of the ministry of agriculture and related
agencies engaged in such activities as irrigation and community
development. Since the agricultural sector differs in size and com-
position in different countries, these budgetary figures should
appear as ratios of the proportion of the gross domestic product
contributed by agriculture. Complete figures are not readily avail-
able from published sources for very many countries. Even so, Table
C-1 shows fairly consistent ratios over the years, except for a few
obvious discrepancies in statistical procedures. The figures suggest
that India has been investing a consistent portion of its agricul-
tural gross domestic product in the agricultural sector. The more
complete data presented in Table C-4 show that the increases in
such expenditures are roughly comparable to the increase in agri-
cultural productivity over a period of seven years (no causal link
can be deduced from these facts, of course). In spite of some
internal inconsistencies, these figures suggest a much greater in-
vestment in these terms in India, for example, than in Argentina,
Burma, the Philippines, or Thailand, and a much lower one than in
Japan.
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TABLE C-1. SUMMARY RATIO OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN AGRICULTURE
TO AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT*
196 1957 958 1959 1960 1961 1962
India .046 .051 .04o .040 .043 .048 .051
Japan .107 .452 .451
Argentina .024 .018 .021 .024 .012
Burma .028 .033 .063 .015 .018 .015
Philippines .028 .032 .033 .029
Thailand .020 .021 .017 .026
*
Sources: See Table C-4.
Further research will be necessary on a country-by-country
basis to improve the comparability of these statistics. Clearly the
composition as well as the size of expenditure is important. In-
vestment in infrastructure such as imposing buildings in the capital
cities obviously produces a smaller return in agricultural produc-
tivity than equal investments more immediately touching the farmer;
similarly, the assignment of large numbers of people to routine
activities surviving from the needs of a colonial society (such
as services to plantations in Vietnam) may produce smaller results
than equivalent assignments to agricultural extension programs.
The fact that such expenditures are politically appealing and re-
quire less commitment to the agricultural sector justifies us in
concluding that the same investment, differently allocated, may
reflect different degrees of the will for agricultural development.
But analysis of expenditures in terms of any economic rationale
will have to await further refinement of existing budgetary figures.
Governmental effort in agricultural development, including
extension, cooperative management, research and field stations,
and agricultural credit, is largely reflected in the cost (includ-
ing wages, salaries, and operating budget) of these activities.
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Measuring such costs first in proportion to other activities of
government (preferably a relatively fixed-cost sector such as the
justice department) over a period of time, then in proportion to
agricultural production per capita of the agricultural population,
would indicate changes in commitment to agricultural productivity.
TABLE C-2. EXTENSION SERVICES
India2
Japan2
Argentina 4
Philippine 2
Thailand2
Number of
Extension
Workers
(1959)
48,5793
13,566
392
1,623
328
Farms Served
Per Workerl
913 (1954)
445 (1960)
1,395 (1952)
1,010 (1948)
6,438 (1950)
'Number is based on holdings for the year shown in parenthe-
ses.
2 Source: C. W. Chang, Extension Education for Agricultural
and Rural Development (Bangkok: FAO, 1963).
3Including community development employees.
Source: Informe del Cento Sudamericano de Extensidn Agricola
(Rome: FAO, 1959)-
Unfortunately no such detailed budgetary data exist. But direct
measures of the actual numbers of agricultural extension workers
do exist, as of 1959, and these figures may be used as a surro-
gate for cost in measuring the intensity of the effort involved.
Thus Table C-2 shows India offering less extension service than
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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Japan but more than Argentina, the Philippines, and Thailand (no
statistics being available for Burma), at least as measured by
the number of farms each extension worker might be expected to
serve. Of course these figures give no indication of the quality
of the effort in each country, and they should be interpreted with
caution in judging the commitment of these countries to agricultural
development.
Other measures may also be developed from personnel statis-
tics from the agricultural ministries. The quality of personnel
assigned to a sector may measure the intensity of a government's
commitment of manpower resources to that sector. Assuming that wage
scales reflect the professional competence of the individuals per-
forming given public services, a direct measure of the quality of
the effort would be mean base wages, over a time series, of agri-
cultural personnel assigned to specific functions (research and
extension) as compared with civil servants' mean base wages.
It is frequently assumed that concentration of agricultural
personnel in the national capital and other large cities produces
smaller results in output than deconcentration of the same person-
nel for extension and other services directly to the farmer. This
hypothesis could become an additional index of effort: the distri-
bution of personnel according to posted assignments. Such statis-
tics too would have to be gathered on a country-by-country basis.
But some relevant information is available through published
sources. For example, if it be assumed that posting extension
workers in the uncomfortable rural areas indicates a greater insti-
tutional effort than leaving them in the cities, it may be signifi-
cant that India has a higher precentage of its extension workers
assigned to the national government (as opposed to intermediate
and local posts) than Japan and the Philippines, and a much lower
proportion than Thailand. (See Table C-3.)
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TABLE C-3. PROPORTION OF EXTENSION WORKERS
POSTED AT NATIONAL LEVEL (1959)
Number at
National Percentage at
Total Number Office National Level
India 48,579 500 1.02
Japan 13,566 48 0.35
Philippines 1,623 31 0.19
Thailand 328 96 29.27
Source: C. W. Chang, Extension Education for Agricultural
and Rural Development (Bangkok: FAO, 1963).
Allocation of educational funds at all levels could provide
another indication of the will to develop agriculture. At the pri-
mary school level it may be next to impossible to distinguish agri-
culture from general education (except perhaps by the composition
of the general education provided by rural schools and the rural-
urban division of educational funds in proportion to the population
distribution). But at the secondary level the budgetary allocation
to vocational agricultural education might reflect the emphasis on
agriculture. Finally, in higher education as well, the money allo-
cated to agricultural institutions as a proportion of the total
budget, or the number of students enrolled in them relative to the
agricultural population, could provide a measure of the importance
assigned to that sector if compared with similar efforts in other
countries.
The attitudes of the civil service as well as its technical
capacity and the incentive system surrounding it may be considered
in measuring the national "will to develop" at operating levels.
Attitude surveys have been conducted for other purposes in both
developed and underdeveloped countries and are undoubtedly methodo-
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logically feasible. The attitudes of the bureaucracy toward the
agricultural activities of the government as compared with develop-
mental programs in other sectors could be surveyed to give some
indication of the relative prestige and interest in the various
sectors of the economy and to explore the comparisons in outlook
between employees of agricultural and other ministries. Standard
devices for sampling, for preserving anonymity of response, and for
verifying the validity and reliability of survey results have been
used in many parts of the world and for a wide variety of purposes.
The relevant link between beliefs and performance is less clear,
however. It may be presumed that an agricultural agency's collective
"will to develop" is related to groups of attitudes of individuals
participating in its programs. Such attitudes will not necessarily
indicate the efficiency of the agencies' actual performance or the
economic usefulness of their programs, but they will bear some re-
lation to future effectiveness.
For purposes of such analysis, the relevant attitudes of
individual civil servants would include:
1. Opinion of the importance of the agricultural sector
(as compared with other sectors).
2. Opinions regarding the possibility of improving
agricultural productivity.
3. Attitudes regarding the propriety of direct govern-
mental action to bring about rural improvement.
4. Attitudes about the assignment of individual civil
servants to rural posts.
5. Opinions regarding the capacity of existing or
proposed governmental agencies to undertake agricultural
development programs.
6. Attitudes toward the role of other critical factors
in the agricultural sector (for example, farmers, landlords,
and commercial interests) that might affect the political
feasibility of major efforts to improve agricultural produc-
tivity.
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7. Indexes of willingness to participate in agricul-
tural development programs.
Attitudes and beliefs are not, of course, "will." Nor can it
be presumed that favorable attitudes on the part of the civil serv-
ice will necessarily produce action. But some inverse presumptions
are surely feasible: that a will to develop has some relationship
to the values and knowledge of the principal actors, and that
negative attitudes toward the goals of an organization will impair
its effectiveness. Moreover, it seems reasonable as well to con-
sider the collective attitudes of civil servants toward agricul-
tural development as an expression of the intellectual ambiance of
their agencies or, perhaps, of the society at large. * I
The use of mass media to condition the national consciousness
also reflects the efforts of opinion leaders to convey to the ex-
posed public both substantive and volitional themes regarding the
agricultural sector. Content analysis of such communications
(newspapers, radio, parliamentary debates, and major public ad-
dresses) would identify the frequency with which the commitment
to development in the agricultural sector was communicated. The
specific nature of the commitment (whether in general terms or in
detailed references to crops or projects) could also be measured
*
The classic study of bureaucratic attitudes in an underde-
veloped country is Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern
Egypt: A Study of the Higher Civil Service (Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1957). A comparative study of attitudes
in three aid-related agencies in Taiwan appears in abbreviated
form in John D. Montgomery, Rufus B. Hughes, and Raymond H. Davis,
Rural Improvement and Political Development: The JCRR Model
(Washington: Agency for International Development, 1964), pp. 37-41.
Measuring a Government's "Will to Develop"
quantitatively. Such measures could probably not be used in making
international comparisons, but they would reflect trends in public
communications within any one country.*
The frequency and the intensity of contacts between govern-
ment and farmer-producers are still another measure of a govern-
ment's commitment to agricultural development (existing reports,
which are already standardized in many countries, would provide
part of the needed data), although the nature and content of these
contacts may be somewhat more difficult to classify. Studies of
such contacts over a period of time could be used both in interna-
tional analysis comparisons and in assessing change within a single
country.
The evidence presently available does not enable us either
to classify countries in terms of the intensity of their will to
develop or to correlate that will with other factors relevant to
the processes of development. But there seems to be enough con-
sistency in published data to justify further research in selected
countries and to warrant pilot studies of attitudes and communica-
tions to see if hypotheses drawn from the commitment of resources
in agriculture and education would be verified by other forms of
evidence.
We are encouraged to believe that further examination will
produce better definitions of the will to develop, both as a means
of measuring its presence and as an analytical and diagnostic
device in national planning.
*
See, for example, David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society
(Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 1961), and Philip E. Jacob and
James W. Toscana, eds., The Integration of Political Communities
(Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1964), especially pp.
83-84, 209-246.
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TABLE C-4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
ON AGRICULTURE AND OUTPUT OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Country
India
Japand
Argentinag
Burmai
GDP in
Year Agriculture
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1960
1961
1962
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1956
1957
1958
1960
1961
1962
55,200b
52,800
62,4oo
62,500
68,900
69,600
69,700
1,778.6e
1,985.9
2,201.2
58,ioo0h
130,389
159,700
170,800
218,390
2,o101i
2,269
2,T179
2,54o
2,7o4
2,795
Government
Expenditures
on Agriculture
2 , 5 14.4 0 c
2,671. 4o
2,465.80
2,464.90
2,988.60
3,329.10
3,535.60
189.6f
898.3
992.3
1,405.9 h
2,322.9
3,315.5
4,007.3
2,598.4
59-13k
74.30
137.25
37.49
47-59
40.79
Ratio of
Government
Expenditures
to Agricul-
tural Output
.0456
.0506
.0395
.0394
.o434
.0478
.0507
.l066
.4524
.4508
.0242
.0178
.0207
.0235
.0119
.0281
.0328
.0630
.0148
.0176
.o146
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Table C-4 (continued)
Country
Philippinesg
Thailand"
Year
1959
1960
1961
1962
1959
1960
1961
1962
GDP in
Agriculture
3,3841
3,523
3,858
4,246
17,7750
20,652
21,357
22,216
Government
Expenditures
on Agriculture
94.8m
110.9
127.9
122.7
348. oP
423.2
365.5
581.5
Ratio of
Government
Expenditures
to Agricul-
tural Output
.0280
.0315
.0332
.0290
.0196
.0205
.0171
.0262
aSources: United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts
Statistics, 1963 (New York, 1964); Statistical Abstracts of India
(New Delhi, 1960, 1961, 1962).
bMillions of rupees: net domestic product at current factor
cost.
cMillions of rupees: current and capital expenditures of the
central and state governments, including centrally administered
territories.
dSources: United Nations, Yearbook 
. . . 1963, cited; Japan,
Ministry of Finance, Budget Bureau, Japan Economic Yearbook (Tokyo,
1962).
eIn 000 million yen: net domestic product at current factor
cost.
1In 000 million yen.
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Table C-4 (concluded)
Sources: United Nations, Yearbook . . . 1963, cited, and
Statistical Yearbook, 1962 (New York, 1963).
hMillions of pesos.
'Sources: United Nations, Yearbook . . . 1963, cited; Economic
Survey of Burma, 1958 (Rangoon, 1959); Revolutionary Government of
the Union of Burma, Budget Estimates, 1962-63 (Rangoon, 1962).
iMillions of kyats: current factor cost, including fisheries
and forestry.
killions of kyats: including loans to farmers.
'Millions of pesos, current factor cost.
millions of pesos.
nSource: United Nations, Yearbook . . . 1963, cited.
0Millions of baht: current factor cost.
PMillions of baht.
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THE BUREAUCRACY AS A MODERNIZING ELITE:
CAN GOVERNMENT ROUTINES LEAD TO DEVELOPNENT?
by John D. Montgomery
The most dramatic increases in agricultural production have
occurred as a result of special efforts under gifted and dedicated
leadership. Task forces often succeed where conventional approaches
fail, sometimes for the very reason that they are exempt from con-
ventional limitations. But most agricultural development must take
place where task forces cannot reach; the need for improving con-
ventional approaches cannot be defined away.
A task force can concentrate on specific geographic or prob-
lem areas, and it can succeed nearly everywhere if there is the
necessary "will to develop" on the part of the national leader-
ship. Each such effort has its own element of uniqueness, but the
essential elements of these successes seem clear: inspired leader-
ship, support from the highest political authority, full participa-
tion of local leaders, coordination among different technical
approaches, and participation of staff members from appropriate
public and private agencies. Exploration of these and other general
principles, and of the various ways of applying the "plastic bag"
philosophy (as opposed to the more rigid, permanent "boxes" on an
organization chart), will indicate when the task-force approach can
be generally used. It seems probable that it would be useful in at
least two situations: those of greatest agricultural promise, where
major increases in productivity are desired; and those representing
the most difficult problems, where improvement is necessary to the
government for political or other reasons. The task-force approach
is adaptable to all levels of governmental operation.
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It is the conventional bureaucracy, however, that performs
the major role in promoting increased agricultural productivity.
It must provide technical and logistical support to any task forces;
it often supplies most of their personnel. Its opposition or in-
difference could hamper the effectiveness of task-force operations,
however skillfully led. Its continuing activities represent, and
it controls, the largest share of public resources in manpower and
capital devoted to the agricultural sector. It is responsible for
carrying out the rule of law, a role often deeply resented by
political leaders, who see procedure as delay rather than a form of
protection. The bureaucracy should not be neglected in any national
concentration of the agricultural effort on local task-force oper-
ations. It may represent a resource capable of equally important
development as an indirect contribution to agricultural productivity.
The limitations of the bureaucratic system in the less-
developed countries are well known. They are the subject of bitter
acrimony on the part of foreign advisers and domestic politicians.
It is safe to say that almost nobody loves a bureacracy. But the
limitations of bureaucratic effectiveness should not be laid to
moral deficiences, lack of good will, or sheer irrationality on
the part of the bureaucrats themselves. Like other social insti-
tutions, a national bureaucracy behaves as it does because of in-
ternal factors and external forces. These are not necessarily
immutable, and an examination of bureaucratic behavior patterns
and their causes may suggest ways of changing them. Bureaucracies
have changed in the past, as the history of U.S. Civil Service
legislation demonstrates and as recent postcolonial developments
in Ghana, Guinea, and China would suggest.
THE "PATHOLOGY"
The symptoms of "pathological" behavior of the bureaucracies
in the less-developed countries are to some extent recognizable as
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characteristics of any bureaucracy. Any listing of the most fre-
quently voiced complaints about a national civil service seems to
produce varying degrees of recognition and assent, no matter what
country is being described; and everyone--bureaucrats included--
seems ready to agree that these characteristics are an obstacle to
economic development, although no one thinks development can take
place without administration. Not all of these objectionable fea-
tures affect development, however, except perhaps in the negative
and general sense that they imply failure to reach maximum effi-
ciency and influence. Some symptoms were cited repeatedly during
the conference: resistance to change, rigid adherence to rules,
reluctance to delegate authority, sycophancy toward superiors, the
"target" mentality implying an indifference to "efficiency" and
the purposes behind rules, a "generalist" or "elitist" orientation
combined with hostility to technology (especially in the despised
field of agriculture), insistence on status and prestige symbols,
adherence to traditional relationships while desiring to appear
modern, overstaffing, corruption, xenophobia, and nepotism. These
attitudes and behavior patterns undoubtedly appear in varying de-
grees of intensity in many countries; amusing and horrifying
examples of each could be cited by almost anyone who has tried to
lure or bulldoze a bureaucracy into action on a large-scale
development operation.
Closer examination of such symptoms suggests that they may
be part of a larger system of interacting responses. These responses
may be grouped roughly into two categories: those relating to the
protection of the civil service as an institution, and those that
are individual responses to various perceived threats from within
and outside the bureaucracy. (See Chart 5.) In both cases changes
in the social order (including those associated with the process of
modernization) appear to be regarded as a potential threat to survival.
The whole social order that produced an elitist bureaucracy
(whether of the mandarinal, feudal, or colonial type) has gradually
changed, often to the disadvantage of the former elite groups. The
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Chart 5
BUREAUCRATIC SYNDROMES
The" Pathology "of Administration in Less-Developed Countries
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changing economy threatens the privileged position of a government
administrator as more and more of the basic decisions relating to
production and distribution begin to fall into other hands, whether
those of technicians, political leaders, or perhaps an increasingly
important private sector. Even the changing political situation may
threaten the bureaucracy as national (or ethnic) pride begins to
affect the staffing of the civil service. "Africanization," for
example, may mean new civil service standards as well as personnel,
and in a one-party state much of the routine decision-making author-
ity may shift to local party politicians. New cultural values
attached to modernization tend further to undermine the self-con-
fidence and authority of the traditional bureaucracy. It is small
wonder that the members of a bureaucratic system feel vaguely
threatened and seek to perpetuate their elitist claims while at
the same time formally adopting the purposes and forms of or-
ganization appropriate to a modern society.
In their individual response also, members of the bureauc-
racy feel threatened by the changes taking place about them. In
many countries the civil servant's family responsibilities--as
eloquently portrayed by Joyce Cary's Mister Johnson, for example--
are attenuated as public employment forces a family man to become
an individualist competing for advancement, and then rationalizes
his pay to a job-related scale. In return his family becomes re-
sentful at being denied its traditional share in the privileges and
duties of public office. Because politics and commerce open up new
routes to power, the civil servant often finds his career and even
his position threatened, or at least reduced in its importance and
opportunity. Even employment security is not what it once was in
countries where surplus employees suddenly find that they have no
automatic job tenure. Any shift toward an individualistic value
orientation threatens the civil servants who had previously found
protection in their family or in their status in the bureaucracy.
Any such classification of the interrelationships of bureau-
cratic behavior (and many others are possible) seems to lead to one
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fundamental conclusion: sometimes neither the civil service system
nor individual civil servants seem to consider the goals of agri-
cultural development as paramount, even if they are formally as-
signed to a ministry of agriculture. The problem in using existing
government agencies for development purposes is to find ways to re-
move these perceived threats and encourage more productive attitudes
and behavior. Although this is a problem of enormous difficulty, it
is not a hopeless one. Human institutions--even bureaucracies--can
improve, and institutional changes bring about changes in individ-
ual behavior. But resistance to any change that appears threatening
may be taken for granted; indeed, any change at all may be re-
sisted unless it seems reasonable and has strong and continuing
political support.
SOME "PRESCRIPTIONS": INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
The easiest changes to make in a bureaucracy are shifts of
leadership: getting a "new permanent secretary" who accepts the
desired development goals, backing him when he encounters resis-
tance, and keeping him in office long enough to carry out his
policies. Usually a strong leader in command of an organization
can select lieutenants who share his views: countless testimonials
can be cited to document the dramatic changes introduced by merely
getting the "right man at the top" and keeping him there. But
sometimes even the "right man" is helpless when pitted against the
system. Leadership changes that merely rotate civil servants among
suitable positions seldom achieve any significant reorientation in
the system, as the postwar purges of militarists from the civil
services in Japan and Germany demonstrate. Neither does the mere
assignment of new titles to an existing bureaucracy, as was done
under "indirect rule" in the British colonies. Changes in the func-
tioning of a bureaucracy and in its relationship to the society as a
whole are necessary if the old elite is to become a modernizing one.
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A more ambitious means of changing the bureaucratic institu-
tion is to reorganize it. The principles of rational organization
are too well known (or perhaps too irrelevant) to discuss here. Or-
ganization and reorganization should take place whenever changes in
the functions or relationships require them; many governments have
established "organization and management" offices to study such
problems (but they are often captured by special interest groups).
Formal reorganization may not have much influence on the actual
routines that seem to dominate bureaucratic behavior. It may even
become a delaying tactic itself. Moreover, the connection between
government organs and the private sector (even with government-
dominated corporations like the Sudan Plantations Syndicate or
the Gezira scheme) is often overlooked in organization charts
and civil service regulations. Important changes in organization
may not be reflected on formal charts at all, such as the intro-
duction of "participative" techniques that soften hierarchic
distinctions and make use of group deliberation as a means of
reaching decisions and establishing goals. Studies of such or-
ganizational approaches in American industry have demonstrated
their superiority in achieving high levels of productivity,
flexibility, and morale over sustained periods of time. The style
of management that involves frequent conferences between a super-
visor and his immediate subordinates, at which communication passes
freely in both directions, is adaptable to a wide variety of
situations. When under these circumstances new organizations and
position titles also convey a productivity or service orientation,
behavior as well as form begins to change. The staff conference
is sometimes--as in Northern Rhodesia--a radical change in the
sociology of the bureaucracy.
A third form of institutional change is in its incentive
system. Salaries in many countries are tied to years of service,
size of family, amount of education, and other factors that may
have only a casual relevance to the goals of development. The pay
scales involved may be so low that some form of supplementary graft
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or corruption is necessary if the civil servant is to achieve even
a modest living standard. In any case, the pay scales of adminis-
trators and technicians in the field of agriculture are usually
attached to a civil-service-wide schedule that cannot be changed
without inviting bankruptcy, especially in countries where the
civil service is padded as an indirect form of social security.
Thus if the governmental will to develop agriculture is real, the
only solution is to offer bonuses in the agricultural sector. (In
*
the SCIPA organization in Peru, for example, bonuses given in
addition to regular salaries brought about an 80 per cent pay in-
crease in three years.) In JCRR (Joint Commission on Rural Recon-
struction, Taiwan) the highest takehome pay of agricultural tech-
nicians is directly related to their productivity. If what is
desired is frequent trips to the villages on the part of the civil
servants, adequate travel expenses must be paid (a rarity in most
underdeveloped countries); if extension workers are expected to
live in villages lacking in amenities important to family life,
either some form of hardship allowance should be offered or
village assignments should be made an integral part of the career
ladder. Nonmonetary incentives can also become part of the civil
service system, especially where "participative" forms of organi-
zation have been introduced, where local units establish their own
goals, and where ways are found to reward appropriate performance.
The high esprit of JCRR in Taiwan probably resulted in part from
the financial rewards, prestige, and social approval offered as
performance incentives.
Some of the most profound changes in the institutions of
bureaucracy have to be introduced outside the civil service alto-
gether. One way to gain bureaucratic approval of development goals
is to give them social and political value. Creating public aware-
ness of the technological requirements of agricultural produc-
*
Servicio Cooperativo Inter-Americano de Produccidn de
Alimentos.
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tivity will help remove the contemptuous images of the farmer that
pervade the thought of the intelligentsia in many underdeveloped
countries. In some countries, changes in the educational system,
although slow in producing new manpower, have already shown that
the role and status of agriculture can be dignified. Changing entry
standards to the civil service (especially by deviating from the
traditional emphasis on law and literature) can offer new careers
to development-oriented candidates who could not qualify under the
traditional patterns of recruitment. Closer relations between the
central civil service and local government in the tradition-bound
rural sector can alter the attitudes of each in making use of the
resources the other can offer to agricultural development.
The above approaches to the bureaucracy as an institution
offer some hope of changing the behavior of individual civil
servants by reducing hampering ties to the past, by removing the
sense of insecurity of those capable of contributing to develop-
ment goals, and by creating an environment conducive to initiative
and innovation. Other devices may also be used more directly to
influence individual behavior.
MORE PRESCRIPTIONS: INDIVIDUAL CHANGE
Daniel Lerner and others have suggested that receptivity to
innovation requires a degree of "empathy," or awareness of styles
*
of life different from those of the immediate community. In the
case of the bureaucracy, the sense of empathy must be twofold:
that involved in appreciating village life, and that associated
with different styles of development administration. The role of
*
For example, Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional
Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: Free Press of
Glencoe, 1958).
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mass media in creating such empathy is well documented. Applying
the principle of empathy to an institution-bound bureaucrat would
suggest a program of interrelated activities, including travel, in-
service training in which new problems and approaches are discussed,
rotation between city and village assignments, the use of internal
communications, and the like. Few could quarrel with the proposition
that a precondition to adopting something new is awareness of its
existence.
Receptivity to innovation can be increased by enlisting in-
dividual participation in the search for new ideas. The well-worn
notion of the "suggestion box," with rewards commensurate with the
value of the suggestions, has been applied with surprising success
in Vietnam and other underdeveloped countries. The use of "brain-
storming" conferences as an in-service training device at all levels
is only an enlargement of the same concept and may be appropriate
in some bureaucratic societies. When employees find that progressive
attitudes lead to promotions and other rewards (SCIPA, in Peru,
includes references to the innovative role of agricultural tech-
nicians in personnel rating forms), their receptivity and perspec-
tives change markedly. Innovation for its own sake is not desirable,
to be sure; but the tradition of social punishment for innovators
is hard to change. (Berger tells of the ostracism inflicted by
the Egyptian bureaucracy on the discoverer of the solar ship that
made international headlines for the archaeological service.) One
innovating civil servant in Vietnam adopted the policy of intro-
ducing revolutionary changes in his agency (in this case, moving
from a rule-of-thumb bookkeeping system to computer accounting)
so that old routines were completely outmoded, and his staff was
forced to adopt fundamentally new procedures of postauditing. He
feared that the introduction of postaudit controls without changing
existing procedures would only double the red tape involved in
releasing funds for development purposes because the system would
"swallow" the innovation without abandoning the procedures it was
designed to replace. Another approach is to keep introducing in-
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novations at a fairly rapid pace so that routines never become
sacred. There is danger of "jamming" the system with too many
changes, of course, but that point is rarely reached in under-
developed countries.
Motivating civil servants to the goals of development is
almost as difficult as motivating farmer-producers to change their
traditional patterns of decision making. The risk that farmers must
take in accepting an innovation has its counterpart in the bureauc-
racy. One means of insuring against the risk of failure is to
socialize the experiences and the responsibility that each civil
servant takes, so that he no longer works in isolation. Frequent
meetings of local agricultural workers, attended by high-ranking
civil servants from headquarters, can remove the sense of isolation
and encourage meaningful exchange of experiences from the "firing
line" of innovation. When such meetings are rotated among villages,
each playing host in its turn, the role of the local worker is
dignified, and new attitudes may be introduced in the host villages
themselves. Inviting leading farmers to attend such meetings may
also create receptive attitudes toward the progressive elements in
the agricultural sector and help modify the traditional contempt
for the peasant.
The concept of "reverse influence" requires that higher civil
servants receive as well as transmit information. When they do,
their own attitudes change; the farmer-producers take on added
dignity; the governmental programs themselves begin to show greater
relevance to the needs of the agricultural sector. Delegation of
authority is possible when no "face" is lost, when the most appro-
priate centers of decision making in fact make the decisions, and,
in short, when mutual respect prevails between the bureaucrat and
the farmer. In part at least these conditions obtain when the flow
of communications is not impeded by artificial barriers. Changes in
bureaucratic attitudes and behavior can be observed just as readily
as among peasants or voters. Research into receptivity to innovations
on the part of the supposed instruments of modernization--the civil
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service--may be just as rewarding as studies of diffusion at the
farm.
None of the approaches suggested here can be offered in a
"package" program, to use a favorite conference term. The bureauc-
racy of each country is unique in its history, organization,
ability, and requirements. Nor is it prudent to expect that any-
thing approaching a controlled experiment in the manipulation of
bureaucracy can be undertaken. These insights--if such they be--
may imply appropriate forms of action in a variety of situations.
But they are no substitute for judgment, experience, and dis-
crimination on the part of the leadership of any country--and any
foreign adviser--that really intends to use civil servants in the
interests of agricultural development; and none can bring important
changes without strong political support. And they are no substi-
tute for a political will to develop.
Appendix E
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND ITS POTENTIAL ROLE
IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
by George M. Foster, Milton L. Barnett, and
Allan R. Holmberg
Behavioral science* research on problems of agricultural de-
velopment is justified on two main grounds: It can aid in finding
ways to increase agricultural production, and it can contribute to
the basic theoretical and practical inventory of knowledge dealing
with individual and group behavior that is a part of the scientific
infrastructure of every modern society. That is, this type of re-
search can help satisfy the professional needs of agricultural
specialists, and it can help satisfy the disciplinary goals of be-
havioral scientists.
Behavioral scientists are concerned with organized groups of
people--with societies; with the ways in which these groups pattern
the "rules of the game" whereby they achieve their goals--with cul-
tures; and with the nature of the interaction of the individual with
other individuals and with his society and culture--with personal-
ity. Behavioral scientists operate on certain assumptions, the most
important of which in the present context seem to be:
1. Sociocultural systems (any society with its culture) are
logically integrated, functional, sense-making units in which each
*
The term "behavioral science" is used in the sense of research
dealing with social, cultural, and psychological factors in agricul-
tural development. Although in a disciplinary sense the fields in-
volved are sociology, social anthropology, and social psychology,
the point of view here is essentially anthropological.
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part is related in a definite way to many other parts, fulfilling a
specific function, and important in the normal functioning of the
sociocultural system as a whole. A corollary of this assumption is
that a change in any aspect of the system implies a series of
changes in other aspects, and that the associated changes may have
both desirable and undesirable effects on the functioning of the
total system.
2. Sociocultural systems are characterized by patterned regu-
larities and similarities that are a function both of historical
development and of limited possibilities in structural forms. For
example, Spanish-American peasant societies show many similarities
to Spanish peasant groups, for historical reasons; but they also
show strong similarities to Pakistani peasant communities, because
there are limited possibilities in the formation of societies at a
particular level of complexity. These regularities in structure
(and in human behavior) make possible a certain amount of predic-
tion, which is essential in the planning of agricultural and other
developmental activities.
3. No two sociocultural systems are identical. Practically,
this means that although prediction in a broad sense is possible,
it cannot be assumed that an innovation that works well in one sys-
tem will automatically work well in another. Each system, in a
planned change setting, must be examined as a unique specimen as
well as a representative of a generic type.
With respect to increasing agricultural production, behavioral
scientists can recognize three major foci for their attention:
The socio-cultural-psychological system of the recipi-
ent peoples (usually farm communities in this context).
The socio-cultural-psychological system of the innova-
ting organization (usually a government or private bureaucracy).
The two systems as they interact. This is the level of
programs and projects.
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The significance of the relationship of the individual to the
two systems, and to the interacting systems, is implied in this
tripartite division.
With respect to research, and speaking now particularly of
anthropologists in agricultural programs, there are two main tasks:
The first is to determine the relationship of the agricultural sub-
system of a particular community to all other subsystems on which
it impinges. Stated in another way, this means identification of
the places and ways in which agricultural activities fit into the
total sociocultural matrix of the community. The second is to de-
termine the patterns of interpersonal relations among all people
who participate in a specific program. This means analysis of the
structure and function of the innovating bureaucracy, of the recip-
ient community, and of the activities that join the two systems in
a particular program.
An important point should be noted here: Socio-cultural-psy-
chological problems in agricultural development are not limited to
forms of communication, to public opinion, and to particular psy-
chological attitudes on the part of change agents and farmers.
While these are significant elements to be identified and measured,
the problem is much broader and involves basically an appreciation
of the relationship of subsystems (such as agriculture, religion,
leadership patterns, and values) to total systems. For example, agri-
culture in any community plays many roles and satisfies many needs
that are not primarily concerned with food and market sales. In the
planning of change, all these roles and needs should be recognized,
and the impact on them of proposed modifications should be analyzed,
as nearly as is possible, to determine possible harmful consequences
for which provision must be made.
Behavioral science research, whatever its particular practical
application may be in a given setting, has both structural and dy-
namic (or processual) dimensions. The structural dimension is the
social, cultural, and psychological matrix in which (in this case)
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farm activities are carried out. It is here that all the subsystems
of the society are identified, where agricultural activities, roles,
and functions are placed, and where relations between individuals
and groups of individuals are examined. The length of time needed
for this kind of research depends on the amount of prior general
research available for the community and nation. In a region for
which relatively good research data are available it is often pos-
sible to obtain the essential information needed for an agricultural
program in a remarkably short time. The types of data usually needed
for this kind of research are listed at the end of this appendix.
The dynamic or processual dimension, which is especially per-
tinent to ongoing agricultural programs, can be looked at in terms
of the barriers to change on the one hand and the incentives to
change on the other. The term "incentive" is actually defective,
since it suggests that the problem of changing behavior consists
largely of individual and group motivations in the innovation proc-
ess. In fact, the guestion is much broader in that the nature of
the basic sociocultural "fit" is very important. This refers to the
ways in which the several subsystems of a sociocultural system ar-
ticulate and mutually reinforce each other. The idea of incentives
and motivations alone does not suggest the range of factors in-
volved.
Contrary to widely held opinions, the behavioral sciences can
now speak with some degree of certainty about the nature of societies
and their dynamic processes, so that individual and group behavior
can be predicted in a number of areas. As illustrations, we know
that the following are significant influences in the process of
change:
1. Traditional reciprocal obligations and expectations that
bind kin, friendship, and neighborhood groups at the village level
often discourage progressive, innovative individuals who are faced
with the dilemma of continuing to divide their increased income in
the fashion expected of them or of risking censure and sanctions
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for failure to do so. Many peasants understand perfectly well that
technological improvements can increase their income, but they feel
they would gain little or nothing since this income must be dispersed
among a great many people.
2. The size and composition of groups have a great deal of
bearing on the kinds of activities that can be carried out. There
is usually a critical mass, an optimum size that, if achieved, per-
mits activities otherwise difficult to carry out. In Japanese War
Relocation Camps, for example, it was found that by permitting face-
to-face relationships in blocks of about 300 people, organization
and activity were accomplished that proved impossible when the total
camp of several thousand persons was viewed as the basic social
unit.
3. Symbolic representations vary greatly between cultures,
and misperceptions often follow when visual aids used in one soci-
ety are transferred to another. For example, in a T.B. campaign in
Southern Rhodesia posters showing a crocodile, which to a European
suggested the great danger of T.B., were interpreted by Africans as
meaning that crocodiles cause T.B. and that one should therefore
avoid crocodiles!
It is clear that the following motivations are of special im-
portance in changing behavior:
Perception of economic gain, a significant part of
which remains with the progressive individual (that is, is
not drained off in fulfillment of traditional obligations).
The desire to achieve prestige and status.
The desire to please the change agent who, by the
mere fact of being in a community for some time, becomes
involved in patterns of reciprocal friendship that entitle
him to cooperation from his new friends.
These motivations appear to be universal. Other motivations
may be said to be culture-bound, in that they are significant in
some places and less so in others. Religion is an example.
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These are some of the kinds of contributions behavioral sci-
ences can make to agricultural programs through research. There re-
mains the question of how this can be done, of the organization of
resources that is most suited to this task. In general, two broad
categories of research are necessary. The first deals with general
anthropo-sociological-psychological analyses of typical communities
and (hopefully) bureaucracies. These analyses should be general
rather than specific, undirected toward particularly practical prob-
lems, and designed to cover the widest range of human phenomena.
Research of this type provides scientific capital and, depending on
its adequacy, permits rapid research on the practical, applied level.
This is the level at which general theory is pushed forward, at
which basic hypotheses about society and culture are generated with-
out regard to action programs. It is important to note that this
level of research is equally important to other fields such as
health and medicine, education, and rural or community development.
The second broad category is that in which this general knowl-
edge is examined and augmented and pointed toward the solution of
specific problems. Popularly this is thought of as applied re-
search, although in fact this is a limiting concept, since basic
contributions to theory often are forthcoming through feedback.
The "clinical" model has properly been suggested (as against the
"engineering" model) to reflect the relationship between behavioral
science theory and research.
Much, but by no means all, of this level of research may be
quite properly integrated with agricultural programs. The research
should be geared to the needs of the program as determined in agri-
cultural terms. Many of the same facilities used for agronomic re-
search should include behavioral science research, and technicians
and research scientists in the several specialty fields involved
must come to understand the goals and needs of their colleagues.
Since behavioral scientists must research the innovating bureauc-
racy as well as the client group, this "participant observation"
through teamwork is an especially valuable technique.
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The behavioral scientist, and especially the anthropologist,
also has a basic operational role at this level: He is the most ef-
fective communicator between farmer and bureaucracy. In underdevel-
oped countries there is no effective feedback mechanism between
peasants and bureaucrats and between low-level and high-level
bureaucrats. The village agricultural agent may have excellent un-
derstanding of peasants, their psychology, their needs and desires,
but if these involve criticism of his superiors--as is sometimes
the case--he is reluctant to pass along such disturbing information.
After all, in order to advance in his bureaucracy he must please
his superiors rather than the peasants. And, even at best, he usu-
ally has such a number of activities, and such a large area to
cover, that he has little time to discuss matters in the tenta-
tive and leisurely way characteristic of villagers.
The field anthropologist, on the other hand, is often the
only person whose role permits him to sit and listen to peasants as
long as they wish to talk, and who wants to draw them out in the
greatest detail possible. Moreover, his prestige and status permit
him to report disturbing as well as satisfying information to the
top levels of his bureaucracy. Hence at the operational level the
anthropologist's presence at the research institute, or as a team
member, is highly important.
LIST OF NEEDS IN SOCIO-CULTURAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL DATA
ABOUT COMMUNITIES IN AN AGRICULTURAL PROJECT AREA
Basic physical-demographic:
1. Population, land settlement (size of units, dispersal,
distances between, relations to market and administrative
towns).
2. Land tenure and attitudes toward same.
Basic technologies, materials, and their sources.
Principal occupations:
1. Distribution by villages and areas.
2. Nature of vested interest groups.
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Social structure:
1. Families, nature of roles, obligations, size, extension.
Unilinear segments such as clans?
2. Concept of friendship, fictive kinship, roles, obliga-
tions.
3. General nature of reciprocal obligations:
a. Horizontal--between people of same status--tradi-
tional cooperative units.
b. Patron-client.
c. Other.
4. Caste and class patterns.
Political structure:
1. Locus of authority. Basic description of system.
2. Techniques by which political leaders achieve position.
3. Decision-making processes (election, council of elders,
consensus, etc.).
4. Relationship of local political structure to larger units.
Where does control really lie?
5. Concept of authority--who legitimately exercises it?
Law:
1. Nature and extent of conflict (e.g., factions, individual
quarrels).
2. Conflict-resolving techniques.
3. What constitutes settlement of a quarrel? ("justice"? I
restoration of status quo?).
Religion:
1. Leaders and influence.
2. Limitations stemming from dogma and doctrine (e.g., Catho-
lics and birth control, Buddhists and pesticides).
3. Basic cultural values stemming from religion.
4. Role of religious activities--entertainment, instrumental
in curing, in farm magic?
5. Superstitions, magic.
Behavioral Science Research 293
Communication and mobility:
1. Literacy, radio, newspapers, etc.
2. Possible language problems (multiple languages).
3. Seasonal and other migration to mines, cities--families
have relatives in cities?
Basic "patterns" of society and culture:
1. For example, "balance" in Latin America in wealth, folk
medicine, etc.
2. Cognitive orientation and world view (perception of role
of government and individuals).
3. Basic "values"; aspirations of people.
Dynamics:
1. Patterns of innovation--motivations to change.
2. Resistances to change.
3. "Natural" leaders--who is a "respected individual"?
4. Can innovation-prone individuals be identified?
5. Can innovation-prone villages be identified?
Health:
1. Folk medical beliefs and practices.
2. Vital statistics--basic indexes on health and morbidity.
Socialization:
1. Learning processes in context of this community.
2. Inculcation of dominant values; implicit assumptions about
conditions of life of the group.
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Appendix F
LAND REFORM
by Wolf I. Ladejinsky
Land reform deals with the adjustment of a cultivator's rela-
tions to the land in a land tenure system. When the system of land
tenure in predominantly agricultural countries provides the culti-
vator with a reasonable reward for his efforts, it stands for eco-
nomic, social, and political stability in the countryside and very
often, and by the same token, in the country as a whole. The obverse
is true when the system of landholding denies the cultivator the
conditions under which he can secure for himself a reward for his
labor commensurate with his role as a producer. In the main, and
with more recent notable exceptions such as Japan, Taiwan, and
Egypt, the latter condition still prevails in many parts of Asia,
Latin America, and the Near East. This state of affairs was accepted
as "normal" only a few decades ago, but this is no longer the case.
The pressure for change in the status quo has been rising and most
countries beset by tenure problems are now preoccupied with the cru-
cial issue of how to change their land tenure systems in greater
consonance with the improvement of the cultivator's standard of
living, the improvement of the land, and greater agricultural pro-
ductivity. The issue is the more difficult because, at least in
Asia, the scale of farming is very small, and particularly so on
tenant-operated farms. One to three fragnented acres is often the
rule. Although Japan and Taiwan have managed to create a technology
and economic and social institutions to suit their conditions, for
the greater part of Asia this is still a far cry from reality. More
often than not they are "uneconomic farms," uneconomic in the sense
that they fall below the subsistence minimum rather than the tech-
nical optimum.
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THE PRESENT CONDITION
The current search for adjustment of the land tenure systems
stems from the circumstances under which vast numbers of farmers
live and work somebody else's land. The principal features that
characterize the tenants' plight are stagnating agricultural econo-
mies; scarce land, yet concentrated in few hands; low yields but
high rents; poor farmers but expensive farms; too many people liv-
ing on too little land, and small holdings get smaller under rising
pressure of population with no alternative occupations; inadequate
tools, indebtedness and usury, malnutrition and illiteracy; keen
competition among the peasants seeking scarce land in the hands of
the relatively few who have it; absence of any chance for advance-
ment within agriculture; little margin for risk-taking; and subsist-
ence farming with a lack of dynamic or regenerative capacity.
Many of these conditions are due to institutional land ar-
rangements over which the peasant has no control. An exploitative
system of tenancy prevails in most countries of the underdeveloped
world. Rack renting and insecurity of tenure are its hallmarks; and
governments and their judicial bodies have given official sanction
to this type of tenant-landlord relationship through the centuries.
The farmers have been obliged to pay exorbitant rentals because the
compelling need for any kind of employment depresses wages and
raises rents. Nor is their contract of tenancy, which is supposed
to ensure security of tenure for the tenant for a specified period,
often worth the paper it is written on. In most cases the contracts
are oral. But whether written or oral, they can be abrogated at the
whim of the landlord. The incentive to improve the land and produce
more does not exist, nor is there a place for creative technology
on a wide scale. To the extent that these conditions preclude a
measure of equalization of opportunities they stifle progressive
impulses and tend to underwrite stagnation in agriculture.
Farmers have never been satisfied with this state of affairs.
They have often expressed their discontent overtly against persons
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and governments that they believed were the causes of their dis-
tress. But in the main, until the end of World War II, in Asia,
Latin America, and the Middle East the conservatism and inertia of
the farmer and his ingrained feudal subservience to the state and
the landlord kept the pot from boiling over. More recently, and at
least in part under the threat of communism, the bonds that kept
the peasant down are loosening under rising agrarian discontent,
both covert and overt. Country after country is struggling with
these problems: how to relieve the plight of cultivators working
for a pittance; how to revive depressed agricultural economies; how
to root the peasant securely and beneficially on the land he culti-
vates. These problems have close bearing on agricultural productiv-
ity and economic development in general.
THE MEANING OF AGRARIAN REFORM
The answer to the questions posed is broadly known as "agrar-
ian reform." The term conveys many things to many people. To the
Communists, agrarian reform is simple enough: It is a means to po-
litical power, based on a promise to the peasant of the one thing
he wants most--ownership of the landlord's land--in exchange for
his badly needed political support. To the non-Communist world
agrarian reform involves such issues as who owns or does not own
land, how it is used, who gets what out of the land, the productiv-
ity of the land, the rate of economic development, and, addition-
ally, social status and political power.
No single panacea will deal with all these issues effectively.
In conditions of rural poverty even redistribution of the land will
not suffice unless it is accompanied by the necessary means to work
and improve the land. It follows that countries that carry out land
redistribution programs must make great efforts to increase agri-
cultural investment, particularly if their rate of population in-
crease is fast. The economic opportunity and psychological incen-
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tives that come with possession of the land or security of tenure
must go hand in hand with a host of other developmental measures.
For this reason agrarian reform in the sense considered here encom-
passes all or most of the following elements: distribution of land
among the landless; security of tenure and fair rents; better meth-
ods of cultivation through technological improvements, adequate
credit, cooperative marketing; and other measures. However, it must
be stressed that not all these elements are of equal importance.
The most important is landownership. If this is absent, all else
may prove ephemeral, including security of tenure and rent reduc-
tion--measures extremely difficult to enforce. This explains why in
the final analysis the issue is one of land to the landless. This
is the real vehicle of security and opportunity upon which a more
resourceful economy can be built.
THE CONTENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
In most instances the content of enabling reform legislation
is twofold: security of tenure and rent reduction, and the redis-
tribution of land among the tenants. In Asia, except Japan and
Taiwan, great stress is laid on security of tenure and rent reduc-
tion, while in the Middle East and Latin America the stress is on
land redistribution and the creation of peasant proprietorship. No
country approaches the content of either main measure in the same
way, but the meaning of its approach depends upon the answer to
this basic question: For whose benefit and for how large a group of
beneficiaries is the reform designed? If the reform is indeed one
for the benefit of the great majority of the tenants its specific
content and its enforcement will differ substantially from a reform
attempting to satisfy both landlord and tenant in the difficult
conditions of scarcity of land, land monopoly, pressure of the farm
population on the land, high rentals, high land values, and sub-
sistence and unremunerative farming. The Japanese and Taiwanese
reforms reflect a thoroughly pro-tenant attitude. Hence they empha-
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sized ownership of land for the majority of tenants through the
abolition of absentee ownership altogether and a low permissible
retention of land (ceiling) for resident landlords; genuine secu-
rity of tenure and low rentals for the remaining tenants; arbitrary
and low valuation of land prices; easy repayment terms; and a type
of enforcement in which the tenants play a major role in order to
ensure a minimum of evasion of the principal provisions of the re-
form legislation. These reforms involved drastic redistribution of
property, income, political power, and social status at the expense
of the landlords. This was the purpose of the reforms, the basic
proposition being that half measures or attempts to satisfy both
parties could not bring about conditions under which those who cul-
tivate the land would enjoy the fruit of their labor.
SECURITY OF TENURE AND RENT REDUCTION
It is axiomatic that great population pressure on scarce land
brings about keen competition for the right to cultivate a plot of
land. The result is that rents are high and security of tenure is
low. Rents in Asia, for instance, of 50, 60, or 70 per cent of the
crop are conmon even when the landlord contributes only the land
while all other elements of production are furnished by the tenants.
In such circumstances the bargaining power is all on the side of
the landlords; they are not obliged, and cannot be compelled, to
give tenants binding security of tenure for a specified period of
time. Insecurity of tenure combined with high rents adversely af-
fect agricultural productivity, not to speak of the tenant's wel-
fare. If this situation is to be reversed, a situation must be
created that leads to a reasonable ratio between the farmer's share
in the effort and costs of production and his share in the crop
produced. Coupled with this must be the appreciation of the fact
that the margins of subsistence are so narrow that tenants can af-
ford little risk; any innovation in production practices that goes
wrong may result in starvation.
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Rent reduction and security of tenure is one form of agrarian
reform. Existing reforms do not reveal any common standard upon
which a reasonable rental may be based. Each country, or in the
case of India each state, deals with the problem in its own way.
Some maximum rentals are 25 per cent of the crop in Japan, 37.5 per
cent in Taiwan, 50 per cent in Nepal, and, in India, from 16 to 50
per cent. The "why" of the range of these rents stems from the natu-
ral assumption that the smaller the rent the greater is the benefit
to the tenant. They have virtually nothing to do with an apportion-
ment of rent among the various factors that go into the growing of
a crop. Rents are of either the "fixed" type, a stated quantity
regardless of the harvest, or the crop-sharing type, a percentage
of the crop. From the point of view of the tenant, crop-sharing
makes sense where there is the danger of recurring crop failure,
but it has a disincentive effect upon the tenant. Rent regulations
under a reform tend, though not always, to effect shifts from crop-
sharing to fixed rents, thereby providing the tenant with greater
incentive. The problem with rent reductions of whatever type is
that they are difficult to enforce. Japan and Taiwan have succeeded
in enforcing them as they have much else, but they are very special
exceptions rather than the rule. This applies particularly in areas
such as India and Indonesia where there is fierce competition for
any plot of land in order to eke out any kind of living.
Security of tenure is part and parcel of rent reduction, and
all reform legislation aims to give stronger protection to a ten-
ant's occupancy rights. Like rents, such measures vary considerably
although they have such common prescriptions as written leases,
specified periods of occupancy, and compensation for useful improve-
ments.
TENANT RIGHTS ON TAIWAN
Taiwan, more than any other country concerned with the prob-
lem, provides the best tenant occupancy rights. The Taiwanese law
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provides that farm lease contracts (of six years' duration) shall
not be terminated before their expiration except under any one of
the following conditions:
1. If the tenant dies without an heir.
2. If the tenant waives his right of culti-
vation by migrating elsewhere or changing his occu-
pation.
3. If the tenant fails to pay a total of two
years' rent.
Such safeguards extend to tenants even after the expiration of the
lease. The law provides that the landlord cannot take back the
leased land for his own cultivation on the expiration of the con-
tract if any one of the following conditions exist: the landlord
cannot till the land himself; the landlord's income is sufficient
to support his family; or the landlord's action in taking back the
land deprives the tenant's family of its subsistence.
For all practical purposes this means that tenants can remain
on the land undisturbed even after the expiration of the contract,
which in Taiwan virtually ensured the enforcement of the rental pro-
vision. Less carefully worded stipulations might have undermined
this part of the reform program. In India, for example, the provi-
sion that a landlord can take back land for "personal cultivation"
has proved to be a serious drawback in enforcing security of tenure
and rent provisions.
LAND REDISTRIBUTION
There are regulated tenancies in the United States, England,
and even in India that so protect the tenant that he prefers to in-
vest in capital goods to improve the land rather than in buying
land. But this is not true in most parts of Asia, the Middle East,
and Latin America. What the farmer wants is a piece of land of his
own. To the Japanese farmer, one without land is one without a soul.
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This mystique about landownership may not be so aptly expressed in
other countries, but its validity is there no matter how expressed.
Prevailing tenurial conditions suffice to explain it. Where tenants
are plentiful and poor and land is scarce, regulated tenancies are
almost impossible to enforce. Japan and Taiwan have succeeded, but
they are very special exceptions to the rule. Ecamples to this ef-
fect are too numerous to cite here. In one case, that of India, an
unwise attempt to regulate tenancies led to still greater insecu-
rities and the driving of tenants to the very bottom of the agricul-
tural ladder, to the rank of agricultural laborers.
The arguments are strong for the diffusion of ownership among
the tenants as the main purpose of agrarian reform. As we shall
see later, enforcement of a land distribution program in Asian
conditions is no easy task either. Yet one cannot but agree with a
student of the problem that, "administratively, there is virtually
no question but that a system of owner-cultivatorship in which the
basic distinction between 'mine' and 'thine' can be marked out on
the ground is much simpler to administer than a system of regulated
tenancies." This of course assumes that a government, in the first
place, devotes itself single-mindedly to the promotion of this kind
of a program. There is another reason why agrarian reform should
stress ownership. Agricultural practices on most of the would-be
new-owner farms need improvement, and this means new investments.
Financial institutions, even if they are public, make a distinction
between owned land and leased land in making loans. In the first
case land is the security for obtaining investment, but this is not
so in regulated tenancies with their continuous shifting of rights
and duties between landlord and tenant.
THE IAND CEILING
There are reforms the sole purpose of which is security of
tenure and reduction of rent (Nepal), but in most countries, redis-
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tribution of land and the establishment of new owner-farmers is the
main objective. This aims toward abolition of tenancy altogether.
The immediate problem of reform makers then is to secure enough
land to endow a given number of tenants with land of their own. The
core of it is the "ceiling." The landlord is permitted to retain a
certain amount of land (ceiling), the remainder being earmarked for
redistribution among the landless. It is the size of the ceiling
that determines how far-reaching the program might be, always assum-
ing that the ceiling is enforced.
Since countries have varying amounts of land available and
varying scales of tenancy, it is understandable that the ceiling
should differ from country to country. More fundamental, however,
is the fact that in some countries the ceiling is made to serve the
objective of widespread ownership whereas in others the ceiling can
become a device to defeat this objective. In Japan and Taiwan the
ceiling was so set that it encompassed all the land of the absentee
owners and permitted (in Japan) the resident landowner to retain
only 2.5 acres. This is an instance of a ceiling cutting to the very
bone of the landlord's holding. It cuts less deeply in South Vietnam
with a ceiling of 250 acres, apparently deeply in Iran where a land-
lord is permitted to retain only one village out of many, while in
India the great variety of ceilings might have served their purpose
except for lack of enforcement and widespread evasion.
Clearly what matters in extending ownership is not only at
what level the ceiling is set but also that it not be evaded. The
cases of Japan and Taiwan on the one hand and Pakistan on the other
are instructive. The low ceiling in the first two countries made it
possible to extract a great deal of surplus land for redistribution.
Before the reforms 54 per cent of Japan's land had been owner oper-
ated, and after the reform the figure rose to 92 per cent; the re-
spective figures for Taiwan were 60 and 85 per cent. West Pakistan
is not Japan or Taiwan, but fixing a ceiling of 500 irrigated acres
and 1,000 unirrigated acres in a country where the land of two
thirds of the farmers averaged five acres each was not really a
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measure for land redistribution. Moreover, exceptions and subdivi-
sions of large holdings among members of a family were permitted on
the eve of the reform. This, combined with the high ceiling, meant
that the land distribution program was divested of any meaning. It
appears that if a ceiling is to provide the landless with land it
must be set at a low level; the acreage retained by the landlord
must be fixed retroactively, or on a date well in advance of the
reform, and; finally, the ceiling must be fixed on the basis of land
owned by a household rather than an individual. With a low ceiling,
no evasions, and effective implementation, large numbers of tenants
can become farmer-proprietors.
THE LANDLORD'S HOLDING
Unless a reform is confiscatory--and the ones considered here
are not--the question of how much to pay for the land earmarked for
redistribution is of great importance. Various countries approach
this crucial issue in different ways. Usually the value of the land
for compensation purposes has been derived from one or a combina-
tion of factors such as valuations shown in land tax records, re-
corded land revenues, rent collected, landlord's net income, or
value of produce. But one thing is common to most of them: Prevail-
ing market prices are seldom accepted as the basis of valuation. If
they are considered, it is only as a yardstick for sharp deviation
downward. Even where the intent is clearly not to penalize expro-
priated owners but rather to compensate them adequately for their
loss, they are not in the same position as a person under no legal
pressure to sell, free to negotiate on the open market for the best
available price. This puts the compensation outside the market in
the strictest sense. Land prices in underdeveloped and densely popu-
lated areas are commonly very high, bearing no relation to the pro-
ductive value of the land. Low assessments of agricultural land,
comparatively low land taxes, and negligence in tax collections
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have frequently been the main reasons for high market values, par-
ticularly in areas with high population pressure on the land. Added
to this are such factors as the social and political prestige and
influence gained from the possession of land, and a favored tax po-
sition compared with that of investors in commerce or industry. The
combination of all these elements has made land values unrealisti-
cally high, a fact that must be faced by reformers in deciding what
to pay for the land to be purchased from the landlords for distribu-
tion among tenants.
In Japan the price of land was fixed by capitalizing the an-
nual rent in a manner to ensure a fair profit for the farmer buy-
ing the land (taking into consideration that all rice save his own
consumption was collected by the government at fixed prices). In
practice this meant 40 times the rental value of a rice field and
48 times the rental value of an upland field. These cash rents were
quite low compared to a price level augmented by inflation. In Tai-
wan the government decided that a landlord would get 2.5 times the
annual value of all crops on a given piece of land. In Italy, as-
sessed valuations shown in the land tax records served as a basis
of pricing. A number of Indian states used annual tax revenue or
net income from the land as a base. But whatever the existing method
of pricing, with rare exceptions the price is fixed below the market
price. The fact is that land purchase under a reform is not an ordi-
nary real estate transaction where seller, broker, and buyer meet
in a free market. If it were, and if tenants were able to pay the
"going price," there would be no need for reform. It may be con-
cluded that the price fixed by a government is an arbitrary one,
the degree of arbitrariness depending upon how a reformer answers
the question already referred to: "For whose benefit is the reform
designed?"
METHODS OF PURCHASE AND REPABINT
There is ample evidence that in order to bring about a land
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redistribution program a government must buy the land and resell it
to the tenant rather than institute direct landlord-tenant nego-
tiations. This procedure rests on the proposition that where land
is at a premium and the economic and political power of a landlord
is strong, the bargaining power of the tenant vis-a-vis the land-
lord is so weak that an agreement can be reached only on the land-
lord's terms. The two decades of Japanese paper reforms before World
War II amply demonstrate this point. This is true in other countries
in Asia where purchase transactions are left in the hands of land-
lord and tenant. In the long run this means prohibitive prices--and
no sales--which explains why landlords are usually compelled to
sell a certain amount of land at officially fixed prices.
How a government pays for the distributed land is of great
importance to government, landlord, and tenant alike. Experience
shows that a government, no matter what the price, is not in a po-
sition to pay for the land in cash in one lump sum; Colombia and
Venezuela are perhaps the only exceptions to the rule. Payments to
the landlord are made mostly in interest-bearing bonds spread over
a period of years, with cash seldom exceeding 10 per cent of the
fixed price of the land. Madras State and the Philippines are excep-
tions. In the latter a maximum of 50 per cent of the compensation
may be paid in cash and the remainder in land certificates, except
that full payment in cash is made in certain cases of expropriation
through the courts. However, very little land has been thus ac-
quired, especially since land acquisitions are based on "fair mar-
ket value." Payment through bonds, extended over periods of twenty
years or more and bearing an interest rate of 3.5 to 5 per cent,
has eased budgetary difficulties and has served to avoid the infla-
tionary impact of large cash disbursements. In some countries the
bonds are negotiable and redeemable in equal annual installments,
or the bonds can be used for the purpose of industrial and commer-
cial investment, for the payment of taxes, and such.
Taiwan's case is unique. To avoid the effects of inflation,
which resulted in virtual confiscation in Japan, Taiwan tied the
Land Reform
price of land to the prices of two principal products of the land
and to shares of stock in government-owned industrial undertakings.
This meant that 70 per cent of the compensation was in the form of
commodity bonds payable in 20 semiannual installments over a period
of ten years, and 30 per cent was paid outright in stocks. This
method worked well for all parties concerned. The commodity bonds
preserved the value of the sales price against fluctuations in the
value of the currency for a ten-year period. And an estimated 40
per cent of the total compensation found its way into industrial
and business investments. This is perhaps the only known case of an
agrarian reform that has consciously planned and succeeded in trans-
ferring private capital formerly tied up in the land into the gen-
eral developmental field.
The methods of repayments to the governments by the former
tenants vary from country to country, but the underlying principle
is that the payments must not constitute an excessive burden on the
new owner. A government's annual recovery from the new owner must
be less than his former rent. Usually repayments by tenants and pay-
ments by governments for the acquired land are extended over a
similar period of years. Since all governments are eager to recover
their original outlays, they aim to strike an annual balance between
what they pay out and what they take in. This does not necessarily
work in practice because of changes in the economic conditions of
the farm community; a government's decision to charge (or not to
charge) to the new owners the administrative costs of a reform; and,
above all, the fact that some governments have realized that, if
land redistribution is to be viable, heavy investments are needed
to improve the land and to create infrastructure to help the new
owners during the formative years of the reform. The recovery of
these extra costs is not often charged to the new owners directly.
On the whole the record of repayments is good. This must be
attributed to the relatively easy terms set by the governments in
question. In Italy, for example, a new owner under the reform pays
an annual sum equivalent to $19 per acre, on the average, as against
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$40-$50 per acre on similar, nonreform land. In Venezuela the new
owners amortize in twenty to thirty yearly installments a predeter-
mined proportion of the cost of the land; improvements and the first
year's working capital are provided by the government as a gift. In
Egypt repayment is in forty annual installments, and, though the
farmers are also charged 1.5 per cent interest per annum and 10 per
cent for administrative costs, the sum total of annual recovery is
considerably below the level of prereform rent. It is clear that
even with good recovery, reform imposes budgetary strains on a gov-
ernment. Two facts must be kept in mind, however. One is that an
agrarian reform is not an ordinary commercial enterprise but one
involving social justice and political stability, an investment in
the future of the nation's people. Second, if the assumption is
correct, as it seems to be, that agrarian reform does lead to an
increase in agricultural productivity, then it is reasonable to say
that eventually the government and the country as a whole will more
than recoup the investments called for by the initiation of a re-
form and its support during the early years.
IMPLEMENTATION AND THE POLITICAL CLIMATE
Effective enforcement rather than reform legislation, however
well drawn, makes the difference between reform in being and reform
on paper. There are too many of the latter kind in the regions under
consideration. The agrarian reform movement in Asia anticipated most
of those in the Middle East and in Latin America, but this advantage
in time did not bring about uniformly good results. With the excep-
tion of Japan and Taiwan, the picture of Asia leaves much to be
desired. The landlords' property in South Korea has found its way
into the hands of the tenants, but the government's failure to come
to the financial assistance of the new owners has brought about in-
different results. The civil war in South Vietnam caused that re-
form to be short-lived. The Burmese tenants are owner-farmers now,
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but government after government has failed to capitalize upon this
and develop the rich lana resources of the country. The Philippines
has four reform failures on its record and is trying now for the
fifth time with no greater prospects for success than heretofore.
West Pakistan and Indonesia have proclaimed reform but with hardly
any implementation, while Nepal, after a dozen years of cogitation,
is just barely taking the first step. Finally, there is India, sig-
nificant and encouraging for what it has attained in unprecedentedly
difficult and bewildering conditions, and just as significant and
discouraging for what it has failed to attain, and for the reasons
why.
None of this has anything to do with ignorance of the ten-
antry's conditions or inability to draft legislation to meet those
conditions. Even Nepal, a closed and remote society only yesterday,
is skilled enough to write good measures--if it wants to. Surely
the same can be said of every country where reform has failed. A
number of reasons explain this state of affairs. To begin with there
may be insufficient administrative and technical skill to mount a
reform; but this is not a crucial issue, and failure to implement a
reform cannot be attributed to it. More to the point are inadequate
measures or half measures deliberately drafted so as to retard--if
not obstruct altogether--the application and implementation of a
reform; absence of leadership among the peasants to propagate the
reform idea and exert effective pressure on legislative bodies; dis-
interestedness--if not overt opposition--on the part of intellec-
tuals and molders of public opinion; and, most important, the built-
in opposition to reform by the landlords, whose role in the body
politic is out of all proportion to their numerical strength. This
combination of factors inhibiting reform is hard to overcome.
Landownership as the main point of an agrarian reform is dif-
ficult to achieve. Examples are legion, and the reason is not far
to seek. Land redistribution under agrarian reform is a compulsory
measure imposed by a government upon the landowners on economic and
legal terms unpalatable to them. In effect this involves a drastic
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redistribution of property and income at the expense of the land-
lords. It becomes a revolutionary measure when it passes property,
political power, and social status from one group in the society to
another. This is a real meaning of an agrarian reform where land
redistribution is its central objective. Considering the fact that
in the areas under discussion legislative assemblies are still
dominated by land-propertied classes, it is not difficult to see
why both the enactment of appropriate legislation and its enforce-
ment present such formidable problems. Thus land reform, despite
its economic implications, commences as an essentially political
question involving a most fundamental conflict of interests between
the "haves" and the "have-nots."
WHO MAKES AGRARIAN REFORM?
No matter how ripe a country may be for agrarian reform, it
does not follow that an agrarian reform then occurs. Nor does en-
actment of a reform always meet popular aspirations in terms of so-
cial justice and better distribution of rights and opportunities
among the landless. The dragging of the feet on the part of govern-
ments and legislative assemblies in enacting reforms is notorious.
Technical expertise in preparing and administering the necessary
legislation is indispensable, but experts do not make reforms. Pol-
iticians, and only politicians, make good or poor reforms or do not
make them at all. They control the political climate, which deter-
mines the will or lack of will to proceed with the task; the spe-
cific measures with which the reform is or is not endowed; the care
or lack of care with which the enabling legislation is formulated;
the preparation or lack of preparation of the pertinent and admin-
istrative services; the presence or absence of technical services
with their bearing upon the success or failure of the reform; and,
most important, the drive or lack of drive behind the enforcement
of the provisions of the law. The "positive" makers of reform must
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represent strong political leadership deeply concerned with the
land and its cultivators and capable of translating those concerns
into action. There is no substitute for this kind of leadership at
the crucial stage of determining a reform's main goal and initiat-
ing it. The financial, technical, and administrative needs of a re-
form can prove to be formidable obstacles to its initiation and en-
forcement. Nevertheless experience shows--and India provides a num-
ber of illustrations--that they are not insurmountable difficulties
if the concerted will of political leadership is brought to bear.
The built-in landlord opposition, abetted by public servants, can
be dealt with successfully if the political leadership is bent on
carrying out its goals. This is especially important because the
peasantry has not developed a popular political movement of its own
capable of effectively representing and advocating its own cause.
THE CASE OF INDIA
India, which has done both much and little, demonstrates how
much can be accomplished when will and determination are present
and how little can be attained if they are absent. India's reform
objectives were twofold: first, the abolition of the zamindari sys-
tem;* second, security of tenure, reduction of rent, and distribu-
tion of land to the landless. Despite opposition and administrative
and technical problems, the zamindari tenures were virtually abol-
ished. Not all have benefited equally, and not all the 20 million
cultivators affected have received permanent, heritable, and trans-
ferable rights. Nevertheless the effort was a major step toward a
*
The zamindari system was a product of early British rule. The
zamindar was given the right to collect land taxes and undertook to
pay the British administration a fixed revenue. In return he was
not only permitted to keep a portion of the revenue but was also
recognized as the proprietor of the revenue-bearing land.
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reconstruction of Indian agriculture. The measure succeeded because
it was politically popular to abolish an agricultural system full
of abuses imposed by a foreign power. With the British gone, the
government went about drafting the necessary legislation; the zamin-
dars were disestablished despite the opposition of the landlords,
lack of financial means, and insufficient administrative and tech-
nical staff. Not every t was crossed and not every i was dotted,
but the job was done. On the other hand, in dealing with its indig-
enous landlord system India faltered, and very often badly, both in
content of the measures and in their implementation. The nation is
not without its bright spots, but security of tenure, rent reduc-
tion, and landlord ceiling provisions have not been successfully
implemented on the greater part of India's 80 million acres of
tenanted land. In fact, perhaps as many tenants have lost their
tenancies as have been made secure on the land through deliberate
rather than accidentally faulty legislation. Such states as Bombay
and Uttar Pradesh have demonstrated that, given strong and willing
leadership, many of the reform problems can be dealt with success-
fully. But where antireform sentiment prevails, as it often does in
Indian state legislatures, vague and complicated measures generously
seeded with loopholes, delays in legislative enactment, failure to
inform the peasants what the law is about, enforcement officers who
behave as if reforms are not meant to be enforced, and refusal to
enlist the support of the farmer in helping carry out the program--
all these become the rule rather than the exception. With varia-
tions the same is true of a great many other countries.
THE JAPANESE EXAMPLE
Japan and Taiwan, on the other hand, proceeded with their re-
forms with no vacillation or half measures. They developed their
own techniques of initiating and enforcing reform. That the Ameri-
can occupation in one case and the loss of mainland China in the
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other were important elements in fashioning the reforms does not
invalidate the proposition that above all else a favorable politi-
cal climate is the precondition of a sound reform and its implemen-
tation. In such an atmosphere even the would-be nonenforcers become
enforcers, and technical difficulties are only challenges to be re-
solved. To be sure, reform has an element of coercion. This is so
because the key to the implementation of any reform that transfers
property and privilege from one group to another is the degree to
which the controlling political forces of a country are willing to
support these revolutionary changes and ready to use all instruments
of government to attain their goals. Government coercion, then,
whether practiced or implied, is virtually unavoidable. But so long
as this kind of a political wind is conspicuous by its absence, a
meaningful reform intended to meet some of the minimum needs of ten-
ants can be neither properly initiated nor carried out.
Even well-drafted measures in a pro-reform atmosphere cannot
be easily enforced if the task is left solely to the bureaucracy.
There are never enough bureaucrats and reform experts to go around;
the experts become experts only in the process of application of
the reform. If a reform is to be carried out successfully, it must
win the active participation of the people directly affected by the
reform, the farmers, who best know the conditions of their rural
community. With the exception of Japan and Taiwan, this principle
has not been recognized by most countries currently engaged in re-
form activities.
Japan is the pioneer in entrusting the villagers with the
lion's share of the implementation of the reform. A close look at
the Japanese experience is very instructive, for it carries a lesson
that other countries might well ponder. The device created by Japan
for the administration of the reform at the village level is the
local land commission made up of five tenants, three landlords, and
two owner-cultivators--all elected by their respective groups. The
preponderance of tenants was a deliberate move based on the theory
that if only one owner-cultivator sides with them a working majority
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is ensured for the commission. The commissions were entrusted with
the actual purchase and sale of land. They had broad powers that
they could exercise with a minimum of governmental interference.
These included: drafting the purchase plan for each village, deter-
mining the suitability of the land to be purchased, establishing
the eligibility of purchasers, deciding cases requiring unusual or
special treatment, and appraising cases of exemption from the pur-
chase provisions. The Japanese scheme was based on the fact that no
staff could have been gathered to deal quickly with the transfer of
30-40 million plots of land and that only the local people knew at
a glance who was who in the village, who owned what land, who leased
land and how much, and so forth. The work of the local commissions,
coupled with the successful effort to bring to the attention of the
farmers the basic points of the reform, more than justified antici-
pations. It is questionable if the reform could have been carried
out so speedily and in such orderly fashion but for the local land
commissions. The duties they performed were an important form of
adult education and served to stimulate new leadership. Tenant mem-
bers who were ill at ease and insecure at the beginning of the ex-
ercise were seasoned performers a year or two later. The very crea-
tion of the commissions enabled all the adult farm population to
vote on a matter of utmost concern to all groups in the village. At
the same time the composition of the commissions proclaimed the
fact that the tenants' interests were to be protected by the ten-
ants themselves rather than by someone acting on their behalf within
the traditional pattern of rural Japan. At the height of the reform
approximately 150,000 commissioners received this kind of special
leadership training; and half of them were tenants. The prereform
contention that only landlords could exercise leadership, make de-
cisions, and administer the community proved baseless.
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THE NEED FOR FARMER PARTICIPATION
It may be argued that what Japan could do with a literate
farm population is not possible in other countries with less liter-
ate farmers. But even illiterate farmers know their own condition
and that of others in their community. A judge in court may dispute
a farmer's occupancy right because he lacks a written contract, but
there is hardly a village where the tenants, like the Japanese ten-
ants, do not know the details of the existing pattern of tenure.
This knowledge, if enlisted through some sort of organization (not
necessarily the Japanese type), could greatly aid any reform effort.
So far, farmer involvement has been conspicuous by its absence un-
less, as in Bolivia, farmers deal with reform in their own spontane-
ous fashion. So long as the would-be beneficiaries are treated as
mere onlookers, often ignorant of even the ABC's of the reform meas-
ure, the reform cannot succeed. The widespread assumption that only
white-collar officials can administer a reform is an idea best laid
to rest. Reform, if effective, must be carried out at the village
level, and the participation of the farmers in an affair that af-
fects them deeply is one of the vital conditions for translating a
reform from paper to reality.
REFORM AND PRODUCTIVITY
Just as insecure and difficult tenure conditions make for low
productivity, it is often assumed that agrarian reform with owner-
ship as its objective makes for higher productivity. This is in
tune with Arthur Young's statement in the eighteenth century that
"townership is the magic that turns sand into gold." It flows from
the idea that investments and productivity are promoted through the
incentive of private, individual ownership of land. This assumption
may or may not be correct depending upon the circumstances surround-
ing the fact of ownership. In Latin America, for example, many a
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private owner of a hacienda has not proved to be a good producer--
and many a small owner has done no better.
While it is easy to postulate that landownership stimulates
productivity, it is extremely difficult to measure its actual ef-
fect. While assessment of output is comparatively simple, the con-
tribution of a land distribution program to productivity cannot be
separated with any degree of accuracy from that of other factors
affecting output. But a close interrelationship between agrarian
reform and productivity does exist if agrarian reform stands for
ownership of the land or secure tenure and such supporting elements
as land improvement, irrigation, credit, marketing, and so on. With-
out these added inputs agrarian reform is not necessarily the touch-
stone to a new owner's increased output and higher standard of liv-
ing.
The pervading spirit of enthusiasm that comes with reform and
the will to make the most of the awaited land of one's own are im-
portant incentives to production; they play an indispensable role
when the supporting services are there to play their role. The ex-
periences of Japan, Taiwan, Italy, Egypt, and India provide ample
evidence that agrarian reform and productivity go hand in hand under
these conditions. Therefore, if the anticipations of the benefici-
aries of agrarian reform are not to be thwarted, a government pro-
moting a reform must be prepared at least in the initial stages to
invest in a variety of other measures that promote agricultural
productivity. On the other hand, efforts to promote agricultural
productivity where tenancy reforms are long overdue are likely to
be adversely affected by the existing tenure system. Unless new in-
puts come to overburdened tenants as a gift or under exceptionally
favorable terms, the chances are that they cannot afford to inno-
vate. The reaction of the tenants to the Package Program in India
is a case in point. It follows that agencies concerned with ways of
building a technical and organizational base for raising productiv-
ity must be equally concerned with the problem of reforming exist-
ing tenures when these constitute a problem.
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SOCIAL STATUS AND POLITICAL STABILITY
Agrarian reform in its inclusive sense stands for salutary
changes in social status and political stability. In Western Europe
the changes in tenurial conditions from feudalism to our own day
amply demonstrate this view. The changes in Japan since the imple-
mentation of the reform tell the same story. The Japanese case
carries implications for underdeveloped countries as well. A reform
worthy of its name is supposed to strengthen the principle of pri-
vate property where it was weakest, at the base of the social pyra-
mid. By multiplying the number of independent landowning peasants
there comes into being a middle-of-the-road, stable rural society
with enhanced status, rights, and privileges. Government then can-
not take the peasantry for granted but must perforce pay close at-
tention to the desires of the countryside. This has happened in
Japan to a degree unknown in Japanese history, and it reflects the
rise in social and political status of the peasantry due to agrarian
reform.
Reform can narrow the traditional differences in the class
structure of the village. As the tenants step up, the landlords
step down. As the landlord loses much of his affluence, he loses
much of his influence. This does not presuppose that the resident
landlord is completely displaced or that it is necessary to elimin-
ate him altogether. What is taking place now in the Japanese vil-
lage is the sharing of power between the old and the new leadership.
Both are meeting now on the agricultural committees, cooperative
and school boards, and in village offices. They rub elbows dealing
with common problems. This is a new and welcome development. Japan's
agriculture after the reform still is a marginal enterprise with
acre and two-acre farmers. It needs all the available skills and
social peace and stability to deal with the reality of six million
farmers on 15-16 million acres of land. This new leadership and the
idea of citizenship rights were both foreign to prereform Japan.
The passing away of the old reality of second-class citizenship is
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a symbol of the new social order and of greater political maturity
and independence. The latter expresses itself in the attitude of
the full-fledged citizen toward a government or a party in or out
of power. Unlike prereform days, voters pick and choose according
to their economic interest. The candidate's own proven concern with
farm conditions and the record of his party's agricultural policies
are decisive. Whatever action a government in power may choose to
take with respect to the price of agricultural products, fertilizer
prices, scope of land improvement work, and short- or long-term
credit funds now affects the distribution of the vote. No longer is
the vote delivered en bloc. Clearly, "We support those who support
us" has a modern democratic ring, and it can be traced to the social
and political changes ushered in by the agrarian reform.
So it is in Japan, but it need not be only in Japan, due al-
lowance being made for different conditions from country to country.
If an agrarian reform is imbued with the meaning ascribed to it
here, then, whether it be India or Egypt, Mexico or Peru, changes
in social status and political attitudes in the countryside are
inevitable. And a government's response to these changes is likely
also to be inevitable if remaining in power requires popular sup-
port of the peasantry.
PROSPECTS OF AGRARIAN REFORM
In the past two decades "agrarian reform" has come to epito-
mize the problems and hopes of rural people in Asia, the Middle
East, and Latin America. In Asia the issue of reform has long
since moved from the talking phase to that of action. The old order
in the countryside is under attack--vigorously in very few coun-
tries, much less so and with results to match in many more. From
the record to date, it might be concluded that only in critical con-
ditions, such as defeat in war for Japan or the escape of the Chin-
ese Nationalist government from China to Taiwan, can far-reaching
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agrarian reforms be carried out. India disproves this thesis at
least in part, as does Egypt in the Middle East. Even in Latin
America legislation has been enacted here and there, and the sub-
ject is no longer taboo but has become a burning issue. Admittedly,
however, a wide gap exists between the anticipations engendered by
the agrarian reform movement and its realizations.
What of the future? The answer lies in a combination of an
act of faith and certain realities that are likely to induce a more
vigorous prosecution of reform in the days ahead. While village com-
munities seem to carry on as of old, the winds of change blowing
from all directions are bound to affect them, and the bonds of cus-
tom are bound to weaken. In India there are already numerous devia-
tions from the norm, entire districts "going places," reaching out
for horizons that only yesterday seemed unattainable. These are
still only "islands within," but the drastic changes they presage
will at some point touch upon the expectations of all groups of
Indian rural society, including the large tenant class. Impatience
with present conditions is very likely to come to the fore. Whether
in an organized or disorganized form, whether through the due proc-
ess of law or revolutionary upheaval, the change will come--and not
only in India--and an all-inclusive agrarian reform will be part of
it. This is the faith part of the argument.
PRESSURES FOR REFORM
Agrarian reform will continue to command attention and ulti-
mately action for other reasons. The areas we are discussing are
agriculturally underdeveloped, particularly in foodstuffs. There is
growing recognition that agricultural production must be increased
if the standard of living of the producers is to be raised and if
capital is to be accumulated for over-all economic development. In
landlord-ridden countries there is a rising awareness that agricul-
tural progress depends upon a set of incentives that the existing
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land tenure systems do not provide. This recognition may yet prove
to be the augury of the kind of action that makes the difference
between reform and "reform." Willingly or unwillingly many coun-
tries have been preoccupied with agrarian reform and have drafted
reform legislation. Even though its content is faulty and incom-
plete and its execution poor, the mere existence of the legislation
serves notice to the landlords that the issue will not just go away,
and that better legislation and enforcement may be fashioned at a
later date. Evasion of the ceiling, as in India, does not destroy
it as a potentially serious attack on the status quo. Landlords
recognize this. They know that their tug-of-war with the tenants is
far from over, and many landlords would dispose of their land for
something less than its market price. They recognize that the old
order in the countryside is not what it used to be and that their
best days are over. How soon or how late all these elements will be
brought to bear in a more drastic effort to redress the position of
the landless still is up to the governments in power. If willing
and wise, they can speed up the process; barring that, somebody else
will take over this long-overdue task, and much more will be at
stake than a new rearrangement of income distribution and status in
the countryside.
REFORM IS NOT A PANACEA
We must recognize that in overpopulated rural areas an agrar-
ian reform, even with all the supporting services, cannot solve all
the problems standing in the way of a better livelihood and greater
production. Where the pressure of population on limited land re-
sources is great, agrarian reform can do nothing to change the land-
man ratio. With no alternative occupation outside of the village,
the rise in the farm population is bound to reduce the size of hold-
ings still further and to increase the number of farms as sons and
grandsons take over. These limitations are obvious even in prosper-
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ous Japan. While in the United States between 1920 and 1957 the
number of farm units was reduced by 22 per cent and the working
farm population by nearly 40 per cent, in Japan during the same
period both categories increased by 10 per cent despite the coun-
try's striking industrial upsurge. The current prosperity of Japan-
ese agriculture cannot hide these harsh realities. Japan's nonagri-
cultural economy has served as a safety valve by providing the farm-
ers with 40-50 per cent of their income. Clearly this is not pos-
sible in developing nations without substantial nonagricultural
economies.
Agrarian reform in such conditions is not a final solution of
the farmer's or nation's problems. Rather it does away with the
worst features of a system that has outlived its usefulness econom-
ically, socially, and politically. Reform provides a partial escape
from the severe handicaps of a resourceless small-scale agricultural
economy pressed upon by a large farm population. It is a means of
elevating the human condition. We may arrange for all the material
supplies of water, seeds, fertilizers, implements, and credit. But
we cannot give the peasant the psychological incentives he needs
unless he is secure on the land, particularly on land that belongs
to him, for uncertainty in this regard is one of the great disin-
centives under which a farmer labors. In any attempt to provide a
better material and organizational base for the rural sector the
solution of the land tenure issue is the clearing of the ground,
the preparatory step for all else, the sum total of which raises
agricultural productivity.
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